FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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HAS BRITAIN A POLICY?

By Harold Nicolson

"AND how," inquired a visitor to Sans Souci in 1768, "how would Your Majesty define the English system?"

"The English," snapped Frederick the Great, "*have* no system."

The events of the last six months might appear to confirm this apophthegm.

Yet is it reasonable to suppose that the greatest Empire which the world has ever known has in fact been maintained, as well as created, in a mood of absent-mindedness? Can it be seriously contended that this little dot of land to the west of an Asiatic peninsula has, by mere unconscious cerebration, spread and consolidated one of the few enduring civilizations in human history? Is it really credible that responsibilities as vast as those which have been inherited by the present generation of islanders have not imposed some theory of policy, some habit of extroverted mind? These habits may be little more than congenital instincts. Yet what *are* those instincts? Are they as valid today as they were before the war? Has the establishment of democratic control of foreign policy rendered these instincts sectional and confused? Is Great Britain abandoning her former directives? Or is the present stage of volatile confusion merely transitional and occasioned only by sudden shiftings in the balances of European power?

Such are the questions which impose themselves today and which, in this article, I shall endeavor to examine.

I am well aware that it would be more expedient for me to postpone what I write until the very last moment before it must go to press. The events of the next few weeks may well disprove my analysis. Yet wisdom after the event is a penurious form of wisdom. It is more stimulating, and in fact more useful, to choose a date (let it be this tenth of May 1936) at which the future of

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British policy is still obscure; and to examine that obscurity in terms of the probable. What, in other words, are the elements of the present confusion and into what pattern of policy is the present jumble of shapeless factors most likely to fall? The course of the next two months may, or may not, give a conclusive answer to that question; let us examine our uncertainties as they stand today.

As a basis for such an examination I shall take one of the most considered and intelligent definitions of British policy ever made. On January 1, 1907, Sir Eyre Crowe — at that time head of the Western Department of the Foreign Office — wrote a confidential memorandum upon Anglo-German relations. This memorandum has since been published.[1] It embodies a careful definition of the historical principles of British policy as well as an acute analysis of German intentions. Let me summarize the main points of the Crowe memorandum and then consider to what extent the fundamentals which he discovered are valid in this postwar world.

II

Sir Eyre Crowe took as his axiom the incontestable premise that British policy was determined by geography. On the one hand you had a small island situated on the exposed flank of Europe. On the other hand you had a vast Empire stretching tremulously across the world. The law of self-preservation necessitated the maintenance of the food supplies of the island and the safety of its communications with its overseas Empire. This dual necessity in its turn implied preponderance of sea-power against any possible enemy.

This maritime preponderance would, if abused, arouse feelings of resentment and jealousy throughout the world. It must therefore be exercised with the utmost benevolence and with the minimum of provocation. It must be "closely identified with the primary and vital interests of a majority of other nations." What were these primary interests? The first was independence, the second was trade. British policy must therefore maintain the open door and free trade, and it must at the same time show "a direct and positive interest" in the independence of small na-

[1] Cf. Gooch and Temperley, "British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898–1914," V. III, p. 397–420. The memorandum has also been published as a pamphlet by "Friends of Europe," 122, St. Stephen's House, Westminster, London, S. W. 1.

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tions. Great Britain must thus recognize herself as the "natural enemy" of any country threatening the independence of smaller countries. The doctrine of the "Balance of Power" thus assumed for Great Britain a constant form. It meant that she must be "opposed to the political dictatorship of the strongest single State or group of States at any given time." This opposition Crowe defined as "a law of nature."

Having in this way laid down the basic principles of British policy, Sir Eyre Crowe then examined how those principles applied to Anglo-German relations as they stood on that January 1, 1907. He started from the assumption that since 1871 the "Prussian spirit" had been the directive force in German politics. He defined that spirit as follows:

> In no other country is there a conviction so deeply rooted in the very body and soul of all classes of the population that the preservation of national rights and the realization of national ideals rest absolutely on the readiness of every citizen in the last resort to stake himself and his State on their assertion and vindication.

He then traced the development of the German national ideal from the conception of a United Germany as a strong Power in Europe to the later conception of Germany as a World Power with "her place in the sun." He indicated that this latter conception took two forms. The first was that contained in the formula the "*Ausbreitung des deutschen Volkstums*," which he defined as "vague and undefined schemes of Teutonic expansion." The second manifested itself in "self-assertiveness" and in the theory that Germany, by acquiring what we now call "nuisance-value," could secure that no great international problem could be settled without her consent.

Sir Eyre Crowe then passed to the consideration whether Germany was aiming at that political hegemony which, as a "law of nature," would incur the opposition of Great Britain. He doubted whether that could be her *conscious* intention, since a prerequisite of any such policy would be initial good relations with Great Britain. "Its success," he wrote, "must depend very materially on England's remaining blind to it and being kept in good humor until the moment arrived for striking the blow fatal to her power." Yet Germany, in 1907, so far from conciliating Great Britain, was doing everything within her power to outrage British opinion. Sir Eyre Crowe concluded, therefore, that Germany's policy "is in reality no more than the

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expression of a vague, confused, and unpractical statesmanship, not fully realizing its own drift." Germany, he argued, "does not really know what she is driving at" and this, in his view, explained the "erratic, domineering and often frankly aggressive" spirit which the policy of the Wilhelmstrasse displayed. Only by her blind ignorance of her own course could he account for "the impetuous mobility, the bewildering surprises, and the heedless disregard of the susceptibilities of other people" so characteristic of German prewar policy.

Students of the Bülow memoirs, of the "Grosse Politik," or of such works as Haller's "Die Aera Bülow" or Theodor Wolff's "Vorspiel," will realize how brilliantly correct was Sir Eyre Crowe's diagnosis. I propose to take this diagnosis as the basis for my examination of British, as of German, policy some thirty years later.

III

Let me begin with Germany. How far is Sir Eyre Crowe's diagnosis applicable to the Third Reich?

It would be agreed, I suppose, that the "Prussian spirit," as defined by Sir Eyre Crowe, is still the dominant emotional impulse in Nazi Germany. "It is an axiom," he wrote in 1907, "of the Prussian faith that right must be backed by force." The whole of Hitler's policy is based upon this assumption.

It would be agreed, again, that Teutonic expansion is still an aim of Berlin policy, nor would any observer of the German idea question the general applicability to modern times of Sir Eyre Crowe's definition of that faith:

> But the vague and undefined schemes of Teutonic expansion ("die Ausbreitung des deutschen Volkstums") are but the expression of the deeply rooted feeling that Germany has by the strength and purity of her national purpose, the fervor of her patriotism, the depth of her religious feeling, the high standard of competency, and the perspicuous honesty of her administration, the successful pursuit of every branch of public and scientific activity, and the elevated character of her philosophy, art, and ethics, established for herself the right to assert the primacy of German national ideals.

It would be accepted also that the old nervous mobility, the old undue suspiciousness, the old passion for dramatic trials of strength ("*Kraftprobe*") and the old national touchiness are still features of German foreign policy.

Must it be contended, therefore, that Germany has learnt nothing from the ordeals of the last twenty years and that for all

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purposes of policy we find ourselves back in 1907 and faced again with the alternatives of German hegemony or of a second German War?

The pessimist would argue that all the factors which contributed to the conflagration of 1914 are present in modern Germany and in an even more extravagant form. The directors of German policy are today every whit as irresponsible as were Bülow or William II and far more ignorant. Public opinion is every whit as gullible and every whit as subject to mass hallucinations. Criticism is stifled as never before. The old self-assertiveness, the old gestures of provocation to right and left, are again beginning to make their appearance. The appalling unreliability of German honor has been emphasized rather than diminished. Germany still claims to be a law unto herself. "Nobody except the German people," exclaimed Göring at Dortmund, "have the right to decide whether Germany has acted correctly or not." Nor is there any diminution of the former disregard of ultimate consequences which brought the Second Reich to so sudden a doom. "I go the way which fate has shown me," screamed Hitler recently, "with all the certainty of a somnambulist." This "*nachtwandlerische Sicherheit*" on the part of a dictator is not a reassuring symptom. Germany of today has, moreover, far less to lose and far more to gain. And behind it all is the dread destiny of all dictatorships which can only succeed by excess. There is thus some justification for the pessimist's contention.

It might be argued also that the main difference which distinguishes the policy of Hitler from that of Bülow is in itself a proof of sinister intention. It will be remembered that Sir Eyre Crowe dismissed the theory that Germany was consciously aiming at European and ultimately at world hegemony on the ground that if that were her purpose she would strain every nerve to lull Great Britain into quiescence until the time was ripe. Bülow omitted nothing which was calculated to render the British Empire hostile and alert. Hitler, for his part, omits nothing which can attract British sentiment. His every gesture, his every speech, is calculated to flatter British vanity and to reassure our anxieties regarding his intentions. The pessimist would argue that this proves that the Third Reich has learnt at least one lesson from the war — namely, that Germany must firmly establish her hegemony over Europe before she can hope to challenge Great Britain for the leadership of the world.

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The German plan, according to this pessimist, is fully apparent. She has occupied the Rhineland zone and so soon as (with the assistance of British opinion) she has forced France to consent to the construction of a German "Maginot Line," she will be safe upon her western border. She will then turn to the East. A Nazi rising at Vienna will be the prelude for the absorption of Austria and for the encirclement of Czechoslovakia. Hungary will be forced into the system and German influence will then become paramount over the Czechs, the Rumanians and the Jugoslavs. Poland will then be obliged to come to a decision and could look for but little help from France. Having thereby achieved *Mittel-Europa*, Germany would think again of the *Drang Nach Osten*. Bulgaria would be glad to assist her. Greece would be too weak to protest. From such a position Germany could gather within her reach the Dardanelles, the Bosphorus and the rich grainlands of the Ukraine. It would be only when she had entrenched herself in such a position that she would turn westwards and deal with England and France. And then, in its unutterable horror, would come the Second German War.

It would be unwise to dismiss this nightmare as a mere fantasy of a distressed mind. That such a scheme is at the core of present German policy is the firm conviction of the French. This conviction is passionately shared by France's Eastern associates. Only in London is it regarded with a certain cloudy skepticism. Are we in fact too optimistic?

A perusal of "Mein Kampf" would furnish some grounds for such a theory. In that strange work (the English edition of which has been shorn of its more menacing passages), Hitler lays it down that the aim of German policy is to acquire more "*Grund und Boden*," more "earth and territory," in Eastern Europe. This area for the expansion of the German people can be found "in the first place in Russia and the subject states upon her borders." Yet how can such expansion be carried out unless Germany acquires protection for her rear ("*Rückendeckung*") as against France? France is defined in "Mein Kampf" as our "mortal enemy." "The pitiless and undying enemy of Germany," writes Hitler, "is, and remains, France." Now France can only be neutralized by acquiring the support of England and Italy. To obtain that support Germany should be prepared to endure any sacrifice or humiliation. She must lull England and Italy into a sense of security and obtain their support. "In this way," writes

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Hitler, "Germany would be given a chance of preparing without interference for a final settlement with France." Having in this manner disposed of France, Germany could then turn to the East and acquire the necessary "*Grund und Boden*." True it is that such territory belongs to other people. Yet Germany must be conscious of her destiny. "Above all," writes Hitler, "we are not policemen charged with the duty of protecting poor little nations; we are the soldiers of our own nation." And as the ultimate justification remains the terrible old formula of "*Weltmacht oder Niedergang*." "Germany," proclaims Hitler, "must either become a World Power or cease completely to exist."

These pronouncements are disturbing enough. Yet there is something to be said on the optimistic side.

Even supposing that Herr Hitler's "destiny" assumes such shapes in his more somnambulistic moments, the scheme is one of such gigantic implications that it would take many years to complete. Nor would it fail to meet with active opposition from Russia, the smaller states and possibly France and Belgium. Before we accept such a course as inevitable it is well to glance at the proportions of power which could be arrayed against it. Even if we assume that Great Britain could remain isolated, these figures represent great power. France, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, Jugoslavia and Soviet Russia could place nearly seven million men in the field and provide some six thousand five hundred front line aëroplanes. Germany could scarcely equip an army of much more than half a million, and even at the highest estimate her front line aëroplanes would not number more than one thousand five hundred. It is doubtful whether Hitler, even in moments of extreme somnambulism, would openly challenge such a coalition. The Reichswehr, who still hold the trump cards in Germany, are determined not to expose the German army to a second defeat. Nor is it necessary even now to eliminate the League of Nations as a factor in the slow but progressive compulsion of the rule of law.

Were we dealing with rational people it should be possible, therefore, to dismiss the idea of immediate German hegemony as a mere daydream on the part of certain French and German publicists. But Germany is not today a rational country. Allowance must always be made for the mass hysteria of the modern German, and of his infinite lust for self-immolation. Suicide can never be ruled out when one is dealing with suicidal maniacs.

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Yet in all probability the course of German policy will be less torrential than that indicated above. German concentration on the *Drang nach Osten* will be diluted by other desires. There will be the desire to include all "Germans" (even Danish or Swiss citizens) within the orbit of the Reich. There will be the desire for colonial prestige and the place in the sun. To some slight extent these desires will cancel themselves out.

Nor should one underestimate the fact that Europe (even Great Britain) is far more aware of what constitutes the Prussian spirit than it was in 1913. Hitler, in so far as British opinion is concerned, has succeeded with his Rhineland coup and will probably succeed with his amalgamation of Austria; but a series of such trials of strength will in the end arouse to a sense of danger even the placid optimism of the British. Should that happen, our public (which is becoming conscious that Germany can in the last resort be restrained only by force) may unwillingly be stirred by instincts of self-preservation. And once again Germany, by her arrogant fault, will have created her own encirclement.

IV

If, then, the spirit of German policy has in effect changed but little since Sir Eyre Crowe made his famous diagnosis of 1907, can it be said with equal certitude that his definition of the principles of British policy has today lost none of its validity?

The axioms remain the same. Geography is still the determining factor and self-preservation the determining instinct. The Channel is still but twenty-five miles wide. Sea-power coupled with resistance to any hegemony in Europe are still the two main foundations upon which British policy should be based. How comes it, then, that a policy founded upon such clear and unvarying necessities has of late appeared to vacillate and lose its sense of direction? The answers to these questions can, I think, be grouped under two main headings. In the first place there has occurred, since 1907, an alteration in the national will. In the second place certain new factors have obtruded since 1907, the exact force of which we are still unable nationally to estimate. Thus on the one hand we are less positive than we once were regarding the validity of our own purposes; and on the other hand the pursuit of these purposes has become infinitely

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more difficult. At the very moment when our desire has diminished, our obstructions have increased.

Let me first consider this alteration, or this shift of incidence, in our national will.

When in 1907 Sir Eyre Crowe composed his memorandum, he could count upon certain generally accepted fundamentals. He would have assumed, for instance, that the majority of the British electorate were what was then called "patriotic." This meant that the government could count upon an ultimate national determination to defend, not only our soil and our imperial communications, but also what was known as "our rights and interests." This vague expression was at that time the British equivalent of what the Nazis now term "national honor." It was a most elastic formula, and therefore a most dangerous one.

Nor was this the only assumption upon which Sir Eyre Crowe based his memorandum. He would have taken it for granted that in the event of war our home-lands and our capital were to all intents and purposes unassailable. And he would have assumed that the British Navy, by sheer force of tonnage and gun-power, would in the end enforce the capitulation of our enemies. Which, indirectly and most protractedly, was what in the ultimate event occurred. Yet our victory entailed upon the electorate a strain which they had not expected. And today they are fully conscious that in the next war this strain will be infinitely more acute.

Nor is this the only change. It is not only that the enhanced influence of left-wing opinion has caused the old ideals to be associated in many minds with aristocratic government; it is that the upper classes themselves have to some extent lost the old imperial habit in their fear of social disturbance. Nor, in these days of submarines, mines and aircraft, is our reliance on the Navy as an immediate protector and an ultimate victor as unquestioning as it was before the war.

To these symptoms of an alteration (it would be a mistake to call it a decline) in national will-power has been added since the war a deep and wide current of pacifism. In 1907 the majority of the British people regarded war as a final solution which, however unpleasant it might be, affected only a prepared section of the population, and furnished opportunities for heroism and glory. Today, there is scarcely a man or woman who suffers from any such illusion. On the one hand we now know that war, even for the victorious, is almost unbearable; on the other hand

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we are all too conscious that in the next war it will be the whole people, and not only the armies, who are exposed to danger and suffering. It may be said without question that in England today the very conception of war is execrated even as it is execrated in the United States. This feeling, which cannot be disregarded by any government, unsettles the whole foundation of Sir Eyre Crowe's assumptions, since in the last resort his principles depended for their execution upon the employment of national force.

These dual tendencies, on the one hand towards a lessening of imperial ambition, and on the other to an enormous increase of extreme pacificism, have been encouraged by two factors which were not seriously operative in 1907.

On the one hand, the emergence of Oriental nationalism, added to a general increase in humanitarian ideas, have rendered the exercise of Empire at once more difficult and less popular. On the other hand our sense of insular security has, since the war, largely disappeared. The public are dimly aware that in April 1917 the German submarine campaign almost brought us to the verge of starvation. Although they also know that the submarine peril can nowadays be kept within bounds, yet they have a very vivid consciousness that today the predominance of big battleships is by no means certain or swift. At the same time they have come to suspect that London is, of all great capitals, the most vulnerable to air attack, and they no longer look upon the Channel as a moat of safety but regard it as a vital area which, owing to its liquid condition, provides no basis for aërial defense. Their idealistic pacifism is thus fortified and increased by a perfectly vivid consciousness that our own island is no longer immune from attack.

V

It will be seen, therefore, that that skepticism, that sense of relativity, that disbelief in the absolute, which has shifted the former firm foundations of religion and ethics has also dislocated the basis upon which Sir Eyre Crowe's principles rested. British democracy demands today a greater control over foreign policy than it ever expected to exercise in 1907. It is fully conscious of the rights of sovereignty but it is not as yet fully aware of those duties of thought and responsibility which those rights imply. It thus endeavors to influence policy in terms of momentary

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emotion without troubling overmuch to translate that emotion into terms of thought. And in this process it is encouraged and at the same time misled by the sensationalism and wayward theory of the popular press.

The foreign observer may be tempted to exaggerate these symptoms. He may incline to interpret our pacifism as a purely negative defeatism of the "peace at any price" form. He may deduce from our present aversion from all European entanglements a general and lasting desire for isolation. He may be so impressed by the present wave of "pro-German" and "anti-French" feeling that he will mistake this for a strong tide of public opinion leading to some new orientation. He may imagine that the increasing independence of the Dominions, the increasing difficulty of administering alien races, our extreme preoccupation with internal social problems, mean the approaching end, not of imperialism only, but also of Empire. And he may conclude that Great Britain, having at long last become a complete democracy, is no longer strong-willed or even interested enough to maintain her vast responsibilities. Such a judgment would, in my opinion, be superficial or at least premature. For behind all the oscillations of recent opinion, behind the haze of our incertitudes, one can still detect the slow but steady beat of our hereditary principles. These principles are no longer identical with those laid down in 1907 in the Crowe memorandum. They are less ambitious and less extensive. How far can they be traced through the inconsistencies and fluctuations of the last six months?

Let us shortly recall those inconsistencies. In September last Sir Samuel Hoare, then Foreign Secretary, pledged us publicly to the whole-hearted support of the League of Nations. The General Election of November proved that in this policy the National Government had the practically unanimous support of the country. In December came the Hoare-Laval agreement, which was interpreted by public opinion as an abandonment of League principles. The ensuing outburst of indignation was so immediate and universal that Mr. Baldwin was forced to apologize and Sir Samuel Hoare was forced to resign. To many of us this demonstration of public will was a remarkable event; it has been characterized by Sir Alfred Zimmern in the pages of this review as "a turning point in the history of the democratic control of foreign affairs." It appeared to the whole world that Brit-

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ish opinion was prepared to face any sacrifice in order to demonstrate that the rule of violence in international relations had been replaced by the rule of law.

On March 7 last Hitler committed a violent and unprovoked attack upon the rule of law. He tore up a Treaty which Germany had signed of her own volition and for which, at the time of signature, she had received great benefits. Yet in the face of this aggression the British public remained unmoved. When the French claimed that on this occasion also the rule of law must be reëstablished by collective action, the British public accused them of being "legalistic." It was due solely to the courage and integrity of Mr. Anthony Eden that Great Britain, during those anxious days, was saved from an actual breach of faith.

On this May 10, 1936, it seems plain that Mussolini will succeed in imposing upon Ethiopia a capitulation far more onerous than anything suggested in the Hoare-Laval proposals. Will British opinion continue to manifest the same righteous indignation which it manifested in December last? The provocation, owing to Mussolini's use of poison gas to effect his victories, is more flagrant than before. But the wave of fury that burst in December appears today to have spent its force.

These fluctuations within a short period of six months would seem to indicate that British opinion has lost all sense of direction and is guided only by the squalls of momentary passion. Yet behind all this oscillation there lies a certain instinctive judgment, which, although almost inarticulate, is not wholly selfish and not wholly unsound. What is that instinctive judgment?

VI

The British people have for long realized that the world is divided between those countries which believe in the rule of law and those which believe in the rule of force. Until quite recently they hoped that the former, in that they were more numerous and powerful, would be able to restrain the latter. They believed also that these restrictions could be imposed by the pacific pressure of economic sanctions applied collectively under mandate from the League of Nations. The Japanese, and above all the Abyssinian, episodes have now convinced them that when dealing with a strong and audacious country something more than pacific pressure must be applied.

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What is that "something more"? The British people realize today that in our endeavor to set an example of disarmament we weakened ourselves to a point where our physical authority became insufficient to support our moral authority. They recognize, although most unwillingly, that we must rearm against the aggressive countries, and that such rearmament represents a step backwards. They are determined, however, that Europe shall not fall back into the old system of armed alliances leading to war. They thus regard our rearmament as a temporary expedient to reinforce our moral or pacific authority. And they insist that the League idea and the principle of collective security should be maintained. Beyond these vague hopes they have not the mental energy or courage to imagine further.

Obviously it is for the rulers of British opinion to lead the public towards that further conception. Several different roads now present themselves. Shall we adopt isolation, sever ourselves from all League entanglements, and merely proclaim a "Monroe doctrine" to the effect that an unprovoked attack upon French, Belgian or Dutch territory will be taken as an attack upon themselves? Shall we adopt a "realistic" policy and contend that the League must be reformed on a basis of areas of certainty applying to regional interests? Under this system every Great Power would pledge itself to use force in defense of the League only over a certain limited area coincident with its own national interests. In all other areas it would merely pledge itself to render to the League moral and economic support. Or shall we endeavor to recreate collective security by building up a real striking force at the disposal of the League and by ear-marking for such a force a certain proportion of our navy, army and air force?

The first alternative would in fact mean that we surrendered Eastern Europe to German hegemony and thereby secured peace, perhaps only for a single generation, with the certainty of an eventually disastrous war. The third alternative would not furnish that certainty in international affairs which is the basis of any feeling of security. How, for instance, could we be positive that in the event of a German attack upon Memel, the British public would really send detachments to fight for Lithuania? It is thus, in all probability, upon the second alternative that general opinion in this country will concentrate. Under that alternative we promise nothing that we should, when the moment came, be unlikely to perform. And from such a basis of comparative cer-

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tainty we might be able to reconstruct a new temple of sanity and peace.

Let it be assumed, as we must I think assume, that in this Italian venture we have failed miserably. Clearly there have been mistakes of intention and of action. It would be an error, none the less, to suppose that this failure will lead to a completely new course. As a whole, the public realize that our failure was due to no serious diplomatic fault of our own. They fully appreciate the fact that Mr. Eden has been wise, courageous and consistent. And they are comforted by another even more important fact. We, being a democracy, can stand this humiliation with but a blink of our left eyelid; no dictatorship could survive such a diplomatic defeat; we are, therefore, stronger in the end than any dictatorship.

And can it be questioned, in the last resort, that France and Great Britain stand together, not merely geographically, but spiritually? Surely it must be generally recognized that whatever our faults and differences we do, in fact, stand for a type of human theory higher than that of Mussolini or Göring. The dictators may, by the use of violence, triumph temporarily. Yet, with all our muddle-headedness, we know that the conscience of mankind will, if we remain calm and generous, be overwhelmingly upon our side.

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IMPERIALISM AND COMMUNISM

By N. Bukharin

IT IS well known that people have sometimes talked prose without having the least idea what it is. This holds true not only of characters in French literature but also of professional politicians. Thus at the present time a regular epidemic of discussion is raging in certain sections of the capitalist press in the effort to find explanations for the acts of aggression which again threaten to rack the world with war. And they are being discovered in natural factors — territory, raw materials, growth of population. These are considered quite apart from the economic form of society and the political superstructure in which it finds expression. In this parlance, Germany, Italy, Japan are "nations without land." The natural growth of the population of these states necessarily leads to a hunt for new land and more raw materials. Here, according to this view, lie the roots of the future war. It is fate, historical destiny. And the only salvation lies in a redivision of territory.

A plan of this sort was proposed by the late Frank H. Simonds in an article entitled "The 'Haves' and 'Have-Nots'" in *The Fortnightly*.[1] *The Economist*[2] published detailed tables showing the distribution of land and raw materials among the various countries in order to prove Great Britain's right to the *status quo*. In France, the fascist proponents of a rapprochement with Germany at the expense of Soviet Ukraine are highly indignant over the vast territories of the Soviet Union and the comparative sparseness of its population. In Germany itself, imperialism is frankly proclaimed as the sacred right of "Aryans" suffocating for lack of "space" ("*Volk ohne Raum*"). Needless to say, the required "space" is sought in the Soviet Union, the government of which is moreover accused of continuing the foreign policy of the Tsars. In Italy and Japan analogous theories have become the creed of the ruling classes, which preach them *ex professo*. The basis of all these arguments — though most of their authors are unaware of the fact — is the so-called theory of "Geopolitik," now particularly fashionable in fascist Germany. It is with this geopolitical "prose" that we shall commence our analysis.

[1] London, June 1935. [2] London, October 26, 1935.

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I. "GEOPOLITICS" IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

It need hardly be said that the forerunners of geopolitics, *e.g.* the English historian Buckle, were in their day on a far higher level scientifically than their contemporaries who adhered to theological conceptions of the historical process; they were able to explain much by material factors that could not be explained by heavenly illusions. In Germany this peculiar brand of geographic materialism, or rather geographical naturalism, was developed by the founders of so-called "political geography," especially by Richthofen and above all Ratzel. The latter declared that the explanation of the historical process and of all politics lay in the size, position and frontiers of a given territory; in the form of the earth's surface and the soil, with its vegetation, water resources, etc.; and, finally, in the relation of the territory in question to other parts of the earth's surface. He maintained "that the attributes of the state are composed of those of the people and of the land" ("dass sich die Eigenschaften des Staates aus denen des Volkes und des Bodens zusammensetzen"). Before him, Richthofen had also introduced the race factor, in addition to factors of a geophysical order. The present-day school of "geopoliticians" (a name invented by the Swedish imperialist and political theorist R. Kjellén), who are grouped around the German magazine *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik* and its editor, Professor Haushofer, reiterate substantially the same ideas.

But while the views of Buckle (in so far as we are discussing the influence of climate, etc.) were progressive in their day, now, after the historical materialism of Marx, the writings of contemporary geopoliticians seem so much childish prattle (that is, logically; politically they are far from that).

In effect, geopolitics flatly denies all history. Relatively constant factors such as territory, soil, climate (and racial attributes which biological sociologists also consider as constant) cannot serve to explain historical and social changes. "Politics" does not grow out of the "land" at all, but first and foremost out of economic relations. The "land" undoubtedly influences the historical process; but it does so primarily through the process of labor and through economics, and these in their turn exercise a decisive influence on politics. The territory and the racial attributes of the British Isles have changed very little since the nineties of the last century, and they cannot possibly be made to

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explain, let us say, Great Britain's rapid change from free trade to a high protective tariff. The existence of a foreign trade monopoly in the U. S. S. R. cannot be explained by the "Russian steppes" or by the so-called "Slavic soul." But Great Britain's change to a high protective tariff can very well be explained by the transition of her economic system to monopoly capitalism, with its trusts and syndicates; and the foreign trade monopoly in the U. S. S. R. can very easily be explained by the peculiarities of the socialist economic system, with its plan, and by the relationship of this system to the outside world. Arguments about space and territory *per se* remind one—if the adherents of these theories will excuse the remark—of people hunting for differential tariffs among crabs or for paper money on wheat fields.

But however ridiculous geopolitics is from the point of view of logic, it nevertheless plays a very active reactionary rôle *in practice*. It supplies an excuse for bellicose fascism, a justification for war and imperialism; it preaches new conquests and wars of intervention. The essence of the matter lies here, not in the quasi-moralistic poetized sophistry with which imperialists often veil their prose.

II. "PERPETUUM MOBILE" IN WARS

In his article which I have already mentioned the late Mr. Simonds, after sharply (and to a great extent correctly) criticizing the League of Nations, draws the conclusion that foreign territory and raw materials are indispensable to Germany, Italy and Japan; that any attempt to persuade these countries to the contrary would be absurd; and that the League of Nations must adopt the rule of economic parity and make an equitable distribution of the world's resources of territory and raw materials. This will avert a world tragedy.

Indeed? But what will come of this plan objectively, that is, apart from the subjective intentions of its authors? Let us analyze this plan of the new "levellers."

First. Who are to be the *subjects* of this deal? Alas! These do not include such countries as Egypt or China or India. Nor do they include any of the small independent states like Czechoslovakia. The subjects of the deal are to be the biggest capitalist powers.

Second. Who are to be the *objects* of the deal? Apparently the U. S. S. R. and a number of small independent countries such as

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Lithuania (for the author of the scheme seeks to justify German fascist aspirations), China (for Japan's policy is similarly "justified") and the colonies (Italy's policy also finds "justification" in this scheme). Thus in effect it is proposed: (1) to cut up the U. S. S. R.; (2) to destroy the independence of small countries, such as Ethiopia; (3) to partition China; (4) to divide up the colonies again, like so much small coin thrown in to complete a bargain. In other words, the entire plan is aimed against: (a) the workers (the U. S. S. R.); (b) the masses in densely populated China (*i.e.*, the semi-colonies); (c) the colonial masses. *Cui prodest?* The biggest capitalist powers. Such is the scheme's "justice" and "morality."

Third. Let us assume that by some miracle or other the idea has been carried into effect. The great capitalist powers have divided up the spoils among themselves (the others, as we have seen, are *quantités négligeables*) on a "basic principle" of super-aristocratic world "parity." But what will happen the day after? That is the question.

It is not hard to answer. The mere fact that in different countries there are different levels of productive power, different quantities of skilled labor power, will lead to different results in the struggle for the world market. No amount of "autarchy" will save a country from having resort to this world market, the more so as the capitalist system will inevitably lead to overproduction. The search for new markets and spheres for capital investment will necessitate new re-divisions of land and resources. And since tariff barriers, trusts, armies and fleets will not disappear, the war song will break out afresh. Thus what is proposed is nothing more nor less than the continuing reproduction of wars, a *perpetuum mobile* of annihilating catastrophes. The picture is truly horrifying.

Fourth. Aside from all this, the plan recalls the verse about Roland's horse:

Wunderschön war diese Stute,
Leider aber war sie tot.

It is just another Utopia. The more powerful groups of capitalists wielding state power will not surrender their colonies for the benefit of their poorer relatives. If Germany, Japan and Italy cannot be persuaded to abandon their expansionist policy, then there is just as little expectation of philanthropy on the part of

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Great Britain, the United States or France. As regards the workers of the U. S. S. R., they can see absolutely no reason for surrendering their common property to their bitterest class antagonists.

Fifth. Capitalist states might ask themselves whether this levelling scheme does not have in it the germs of what Japanese diplomats would call "dangerous thoughts." For mankind is divided not only horizontally into states, but also vertically into classes. (By the way, this idea of a redivision, and of a blow at the maxim "Beati possidentes," calls to mind the whole class which is made up of the "possidentes." Here, however, it is not a question of re-dividing the factories and distributing the machines among the workers, but of common ownership of the means of production. And this is the course which history will take.)

III. WHAT IS IMPERIALISM?

So we may put the question as follows: Is the present tendency to violent expansion now being displayed so strikingly in Japan, Germany and Italy a purely natural function of land and race, or is it a function of the social-economic system?

The question can be most easily considered by taking the example of Japan. The density of population in Japan is great. There is little land per capita. Emigration has always been very considerable. The German professor, Paul Berkenkopf, in his recent work "Sibirien als Zukunftsland der Industrie," uses the very fact of overpopulation ("Druck der japanischen Übervölkerung") to explain Japanese imperialist expansion, assuming, however, that this expansion will proceed primarily in the direction of Australia and the Philippines. And thus it would seem that here as nowhere else the bare laws of geopolitics are the determining factor. But in that case how can we explain the crisis of overproduction? And how can we explain the paradox that this strange profusion of products is constantly impelling Japan's ruling classes to more intensive expansion? What becomes, then, of all the primitive argumentation that where there is little land, nothing to eat, and too many people, *ergo*, new territory is needed? It simply goes to pieces. Obviously the matter is not at all so simple. In reality, it is a bastard form of *fin de siècle* monopoly capitalism coupled with considerable survivals of feudal barbarism: savage exploitation of the workers and peasants, land-hunger on the part of the latter, exorbitantly high rents, poverty,

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and consequently low purchasing power of the masses — all leading to the paradox of plenty and poverty, overproduction and the quest for new territories. And are not these things peculiar to capitalism as a whole? Is not the hunt for markets, coupled with over-production and under-consumption, a characteristic feature of the special capitalist "mode of production?"

Or take Germany. We hear the chorus that it is absolutely essential for her to steal new territory from the U. S. S. R., since she, Germany, is starved for raw materials. We shall not speak here about the German war industry, which has swelled to gigantic proportions, which swallows up vast quantities of raw materials, and which does not in any way "grow" out of the properties of the German "soil." Nor shall we talk about the stocks of raw materials for war at the expense of consumption, nor about the sabotage on the part of the peasants. We only put the following elementary question: Why should not Germany *buy* raw materials from the U. S. S. R.? Does the latter want a high price? No, on the contrary. Many persons have shouted at the top of their voices that the U. S. S. R. is practising dumping — so favorable to the purchaser are the prices at which the U. S. S. R. has sold raw material. But German monopoly capital wants to have monopoly ownership of Ukrainian raw materials for military-economic autarchy, which in its turn is a weapon for further world struggle. "Territory," "space" (fascist philosphers have raised the category of "space" five heads higher than that of "time") do not produce any policy *by themselves*. It is definite social-historical conditions that lead to wars.

Mr. Simonds quoted Signor Mussolini's dictum: "For us Italians the choice is between foreign expansion and domestic explosion." And he added: "And that is why Italy and Germany, like Japan, are preparing for war." About Germany he spoke still more clearly: either a war of conquest, or communism.

Let us assume that this is so. But what does it signify? It simply signifies that communism can live without wars, whereas the other social form, capitalism, through the mouths of its own politicians and ideologists, declares: Better a war of conquest than communism. This only serves to corroborate the proposition that a war of conquest is a function of the social order, that it is not a non-historical category connected directly with geophysical and biological factors.

The structure of modern capitalism must be analyzed scientifi-

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cally, soberly and without prejudice. The Italian fascists claim that there is no capitalism in Italy, but a special kind of order which is neither capitalism nor socialism. Herr Hitler's followers declare that in their country they have national socialism. Mr. Araki and the other ideologists of Japanese aggression speak about the "imperial path," about Japan's peculiar traditions and her celestial mission: God himself points out definite strategic and tactical plans to Mr. Araki. Camouflage and juggling with words constitute one of the distinguishing features of profound social decadence. But fact remains fact. In none of the above-mentioned countries has one hair fallen from the head of the finance-capital oligarchy. Herr Fried in his book, "Das Ende des Kapitalismus," painted a very graphic picture of this oligarchy. But Hitler's régime has left it in complete immunity; these oligarchs have only been converted (in words) into "leaders of industry" on the basis of "public service." If we recall that fascism's most outstanding philosopher, Spengler, considered the Hohenzollern Officers' Corps and the Prussian Government officials as the epitome of "socialism" there is really no need for surprise. Has it not been said that "man was given a tongue to hide his thoughts?"

The same kind of camouflage is observable in another form even in capitalistic countries with democratic régimes. Not so long ago, for example, Mr. Thomas Nixon Carver, an indiscreet Pindar of "prosperity," proclaimed *urbi et orbi* that in the United States every worker is a capitalist. The subsequent spread of the crisis and of so-called "technical unemployment" have given a tragic refutation of this capitalist optimism.

What is in fact the real state of affairs? And why does this real state of affairs give rise to imperialist wars?

Since the eighties of the last century, as a result of the triumph of large-scale production and the centralization of capital, the form of capitalism has changed. From the previous stage of industrial capitalism, with its freedom of competition, its individualism, its principle of *laissez faire, laissez passer*, it entered the stage of monopoly capitalism (trusts, intergrowth of banking capital and industrial capital, monopoly prices). The partition of the world led to accentuated competition; to the policy of dumping (the losses incurred were compensated for by high monopoly prices in the home market); and to the system of a high protective tariff. In its turn, protectionism intensified the export of capital (in place of commodity exports, now hampered by tariff barriers).

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The monopolistic possession of markets, raw materials and spheres of capital investment, together with the whole system of monopoly exploitation, tariffs, etc., based on the already accomplished partition of the so-called "free lands" (which meant putting an end to the principle of the Open Door), led capitalist competition on the world market to acquire more and more clearly the character of forcible pressure (*Machtpolitik*). The diminished possibilities of "peaceful penetration" were remedied by the brutal policy of armed force.

Accordingly, the state power of capital, its "interference" in economic life, acquires increased significance. We witness the militarization of the economic system and an extreme intensification of the tendency to economic autarchy, which is also important militarily and politically in determining the *Machtposition* in the arena of world struggle. Here the inner motive is represented by the interests of profit, which on the one hand maintain the purchasing power of the working masses at an extremely low level (even in Ricardo's day it was a well-known fact that profit stands in inverse proportion to wages), and which on the other hand continually force commodities and capital beyond the bounds of the given state, compelling a constant search for fresh markets, fresh sources of raw materials and fresh spheres for capital investment. The greater the contradiction between the productive forces of capitalism and the mass impoverishment which is immanent in this system, the more intensive grows world competition, the more acute becomes the problem of war.

Imperialist war is an expression of the expansionist policy of monopoly capitalism. Such is the specific, historically limited, significance of imperialist wars. On the one hand, monopoly capitalism acts as a check on the development of the productive forces (the decay of capitalism); on the other, it leads to catastrophes of the most devastating kind.

Thus not every sort of war, not even every predatory war, is an imperialist war. Slave-owning forms of society waged wars for slaves; feudal lords fought for land; merchants and traders fought for markets and for exploitation through trade and plunder ("Handel und Piraterie," as Goethe called it); and so forth. Imperialism wages wars to extend the domination of one country's finance capital, for the monopoly profits of trusts and banks. Its wars are universal (for the whole world is already divided up); its wars confront all mankind with the dilemma: either death or socialism. *Hic Rhodus! Hic salta!*

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IV. IMPERIALISM AND THE U. S. S. R.

From the above it will be clear how senseless it is to talk about the "imperialism" of the U. S. S. R., as is done *con amore* by fascist theoreticians and by "researchers" of the type of Herr von Kleinow. A phrase like "the imperialism of the U. S. S. R." is a contradiction in terms, like "dry water" or "square circles."

But it may be asked: Will not the U. S. S. R. pursue an aggressive policy, not in favor of finance capital, but against it? Will it not fight for the expansion of socialism? Here again let us begin with an example.

As is well known, the Empire of the Tsars formerly occupied present territory of the Soviet Union, plus Poland, plus Finland, etc. It possessed even more territory and more "natural wealth" than does the U. S. S. R. But it was continually engaged in wars of conquest. On the eve of 1914 it dreamed of seizing Constantinople and the Dardanelles and of subjugating all Turkey, of seizing the whole of Galicia from Austria-Hungary, of dealing Germany a blow and of concluding a trade agreement with her on onerous terms; and so on. What, under Tsarism, drove not only the landlords but also the bourgeoisie (even before they had a share in the government) to these adventures? First and foremost, the weakness of the home market. The peasant was fleeced to the skin by the landlord, the worker's wages were meagre. Hence the policy which the Tsar's minister Vyshnegradsky characterized in the words: "We'll go hungry but we'll export." Hence the Far Eastern adventure — and the "Russo-Japanese War," during which, by the way, all sections of Russian society except the landlord aristocracy desired the Tsarist Government's defeat. Hence, too, Russia's participation in the World War, with a frenzied imperialist program (here the grain exporters played the biggest part).

Now let us take the U. S. S. R. One does not need to be a genius to observe that in the U. S. S. R. *the demand is not less but greater than the supply*. In our country we have a tremendously strong home market. Despite the enormous scale of production there is a shortage of commodities, there are still too few goods on sale.

The socialist system contains within itself much greater possibilities for productive forces to develop, for labor to increase its productivity and for technique to progress. But in the Soviet Union, be it noted, this cannot result either in unemployment

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or in overproduction. Our national economy is conducted not with a view to profits for a capitalist class, but to satisfy the requirements of the masses. This means that when production of necessary articles is increased their consumption is proportionately raised, and not lowered into the sea like Brazilian coffee. If completely superfluous articles are produced — a highly improbable contingency — corrections can be made in the production process itself. Under planned economy it is easy to redistribute the productive forces; they can be transferred to new sectors, engendering new requirements and supplying the masses with new lines of production. There will never be any threat of unemployment, and a universal rise in labor productivity will only lead to a growth of plenty, shorten the working day, and leave more scope for cultural development.

Thus the motive inherent in the very nature of the capitalist system, which begets surplus value and prevents its realization — the motive which is most glaringly manifested in the era of imperialism and impels the ruling classes to war — is reduced in a socialist society to absolute nonsense.

This was why beggarly Tsarist Russia, where the "upper ten thousand" of landlords and bourgeois lived in splendor while the masses starved, pursued a policy of wars of conquest. And that is why the U. S. S. R., which is rapidly growing rich in the sense that well-being is spreading throughout the entire mass of the people while social wealth is concentrated in the hands of the socialist state, pursues an exactly opposite policy, the policy of peace. The U. S. S. R. is not interested in conquests in any direction whatever. But it is interested, very deeply and lastingly interested, in peace. What, then, remains of the celebrated argument that the U. S. S. R. "is continuing the policy of the Tsars?"

There is another piece of geopolitical sophistry in circulation which goes more or less as follows. Fact remains fact: in 1914 Russia was in conflict with Japan in the Far East; in 1914–18 she was in conflict with Germany; the same thing is happening again, *mutatis mutandis*, and the fundamental geophysical laws are again breaking their way through all obstacles.

What is the reply to this piece of sophistry?

First, even the facts themselves are distorted. For example, in 1914 and the years following Japan was in league with Russia against Germany; now Japan is in league with Germany against

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the U. S. S. R. The Japanese Samurai have even been proclaimed oriental Prussians of Aryan extraction.

Second, the question must be stated more clearly. What, in effect, is under discussion? What we are discussing is not the mere fact of a conflict (for a conflict presupposes at least two parties — our object in this case not being to analyze the inner struggles of a Hamlet), but the policy of one party and the policy of another. After this logical dissection the question becomes perfectly clear. In Japan power is in the hands of approximately the same classes as before, and Japan is continuing its policy of imperialist aggression, heading for war. The U. S. S. R. is not Tsarist Russia and the radical change of the country's economic system demands an exactly opposite policy, the policy of peace. Nevertheless war *may* break out, for the situation is not determined by the one-sided will to peace of the Soviets. War may be forced upon us. Contiguity of frontiers and territory certainly have an influence here, but not directly, and the war guilt will lie not with "the land" but with Japanese imperialism.

Finally, there is one other argument with which the opponents of the U. S. S. R. try to discredit Soviet foreign policy. It is trotted out regularly by Herr Hitler and his ideological agents. It runs, roughly speaking, as follows: National Socialism is based on "nationality" ("Volkstum," "Volksgemeinschaft"); its business is with the domestic, internal affairs of Germany; National Socialism is *national* socialism, and is not super- or supra-national. Accordingly it never meddles in "other folks' affairs," but speaks exclusively *pro domo sua*. Conversely, Sovietism — bolshevism, communism — has a super- and supra-national orientation; it is an international force, dreaming of world domination; it is the *spiritus rector* of all sedition and unrest.

Clearly this argument is intimately connected with our theme.

First of all, a few words about the Germany of Herr Hitler. The German fascists, it is true, are idolaters of the fetish of so-called "race purity;" they even castrate those who are not pure Aryans and imprison people for the "crime" of sexual intercourse with non-Aryan men and women. They propagate economico-national autarchy, as a vessel containing the holy and precious body and blood of the "Nordic Aryan race." But it would be a childish absurdity to suppose that this leads to a policy of "non-interference." Quite the contrary. Fascist action is most energetic in all foreign countries. And this is easy to understand, for

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their very "national narrowness" is nothing more nor less than the clenching of the military-economic and ideological fist. Their orientation is towards world hegemony, entailing the crushing and enslavement of all other nations. No, to be sure, they are not internationalists. But they are potential nationalistic oppressors of all other nations (those of "low degree"). It is precisely from this point of view that the Nazis meddle in the internal affairs of all other states. It is worth knowing, for instance, that even in the case of the United States the Nazis count on the millions of citizens of German blood to act against the Anglo-Saxon and other elements. In fact, it is to fear of a German revolt that Herr Colin Ross ascribes the unfavorable attitude of Americans towards National Socialism.[3] Setting out from the premise that "present-day America is tired and old, amazingly old" ("*das heutige Amerika ist müde und alt, erstaunlich alt*") the author threatens a national upheaval of millions of "self-knowing" Germans. Approximately the same arguments ("salvation" of the Ukraine or of the Volga Germans) are employed by Herr Rosenberg in his appeals for war against the U. S. S. R. It is thus quite futile for the Nazis to pose as offended children, occupied in the washing of purely domestic linen. That argument is mendacious.

However, *revenons à nos moutons*. Do we believe in the world-wide triumph of socialism? Of course we do. Moreover, we know for sure that this will undoubtedly come, as a result of the inner contradictions of capitalism, through the victory of the historically progressive forces within it. We know that our diagnosis and prognosis are scientific and exact. But does this mean that the U. S. S. R. should interfere in the affairs of other states or pursue a policy of conquest? Of course not. For the best "propaganda" of all is the very fact of the existence and uninterrupted development of the new economic relations and the new culture. It would be sheer stupidity to interrupt this process.

Hence it follows that not only from the economic but also from the purely political standpoint — not only from the standpoint of the U. S. S. R. proper but also from that of the ultimate world-wide victory of socialism — it is utterly senseless to think of a policy of war being adopted by the proletarian state. And as regards the "last days" and the "world rule of communism," history will settle this question. "*Que les destinées s'accomplissent!*"

[3] *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*, XII Jahrg., 3 Heft. p. 135: "Idee und Zukunftsgestaltung der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika."

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However, in the interests of full scientific clarity we cannot leave unanswered one further argument against the Marxist presentation of the question concerning the destinies of society. It is set forth in an article in *The Round Table* (No. 99) entitled "Economics and War." The author asserts that Marxism is wrong, because:

> If, as its disciples hold, the existing economic system leads inherently to the class war, which of its nature cuts across national boundaries, then surely it cannot also lead inherently to the war between nations, in which all classes are ranged side by side against their fellows of another country. . . . For experience amply proves that war is the great opportunity of the forces of the Left to overthrow the established régime. The calculating communist, far more than the calculating capitalist, ought to foment war.

I regret to say that the author errs on every point. War "between nations" (or rather between capitalist states) formally unites classes, but only to aggravate class antagonisms still further later on and speed up the revolutionary process. So it was in Germany and Austria, so it was in Russia, where the revolutionary party was able to carry things through to the end. It is precisely for this reason that war enables "the forces of the Left" to "overthrow the established régime." But they are able to do so for the further reason that they rally the masses against war. It is as the force of peace, the only consistent force of peace, that they are victorious — not as the fictitious and silly-clever "calculating communist" imagined by *The Round Table*. As regards the capitalists, they are driven on by the blind, supra-rational, elemental forces of an unorganized society. One of the characteristic features of this society is that people get results quite different from those intended: thus none of the capitalists wanted the crisis, but the crisis is the result of their actions. This is the so-called law of the heterogeneity of aims, characteristic of irrational (capitalist) society and non-existent in rational, organized (socialist) society. Thus, the peace policy of the socialist state is not just a passing "juncture" for it, not a temporary zigzag in policy, not an opportunist compromise. It expresses the very essence of the socialist system.

We are not obliged to think for the capitalists. But, contrary to *The Round Table's* advice, we stand and will continue to stand for peace, peace and yet again peace. And precisely for this reason we shall conquer in a war if the imperialists force one on us.

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V. THE SYSTEM OF PROLETARIAN STATES: COMMUNISM AND WAR

Now it will be easy to answer the question as to whether wars between proletarian states will be possible — wars for markets, for raw materials, for spheres of capital investment — and whether wars will be possible under communism, *i.e.*, in the subsequent stage of mankind's evolution, after it has already taken to socialism.

Basic actuating motives are represented by definite interests. The world economic system of the capitalist régime is broken up into "national" economic units with conflicting interests (we put the word "national" in quotation marks, for the term includes bourgeois states composing many nationalities). The most acute form of conflict in which this clash of interests finds expression is war between these states. War is a special form of capitalist competition, peculiar to the capitalist world as such. The question of relations between proletarian states is altogether different.

Logically: there is no clash of real interests between proletarian states whatsoever; on the contrary, their real interest is in maximum coöperation. From the very start this real interest is realized as the actuating motive of all activity, for it is commensurate with the whole system of rationally organized labor with the ideology of the revolutionary proletariat.

Genetically: the very process of the struggle waged by the proletarian states for their existence will knit them together in a still closer bond. There can be no doubt that after a certain stage of development tremendously powerful centripetal tendencies will be revealed — tendencies toward a state union of proletarian republics.

Empirically: the experience of the U. S. S. R. fully confirms these considerations. Tsarist Russia collapsed as an integral whole, and in those parts where the bourgeoisie remained in power (Finland, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland) it has split apart and now forms mutually antagonistic elements (*cf.* Poland versus Lithuania). On the other hand, in those places where the workers were victorious they have joined the Union of proletarian republics, united by a single economic plan and a centralized government, but organized in a federation. The constituent nations have full rights, and their various cultures, national in form and socialist in content, are flourishing now as never before. This, of

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course, is far from being an accident; it is a manifestation of the most profound historical law, linked with a new social structure.

With the further flowering of proletarian states throughout the entire world war will become unnecessary. War will be impossible in a system of unified communist society, where there are no classes and even — *horribile dictu* — no coercive state power nor armies. This society will really "turn swords into ploughshares" and release gigantic masses of energy for national creative work for the benefit of all mankind. If even the first historical phases of socialist development in our country have already produced such brilliant creative results as the Stakhanov movement, and the heroic feats accomplished by our youth in all fields of culture, then what abundant sources of social wealth will pour forth in the splendid fraternal society of communism!

This, it will be said, is utopian. But we know very well that Aristotle was no fool, that he was one of the greatest men of all times. Yet he held that society was inconceivable without slaves. Not so long ago the planters of the southern states held that Negroes are innate slaves. So today the bourgeois and their little "Aristotles" hold that society would be as inconceivable without war as without wage slavery, and that the U. S. S. R. is a *lapsus historiæ*. Let them think so. *Qui vivra verra.*

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THE NEW NAVAL AGREEMENT

By Norman H. Davis

FEW international conferences can ever have met under less auspicious circumstances and with less promise of success than did the London Naval Conference of 1935. The system of naval limitation established by the Washington Treaty of 1922 and the London Treaty of 1930 had immensely benefited all the naval powers and injured none of them. Notwithstanding this fact, it became apparent as the date for the recent conference approached that it would be most difficult — indeed that it probably would be impossible — to agree upon a renewal of the existing treaties or a continuance of naval limitation on the old basis.

Preliminary bilateral discussions had been begun in London in June 1934, on the initiative of the British Government, in the effort to find a satisfactory basis on which formal negotiations might be undertaken with some promise of eventual agreement. The result of these preliminary conversations was not encouraging. But the terms of the Washington and London Treaties, which expire December 31, 1936, made it obligatory that a conference be held in 1935. It was also felt that, in spite of the apparent difficulties, no stone should be left unturned in the effort to negotiate a treaty which would at least preserve the principle of naval limitation and avoid the chaotic situation that would result if upon the expiration of the two existing treaties there should be no agreement whatever to take their place.

The conference convened, then, in London on December 9. Almost before it had settled down to its work, the Japanese delegates advanced (virtually as a *sine qua non* to agreement) a proposal for a so-called "common upper limit" which, in effect, meant the complete scrapping of the basis on which the existing system of naval limitation rests.

In substance, what Japan proposed was to change the existing ratio of 5–5–3 for the United States, Great Britain and Japan respectively, to a ratio of 3–3–3 or 5–5–5. The Japanese delegates preferred that this naval parity be achieved by a scapping of American and British ships until the navies of these two Powers had been brought down to the size of the Japanese; alternatively, they suggested that Japan increase its fleet to the level of the other two. They admitted that different nations had varying degrees of

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vulnerability and varying needs, and that naval parity and equal security are not synonymous. But they argued that the acceptance of their proposal would help to equalize vulnerability, and added that in any case, as a matter of national prestige, they could not agree to negotiate a new naval treaty on any other basis.

During the ensuring thorough and frank discussion of the Japanese proposal, lasting over the Christmas recess and until the middle of January, evidence accumulated that it could not be accepted as a practical basis for negotiation or agreement. The United States and Great Britain agreed that Japan was entitled to equal security. But they pointed out that this had in fact been achieved under the Washington and London Treaties. They also explained that on account of their geographical situation, their extensive coast lines, and their distant outlying possesssions, they required larger navies than Japan in order to maintain equal security. They could not, therefore, agree to naval parity for Japan, the effect of which would be to give her naval superiority, *i.e.* superiority of attack and defense. France and Italy likewise rejected the Japanese proposal. Admiral Nagano and his colleagues thereupon withdrew from the conference, leaving observers to follow its progress.

Although the Japanese withdrawal increased the difficulties in the way of negotiating any kind of agreement, the representatives of the other Powers at the conference decided to remain in London and endeavor to work out some sort of solution of the problem confronting them. The results justified the decision, for in spite of the Japanese withdrawal we succeeded, after considerable time and effort, in negotiating a treaty which not only preserves the principle of naval limitation, although on a new basis, but also contains important new provisions which we believe will be beneficial.

The new Treaty was signed in London on March 25, 1936. It differs in substance from the two previous naval treaties in that it contains no provision for the direct quantitative limitation of naval armaments. Desirable as a continuation of quantitative limitation might have been, it did not lie within the realm of the possible. It is not possible to limit aggregate naval tonnage without fixing ratios; and the two earlier treaties are about to lapse because, with the exception of Great Britain and the United States, none of the parties thereto were willing to be bound any longer by ratios. Furthermore, the liking of Britain and America

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for ratios arises in no small measure from the fact that they have the highest ratio and accept the principle of parity as between themselves.

The many technical features of the new Treaty, inevitable in a document dealing with such matters, may tend to obscure, for the casual reader, its important substantive provisions. On the positive side, it is designed to accomplish two main things: first, to devise an acceptable and workable method for preserving the principle of naval limitation; second, to prevent a naval race, this to be accomplished by limiting, reducing, and standardizing the size of ships and the caliber of guns and providing for the exchange of full information as to all projected and actual naval construction.

Since the new Treaty establishes no quantitative limitations, each Power has equal rights to build as many or as few ships as it chooses. There are, however, very definite and important limitations as to the type of ship which may be built and the caliber of guns which may be carried.

Even apart from the political difficulties of reaching a quantitative agreement, there is much to be said for a purely qualitative limitation. As soon as there is any question of fixing a top limit for the various Powers, a tendency develops on the part of each Power to make it a high limit; and afterwards there is a tendency to build up to that limit out of reasons of prestige. The fixing of a top limit also means fixing a ratio, and we have seen that ratios inevitably raise questions of national pride. Qualitative limitation, on the other hand, raises no question of national pride or prestige. In combination with a full exchange of information, it should prove to be an effective way of preventing competitive naval construction.

Nations, like individuals, are inclined to clamor to do what they are told they cannot do, whether or not there is any real reason to do it. If left to themselves to decide how many ships they require, many countries may find that their naval needs are relatively modest.

In the new Treaty the maximum size of battleships is left at 35,000 tons, as established by the previous treaties. But the caliber of guns on future battleships is to be reduced from 16 to 14 inches, provided all the Powers which signed the Washington Treaty enter into a previous agreement to that effect. The age limit of battleships has been increased by six years (from 20 to 26

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years) in order to prolong their life, thus effecting substantial replacement savings.

A new feature is what is called the "zone of non-construction" between the battleship and cruiser classes. The signatories agree not to construct battleships between 8,000 and 17,500 tons; nor may battleships mount a gun less than 10″ in caliber. This provision is inserted to prevent the sudden introduction of a "surprise type" of ship, like the German pocket battleship, which by definition would be a capital ship but in reality would be a cruiser, thus upsetting the present limits and creating a new and most dangerous form of competition.

Aircraft carriers are to be reduced from 27,000 to 23,000 tons; and the maximum size for submarines has been placed at 2,000 tons.

Light surface craft, which includes cruisers and destroyers, are divided into the following three categories: "A." Vessels which carry a gun in excess of 6″ but not exceeding 8″ caliber, and which do not exceed 10,000 tons displacement. "B." Vessels which carry a gun of 6.1″ or less and which do not exceed 10,000 tons. "C." Vessels which carry a gun of 6.1″ or less and which do not exceed 8,000 tons. With a view to effecting as much limitation as is possible under existing circumstances, the American delegates agreed, upon certain conditions, that there should be no increase in the existing numbers of "A" Cruisers and "B" Cruisers in excess of 8,000 tons during the next six years. In accepting this so-called holiday in construction we did not sacrifice any American principle or agree to anything detrimental to our national security. In so far as the United States is concerned we now possess, either built or building, all of the 10,000 ton cruisers which we were permitted to have under the London Treaty; and we have no desire or need to increase this type of cruiser except in case of an excessive increase in the construction of cruisers by some other Power or Powers. In that event we have the right under the Treaty to terminate the cruiser holiday and to construct additional 10,000 ton cruisers if we deem it necessary.

One of the most important chapters of the new Treaty is that which provides for exchange of information between the contracting Powers or others which may later adhere. Under the two former naval treaties, provision was made for information to be given only after construction had been started and completed. Under the new arrangement, no construction is to be put into

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effect and no keel is to be laid without four months' notice to the other parties to the Treaty. This is a great improvement over the Washington and London Treaties. To the layman it may seem unimportant; but to naval experts or those conversant with the naval problem the removal of uncertainty is a feature of considerable importance. It provides against any sudden development of naval building, both as to type and quantity, which would seriously disturb the relative naval security of the Powers parties to the Treaty. It reduces suspicion and the incentive to try to get the lead in naval construction or to start a naval race.

In view of the fact that some of the principal naval Powers did not sign the Treaty, we thought it necessary to provide for an escape under certain contingencies. Obviously the contracting states could not afford to restrict themselves unduly in case the naval construction of states outside the scope of the treaty should menace their national security. While these escape clauses are so drafted as to give each Power ample assurance of being able to meet unforeseen contingencies, it is not contemplated that the whole structure of the Treaty will be destroyed by a simple non-compliance with the letter or the spirit of its provisions. Only in case a country should consider that the requirements of its national security are seriously affected by the actions of a non-contracting party or other change in circumstances, will it undertake to put into operation the machinery to release it from its treaty obligations. "Escape clauses" are not new; and experience has shown in the case of other naval treaties that they are not lightly called into use. A Power which wishes to avail itself of the right to be let out must set forth in detail its reasons and justify its action to the other treaty Powers.

The present signatories of the new Treaty are Great Britain, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, France and the United States. Although the treaty has not been signed by two of the Washington Treaty powers, namely Japan and Italy, it has been left open for their future adherence. The Italian delegates collaborated throughout in the formulation of the Treaty and it is expected that Italy will sign at a later date. Also, Japanese observers remained to follow the work of the conference and it is hoped that Japan will see fit later on to adhere. It is furthermore expected that Germany and Russia will adhere to the principles of the Treaty through bilateral treaties with Great Britain.

As three of the Principal naval Powers — the United States,

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Great Britain and France — have agreed upon a limitation as to the types of vessels which may be built, there is reason to expect the non-contracting naval Powers to adhere to the types established, unless they wish to assume the responsibility and onus of starting a naval race. I do not believe this will be the case.

Although no limits have been placed on the size of their fleets, England and America have agreed that as between themselves there shall be no competitive naval construction. In an exchange of letters between Mr. Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, and myself, as Chairman of the American Delegation, this point of fundamental importance was recognized. These letters reaffirmed the understanding that the principle of parity between the fleets of the United States and of the British Commonwealth of Nations, which was established in the Washington and London Treaties and which has become a well-established principle acceptable to the British and American peoples, shall continue to govern their naval policies. The assurance that there shall be no naval race between the two leading naval Powers should have a stabilizing effect in these uncertain days.

In view of the difficulties which stood in the way, we considered that we were fortunate in being able to negotiate a treaty at all, especially one which not only preserves the principle of naval limitation but which has important advantages, notably in that it is less rigid and less restrictive than previous naval treaties and hence may prove more enduring and more practical. Of course, some things are not in the Treaty which we should have liked to see there. There is nothing in it, however, which the United States does not want. There is nothing which is unfair or injurious to any naval Power. And there is much in it which will be of benefit to all the naval Powers if accepted and lived up to by them. Thus one may hope that those states which have not yet signed the Treaty will see fit to accept and adhere to its provisions.

In contrast to the low spirits with which the conference began, its participants separated feeling that they had negotiated a treaty which did not prejudice the interests or wound the susceptibilities of any nation. They felt, too, that they had demonstrated that with patience and perseverence it is still possible to contribute positively, even under adverse circumstances and in a time of extreme international stress, to the cause of world security and peace.

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BRITISH VACILLATIONS

By André Géraud
("*Pertinax*")

DURING the last fifteen months the British Government would seem to have outdone itself in hesitation, vacillation and alterations of policy. In France we are in the habit of paying homage to the empirical genius of our English friends. But we take empiricism to mean action which is inspired by an attentive observation of facts. An empiricist is not satisfied with ready-made ideas; he must be modest and prudent, yet intelligent; he is not necessarily pusillanimous. The empirical process is logical, rigorous, disciplined. It does not lead to the practice of diplomacy in accordance with fixed conceptions, as is sometimes the French manner, nor does it nourish bold projects and grandiose ambitions of the sort which characterize modern Germany. But it is not confusion and weakness. For the moment we refuse British policy the bright appellation of "empirical." At the same time we express the hope that it may speedily transform itself and again deserve the name; for we are convinced that this is the price of European peace. What follows is a justification of this judgment.

II

After the close of the World War the British people quickly showed what was to be its tendency with regard to the peace which had just been won. The definitions used by its ruling class were not always very clear; but the instinctive wish evidently was that all peoples, victors and vanquished alike, should forthwith devote themselves to acquiring the greatest possible degree of material well-being. The free exchange of goods, of services, of capital; unrestricted travel and intellectual intercourse; disarmament as far as possible; the elimination of every distinction between loser and victor as a result of a gradual and mutually acceptable revision of the treaties of peace, resulting, in turn, in the substitution of "spiritual frontiers" for the old physical frontiers —such was the ideal. It furnished the justification for the League of Nations which had just been founded at the entreaty of President Wilson. A majority of the countries already possessed democratic and parliamentary régimes. Those which had lingered under authoritarian governments tried to give evidence of con-

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forming to the general norm. Even Russian bolshevism came to put aside a little of its first rigor. The idea was generally accepted that the wish to wage war and to make conquests belonged only to more or less absolute sovereigns and their narrow military and diplomatic cliques. The masses were supposed to be interested only in material advantages. Liberty, bread, play — this would be the motto of the human race now that it was rid of its tyrants.

One should read over again today the pages which J. M. Keynes wrote on the morrow of the Treaty of Versailles. They show us how at that time Mr. Britling saw the world. In 1919 I passed my holidays with a man who still is a force in British public life. There was with us a friend (now a celebrated dramatist) who had just accepted a position as London correspondent for a great French newspaper. The job interested him, but he expressed regret that he did not possess a wider knowledge of history in order to fill it better. "Don't let that worry you," said the English politician. "Your ignorance is an advantage. We are starting with a *tabula rasa*. The old passions have ceased to count. Precedents no longer have any value."

The cathedral built from these illusions, and bearing the names of "Saints" Briand, Stresemann and Chamberlain, has collapsed. The first two are dead without leaving any disciples. The third has had to change his mind on many problems, and anyway no longer wears the ministerial mantle. At a certain moment, he would have asked us to include Mussolini in the company of titular saints; but since then the Italian has given a resounding kick to those who wanted to label him an apostle of peace.

The area where parliamentary institutions and democracy prevail has now been reduced to the territories of ten or a dozen states. Free trade has ceased. No country buys abroad more than is strictly necessary, and each tries to come as near as possible to autarchy, calculating that in view of the armed conflict which lies ahead each must be independent of the others. The mechanism of the gold standard no longer regulates production either inside states or in international trade. The common denominator — international money — has disappeared. Governments use decrees to supplant the freedom of initiative which the gold standard used to foster. Everywhere the demagogues flourish, able easily to sacrifice their subjects on bloody altars and yet in a position to claim that they hold their unshakable affection. In comparison with the new party dictatorships the despots of pre-

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vious centuries seem gentle and easy-going. The governments of Germany, Italy and Soviet Russia hold their subjects in a permanent state of mobilization. Everywhere preparations for war are being feverishly carried on, and in the totalitarian states they dominate the whole national economy. Public opinion is manufactured to order like any other sort of merchandise. There is no theory too absurd for the dictators to adopt and propagate. In 1911 Kiderlen-Wächter said to Jules Cambon: "A well-conducted press campaign can implant any sort of folly in the German mind in four months." Alas, he was right. The demands of the Berlin government, which play so great a part in setting the tone of European life, are neither rational nor restrained. They are dominated by the thesis that the Germans are a pure race of peculiar worth, and that the Führer is an infallible person who not only makes policy but creates right. Which is to say that German policy is governed by metaphysical considerations. "Mein Kampf" — that new political bible, henceforward not only to be taught in the schools and preached in the pulpits but even to be placed as the complete guide to life in the hands of each newly-married couple — sets as the German objective the annihilation of France and the establishment in Europe of a nation of 250 million Germans.

In short, the world of today has no relation to the ideology which the English accepted just after the war and which they have held to during the intervening years. Having sunk Germany's fleet and appropriated most of the German colonies, they thought in 1919 that a period of repose was opening before them. They reduced their army and air force to a size which would enable them to undertake only small colonial expeditions. The navy was neglected. The problem which now faces Britain is to reconstruct her power and recast her policy so as to bring it into harmony with the actual situation existing in the rest of the world. For two years Mr. Baldwin and his colleagues undoubtedly have seen this necessity. But they have not known how to proceed. So far they have succeeded only in giving the world a spectacle of myopia and confusion.

III

We may consider that a whole period ended on October 14, 1933, when Germany abandoned the League of Nations. Six months later, April 17, 1934, M. Barthou, Minister of Foreign

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Affairs in the Doumergue cabinet, sent his famous note to London rejecting the disarmament project which the British and German Governments then seemed ready to accept. This decision of the French Government has been much criticized. It was made on the recommendation of MM. Herriot and Tardieu, the two Ministers of State who had been assigned the task of studying the question; M. Barthou himself and the staff of the Quai d'Orsay favored further temporizing. Personally, I am persuaded that the ministry had no choice but to act as it did. The French Army was organized at that time on the basis of a one-year term of service, with recruits called up semi-annually in April and October (which meant that they could not be given any real instruction). The army was in fact excessively weak, weaker than most foreigners have ever suspected. Readoption of the two-year service was evidently going to become necessary at an early date, and this in itself would have prevented us from signing the proposed agreement. Unlike Germany, France does not possess quasi-military organizations to compensate for weaknesses in the regular military establishment.

The two principal features of the system which London devised, and which evidently attracted Berlin, were very disquieting to France. The first proposal was for the international control of effectives. Would this control prove really effective in Germany, where all lips are sealed by espionage and police repression and where it is almost impossible to draw any clear line of demarcation between the army proper, the various quasi-military formations, and the mass of the population? The second feature was the proposal to suppress so-called offensive arms. No one who believes that Germany, possessing a far greater capacity for industrial production than any other European country, will choose the date and the site of the next war, can help fearing that she will arrange to come into that war equipped with whatever engines her opponents have destroyed and which they therefore would have to manufacture or procure elsewhere after the struggle had already commenced. I do not mean that an effective international control would not obviate this danger. We simply do not believe in the possibility of an effective international control in dictatorial countries. (I have felt bound to try to clarify this matter because our policy regarding it is often attacked in England. Lord Lothian, for example, often expatiates on it in order to establish the "sincerity" of Adolph Hitler. But I believe that in the British

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Foreign Office itself there are many who recognize at the bottom of their hearts the justice of the French position.)

During all of 1934 Anglo-French relations were stalemated. MM. Doumergue and Barthou would certainly have welcomed a chance to coöperate with England. But they could not persuade themselves that anything was to be expected from Mr. MacDonald and Sir John Simon, who on October 14, 1933, had shown only dismay when Berlin rose up against the League of Nations. The French Ministers therefore devoted their principal attention to developing a rapprochement with Soviet Russia and to the attempt to bring about a reconciliation between Italy and the Little Entente, which obviously became a particularly urgent matter following the assassination of Chancellor Dollfuss either at the direct or indirect instigation of Berlin. As far as England was concerned, their sole ambition was to get the Foreign Office to ratify the peace structure which they were seeking to effect in Eastern Europe. For it goes without saying that, without assurance of English benevolence and even of English aid, France could not carry out whatever engagements she might make at the other end of the continent. Matters nevertheless became worse. On October 9, 1934, King Alexander of Jugoslavia and M. Barthou were assassinated at Marseilles. The Saar plebiscite was approaching.

It was then that Sir John Simon, stopping over in Paris en route to a holiday on the Côte d'Azur, visited M. Laval and invited him as well as Prime Minister Flandin to come to London. "It will be useful," he said, "to demonstrate the friendship of the two countries." Thus came about the Franco-British conference held at the end of January 1935, climaxed by the famous communiqué of February 3. The two governments agreed upon the conditions under which Germany could legalize her secret rearmament at least in part, and consequently take her place again inside the framework of international law. The formulas were complex but the conceptions were simple enough. The German Government was asked, in return for being granted a large military force, to participate in various pacts of mutual assistance which would assure the defeat of any aggressor and so prevent aggression: a western air pact, to be superimposed on the Locarno Pact in order to dissipate the aërial danger which in 1925 had not been envisaged in its true proportions; a pact of mutual assistance for Northeastern Europe; and a pact for Central Europe aimed at

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safeguarding Austrian independence. These pacts were the essentials of the project. But at the very last session of the conference a misunderstanding became visible. "What will you do if Germany refuses or withdraws?" asked MM. Flandin and Laval. "Will you conclude the western air pact with France even without Germany, thereby demonstrating to everybody the solidarity of the two great states of western Europe?" Sir John Simon hesitated to commit himself. He replied obliquely that these circumstances would create a new situation, that it would be necessary to consult afresh, etc. Then the Permanent Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office, Sir Robert Vansittart, intervened with the following remark addressed to Sir John: "If we are not now prepared to sign the Western Air Pact with or without Germany, it would have been better to have abstained from producing our plan." The French ministers left London convinced that Sir Robert's remark indicated the direction in which the British cabinet would proceed. But Mr. Anthony Eden was immediately charged to make a declaration in the Commons that reserved the freedom of British policy.

The sequel of this story is well-known. Hitler not only refused to have anything to do with the Franco-British proposal of February 3, but on March 9 he officially attached to the Reichswehr the military aviation force which Germany had illegally created in violation of the Treaty of Versailles. Further, on March 16 he solemnly declared that the German Government no longer considered itself bound by the terms of that Treaty. The only reply of the British ministry to this provocation was to send Sir John Simon and Mr. Eden to Berlin. It had been originally planned to send these two gentlemen to the German capital to discuss the proposals of February 3, namely the conditions under which the Reich's illegal rearmament could be legalized. The Reich settled the question by arbitrarily appropriating to itself the stakes in the game. Hitler thus confronted England and France with a *fait accompli*. The basis for the negotiation had disappeared. Nevertheless, the two members of the British cabinet, just as if nothing had happened, put themselves to the trouble of visiting Hitler in order to learn his inclination and to parade before him their own perplexities. The *Führer* took the occasion to say this sort of thing to them: "When Wellington saw Blücher arrive on the battlefield at Waterloo, did he ask him if his army had been raised entirely in conformity with existing treaties?"

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For all this backing and filling the British tried to plead extenuating circumstances, emphasizing to France that the military clauses of the Versailles Treaty had already been dead for some time. But this was not the question. The issue was not the British signature of June 28, 1919, but the British agreement of February 3, 1935. Sir John Simon had promised to consult first with the French in the event a new situation arose. But he refused to come to Paris before going to Berlin. The most that he would do was reluctantly to send Mr. Eden to try to assuage M. Laval's anger.

The end of the chapter is not pleasant. Sir John joined with very poor grace in the theoretical condemnation of Germany voted by the League Council on April 17, following the futile Stresa Conference. He imposed several amendments, and later put obstacles in the way of the committee appointed by the Council to study measures to be taken against states which in the future repudiate their obligations by unilateral action. On the other hand, he hurriedly rose to the bait which Hitler had offered him at Berlin — recognition of Britain's maritime supremacy. This was embodied in the Anglo-German Naval Treaty of June 18. I have already discussed this treaty in these pages,[1] so that it is unnecessary to repeat my views. I need only point out that up to the present time the British have not succeeded in obtaining information regarding the German naval building program, nor do they know how rapidly it is to be carried out. As the price for so many recantations Sir John did not in the end obtain a single real concession on behalf of European peace. The *Führer* agreed that Germany would permit states with which she signed non-aggression pacts to enter also into mutual assistance pacts in which Germany herself did not participate (declaration of Herr von Neurath to Sir Eric Phipps on April 12, 1935). But it seems doubtful whether even this advantage — if it is one — has been gained definitely, for the British questionnaire sent to Berlin on May 7, 1936, had to raise the subject all over again. The fact is that Germany seems to look on bilateral pacts as useful instruments for preventing the various nations from forming a circle around an eventual aggressor.

The Naval Treaty of June 18 may be considered as Sir John Simon's final important act. After the jubilee festivities were over he had to abandon the Foreign Office to Sir Samuel Hoare. Alarmed by the turn affairs were taking in Europe, and unable to

[1] FOREIGN AFFAIRS, October 1935.

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make anything of the government's moves and countermoves on the diplomatic chessboard, the most active segment of British public opinion began to find serious fault with the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister. It was at this moment that the results of the "Peace Ballot" were announced. If a general election had been held just then most competent observers agree that the cabinet would have been defeated. Throughout his career as minister Sir John Simon had revealed only a mediocre character. In 1914 as Attorney General in the Asquith cabinet he voted for entrance into the war; he voted with great damage to his conscience, but he voted nevertheless. Two years later, when it became evident that the war would be lost if the British people did not resign itself to conscription, his scruples reawoke and this time overcame him. This man who willed the end did not will the means. The episode summarizes him completely. History will recount that with him came to an end the postwar British policy of easy optimism and hopefulness; that when the walls began to topple he made vague efforts to persuade France to adopt a common policy with England, but then shrank back; and that he left only ruins to his successors.

IV

With the advent of Sir Samuel Hoare and the Italian aggression in East Africa began a second effort to reconstruct British foreign policy. When the first Italian bombs fell on Abyssinian villages on October 3, 1935, Italy violated four treaties: the tripartite convention of 1906 in which England, France and Italy regulated their respective economic interests and undertook to maintain the independence of the Empire of the Negus; the Covenant of the League of Nations; the Briand-Kellogg Pact; and the Italo-Abyssinian treaty of friendship of 1928. It was a wholesale attack on international law. But the conflict did not exist only between Italy and the League of Nations. England herself was directly provoked. Mr. Eden went to Rome at the end of June to remonstrate with Signor Mussolini, but the reply he got was in effect that England no longer could speak as mistress of the Mediterranean.

At first the Baldwin-Hoare government seemed resolved to take up the gauntlet. During the first half of September a large part of the British fleet was concentrated between Gibraltar and Alexandria. Great Britain up to then had always interpreted

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Article 10 of the Covenant (providing for sanctions against an aggressor) in a most limited sense; now she suddenly passed over to the opposite attitude and threatened her adversary with military sanctions. On September 24, after a cabinet meeting in Downing Street, Sir Robert Vansittart asked France to join in the precautionary naval measures taken by Great Britain on the basis of Paragraph 3 of Article 16; and on the same day the British Naval Attaché at Paris made a similar *démarche* at the Ministry of the Marine. I shall not deal here with the conduct of M. Laval, who in Rome on January 7, 1935, had given Mussolini a free hand in Ethiopia, and who subsequently always accorded Italy a wholly unjustified priority in French policy — unjustified relative to France's other political associates, England, the Little Entente, the Balkan Entente and Soviet Russia, not to mention the League of Nations itself. Here was where M. Laval missed the chance of chaining London to an interpretation of the Covenant which exactly coincided with French aspirations; for the interpretations which could have been extracted from England at that moment would have held Pan-Germanism in check by the menace of automatic action and the massing of superior forces. Instead M. Laval took the heart out of Britain's new determination in international affairs and set up a formidable current of hostility against France.

But what can be said of Mr. Baldwin and the majority of his colleagues? Ought they to have mobilized the British fleet if they were not determined, having adopted that course, to go through with it to the very end, even to blockading the Red Sea? In the first half of September should they have conceded to M. Laval that there would be no recourse to military coercion? And when M. Laval, wishing to pin them down on this, offered them all the economic sanctions *en bloc*, why not have taken him at his word instead of deciding that it was better to apply them gradually one after the other? What a strange spectacle it was! On one hand a deafening warlike tumult. On the other a naïve, almost timid, assurance that Italy could be brought back into the international order without subjecting her to too violent pressure. The theory was that the Italo-Abyssinian military operations would take so long that there would be time for the gradual application of sanctions to ruin Italy; that it was possible to temporize in the enforcement of "collective security;" that the fifty states members of the League could act nonchalantly, to

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suit their own convenience; that there was no need for a given state or group of states to assume greater risks than others took; that all the fifty states must keep in step, like dancers on the stage, for fear lest the performance of one might surpass that of the others. The legal lights of Geneva, firmly convinced that London had decided to utilize its full powers, had drawn up (October 7) a procedure for determining the aggressor that left the widest possible latitude to the initiative of individual states. It was decided not to have a vote of the Council but simply declarations by sovereign states. By means of the Coördination Committee (a diplomatic conference legally distinct from the League itself), Sir Samuel Hoare strove to blend British action with collective action. Then one fine day, in doubt whether he could count on France if the oil sanction were imposed and the British fleet attacked, he threw himself into the famous compromise of December 8. What Sir Samuel Hoare really hoped from collective action was to secure all the advantages of war and at the same time all the advantages of peace. The fact that fifty states are supposed to act in concert was shown to mean that each need put forth a minimum of effort.

When it came to planning the details of application the same naïveté was shown. The Jugoslavs promised their aid in case of hostilities; but when they asked, as was natural, what part the British naval and air forces would take in protecting the Dalmatian coast, the British military experts replied coldly that the subject did not interest them. In the same way the French general staff had to spend much time making London understand what enormous responsibilities, both on land and on sea, in Africa and in Europe, France would have to fulfill in case of war with Italy. No wonder Geneva could not prevail against Italy. The League of Nations is not a metaphysical divinity. It is subject to physical laws. If this ordeal means that England has rid herself of a dangerous myth to the contrary, then the price will not have been too high. The reform of the League of Nations is not to be achieved in the Covenant but in the mind and the heart of the ministers who must carry it out.

V

Signor Mussolini's brutal sense of reality, the ramblings of French and British policy, were not slow in producing their effects. Hitler was offered a great opportunity. He seized it with

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alacrity. On March 7, overruling the Reichswehr generals who told him that the new German military machine was not yet prepared for war, he ordered the reoccupation of the demilitarized zone of the Rhine, thereby tearing up the Locarno Pact just as a year before he had scrapped the military clauses of Versailles. The moment was well chosen. In England, a scant month after the elections, the prestige of the ministry had already been shaken by its enemies' accusation that it had asked and received the country's confidence under false pretenses. In France M. Laval had confused public opinion by his efforts to favor Germany and Italy against England, the Little Entente and Soviet Russia. Nevertheless, all could have been saved if the Sarraut-Flandin ministry had held to its decision (made and communicated to Mr. Eden on March 3) to mobilize three classes of reserves and to seize German territory as security. Asked to give immediate support to the French Army as stipulated in Article 4, Paragraph 3 of the Locarno Pact, England wriggled out. I ask anyone who inclines to quarrel with my statement to reread the text: the engagement was categorical. Today we know that if the French Army had crossed the frontier, the Reichswehr would not have accepted battle: it had received the order to evacuate the demilitarized zone. Would the Hitler régime have survived this humiliation? At any rate, the opportunity was lost.

Though this mistake can be charged to France — incidentally MM. Sarraut and Flandin probably did their best, but were hampered by the public's apathy — what about the operations of the British cabinet? It was composed of men who, taken one by one, might be called eminent. Considered collectively, they gave the impression of being directed by Mr. Pickwick in person. On March 10, Mr. Eden, the new Foreign Secretary, arrived in Paris with Lord Halifax. Their surprising thesis was that as the Treaty of Locarno had just been eliminated by the action of one of the signatory governments, there was nothing left but to negotiate another treaty of the same sort with the same government. As Mr. Titulesco remarked, this meant that the Locarno Treaty became null and void on the very instant there took place the event in anticipation of which the Treaty had been made. Mr. Eden, Lord Halifax, and Mr. Neville Chamberlain (successor-designate, to all intents and purposes, of Mr. Baldwin) wound up by recognizing that the result of the coup of March 7 was to transform the Locarno agreement into a sort of pact of solidarity

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between England, France, Belgium, and even Italy (that is, when Italy should have come to terms with Geneva!) for the defense of the *status quo* in the Rhineland. But while the English cabinet on March 9 spontaneously recognized the obligation to support France and Belgium if they were attacked, it neglected the other duty formulated in the contract of 1925: it refused to apply financial and economic sanctions against Germany in order to reëstablish the demilitarized zone. Its pretext was that the mass of the British people opposed a continuance of the former inequality of rights between France and Germany. But on this last point it contradicted itself. In the "propositions" accepted by France, England, Belgium and Italy (who did not ratify them) on March 19, the British cabinet agreed that in the course of the pending negotiations they would press "for the adoption of provisions intended to prohibit or to limit the subsequent establishment of fortifications in a zone to be determined." Likewise, the first paragraph of the letter delivered by the Foreign Office on April 3 to the ambassadors of France and Belgium refers to this same question. "His Majesty's Government," the letter read, "will at once consider . . . the steps to be taken to meet the new situation" which would be created "if the effort of conciliation [proposed March 19] . . . should fail."

Today there clearly exists only one way to prevent the Reichswehr from fortifying the Rhine — by war. Did Mr. Baldwin and his colleagues really wish to commit themselves to that? No; they believed, contrary to all probabilities, that by persuasion they could extract the necessary promise either from Herr von Ribbentrop or from Hitler himself. And now that their illusions have been dispelled, they are seeking to trade off the clause forbidding the fortification of the Rhineland (already violated by the Reichswehr) in return for Germany's participation in a system of mutual assistance providing security in Central and Eastern Europe. Obviously the fortification of the Rhineland would greatly disturb the effectiveness of any plan of mutual assistance between France, the Little Entente and Soviet Russia, since it would permit the Reich to hold the French forces in check with a few hundred thousand men while it used the bulk of its man power to overwhelm the rest of the continent. But it is entirely unlikely that England will persuade Berlin to participate in a really effective system of mutual assistance for Central and Eastern Europe.

Of course England should never have thought of the Rhineland

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coup as a question of "equal rights" but as another step in Germany's preparation for war — Winston Churchill's thesis. From now on the question becomes whether the governments of London and Paris will permit the preponderance of material forces to pass to Germany. The French army is still superior to the German; but in twelve or eighteen months this superiority will have disappeared. After having let herself slip into an alarming state of military weakness, will England be able to speed up her rearmament, and, with the other associates of France, fill in the gap? This is the whole problem. No other exists. All the current diplomatic conversations about other matters are purely ornamental. On January 12, at the close of a Council presided over by General von Blomberg, the Reichswehr generals had to recommend caution to Hitler. If the day ever comes when they can say to him: "You are the stronger!" — on that day European peace is finished. Irresistibly Hitler will undertake to make over European law just as he has already made over German law. We French and English, practically without exception, hate and dread war. We feel that our common civilization would very likely perish if there were another war, and that the consequences of the collapse would be like what happened to Greco-Latin society during the fifth and sixth centuries. We are not justified in imagining that Hitler has any such sentiment. Europe has entered into an era in which military power ready for instant use counts more than any other element.

Looking back over this outline of British diplomacy one discovers a dominant factor — public opinion. During the postwar years the English people, immersed in its daily occupations and pleasures, paid no attention to what was going on in the rest of the world. That in the end it awoke is something, maybe a great deal. But this public opinion constitutes a force which is illogical, sentimental, capricious. The fact that it is quiescent at one moment seems only to mean that the next moment it will break out in all the greater fury. Its highs and lows are unpredictable. It has no fixed point of reference. Yet as it gyrates it carries both Parliament and cabinet with it. This is dangerous, because Germany and those who are determined to resist her will both count on having British opinion on their side; and in the end one or the other will necessarily have been deceived. It is as though a badly stowed cargo could sink the European ship by shifting violently from side to side, now to starboard, now to port, like a sort of

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battering-ram. Unless the English ministers have the wisdom and knowledge necessary to inform and guide the sentimental and impressionable mass which is English opinion there can be no long-term accord between Paris and London. And a long-term accord (a "deterrent" as Mr. Baldwin has often repeated) is indispensable if events are to be held under control. The question is whether Mr. Baldwin and his colleagues are capable of evolving a well-rounded doctrine on the problem of war and peace. Can they decide to live otherwise than from day to day? Their talk, both public and private, makes us wonder. As far as western Europe and the Rhine frontier are concerned, it seems now that a certain point of view has taken shape and must in the end prevail over alternative policies — and in this regard Mr. Eden's courageous speech in the Commons on March 26 marks the decisive turning point. Ever since June 1934 Mr. Baldwin had spoken in much the same terms; but on December 13 last he declared again in the Commons that he doubted whether England would be serving the interests of peace by making known in advance that she would range herself in one camp rather than the other!

England will not let France, Belgium and Holland succumb. The current question is whether she will disinterest herself from the general problem of Pan-Germanism, leave things along and beyond the Danube to chance, and forget that the war which she won in 1918 was above all, to use Count Sforza's energetic expression, the war of the Austrian Succession. Those who speak thoughtlessly of abolishing Articles 10 and 16 of the Covenant answer these questions in the affirmative. Have they reflected on what would happen to us in the west of Europe if next door to us there again should arise German *Mittel-Europa?* Uncertainty is no longer permissible. London must make up its mind one way or the other. Once some stable notions become firmly planted in the minds of the ministers, and percolate through them into the national mind, we may hope for the dawn of the conviction that in crucial moments certain risks must be accepted if greater risks are to be avoided. This lesson must also be learnt by the French Government and by the French people. If not, the *virtuosi* of the "fait accompli," the Hitlers and Mussolinis, will push the world over into the abyss.

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MR. HIROTA'S THIRD POINT

By Edgar Snow

AMONG the numerous threads feeding day by day into the uneven fabric of Sino-Japanese history one glowing strand is never lost. It is described somewhat tritely by rulers of both countries as The Red Menace. It is so clearly of importance in the present Sino-Japanese crisis that it needs to be closely examined. About the pivotal idea of *fan-kung*, or "counter-communism," may turn the fate of all China.

Although the Japanese desire to "coöperate" with Nanking has often found expression in demands for a Sino-Japanese understanding against communist intrusions, the project of an anti-Red alliance was not given recognition as an organic part of Japan's China policy until last autumn. It was done then with the formulation of the Three Points of Mr. Hirota, at that time Japanese Foreign Minister, today Premier of his country.

The Hirota program defined Japan's requirements in China in the following order: (1) the abandonment by China of "her policy of playing one foreign country against another," and positive demonstrations by Nanking, affecting all phases of Chinese life, of a sincere desire to coöperate with Japan; (2) "recognition by Nanking of the existence of Manchukuo," and the realization of a Japan-China-Manchukuo economic bloc; (3) "formation of a common front against the Chinese communists and the further extension of Red Influence in China."

In the tradition of Oriental diplomacy, the last item is the most heavily freighted with meaning. The other two are complementary. Neither of them can be realized with any degree of permanence or security without the third. The Red power in China, with all its internal potentialities, and with the prospect it offers of a close union between Soviet China and the U. S. S. R., now constitutes a major obstacle in the path of Japanese imperialism.

It seems probable that when Sino-Japanese negotiations reach a critical moment we shall hear less and less about formal recognition of Manchukuo, or even about the three-partite economic agreement as an independent principle. Japan's determination on these issues may gracefully bend within the arc of diplomatic manœuvre. Her insistence upon point three, however, is unlikely to diminish in any respect. Confirmation of this was given in the

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recent military demonstration in Tokyo. For the third point is the Army's point. Evidence is abundant to show that when the General Staff compromised on Hirota as Admiral Okada's successor it was with the understanding that he would not delay in attempting to consummate the anti-Red alliance.

The public statements of leading Japanese are in harmony with this view. In his first official statement, issued shortly after being received in Imperial audience as Premier, Hirota reiterated his intention to enforce the three-point program. When Mr. Arita took over the portfolio of Foreign Minister, he seconded his chief's statement with the comment that the primary purpose of his diplomacy would be "to seek the realization of Sino-Japanese joint action against the communists." Significant also were the remarks of General Count Hisaichi Terauchi, Minister of War, at the opening meeting of the new Army-made Cabinet, held over the grave of Japanese liberalism. The General frankly expressed his wish to begin at once "the enforcement of joint defensive action by Japan, Manchukuo and China against the infiltration of Red troops into North China." In Peiping about the same time, General Kenji Doihara, nimblest-witted of the empire-makers, told the writer that it was not only Japan's right but "her duty and responsibility to extirpate communism in China and preserve peace and order in East Asia," because, you see, communism is "fundamentally opposed to our Oriental ideas," and troubles the progress of Sino-Japanese coöperation. When in April General Koryo Matsumuro arrived in Peiping he brought correspondents this cheerful statement: "The Japanese Empire is ready to pay any price, to make any sacrifice, that may be necessary . . . in saving the country [China] and defending it against communism." Finally, the signing of the mutual-defense protocol between Outer Mongolia and the U. S. S. R. has given a stern note of urgence to Japanese demands for joint operations (in the words of Mr. Arita) "to save the Orient from the danger of being overwhelmed by bolshevik influence."

These and similar pronouncements indicate the vehicle in which the Japanese militarists hope to ride into China. They see that the anti-Red principle provides, for the first time, a meeting ground for the class interests common to themselves and to the Chinese compradores who influence Nanking. By skilful use of the *fan-kung* motto they hope to: (a) solve important problems in continental strategy presented by the Soviet penetration of

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Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia; (b) achieve political, military, economic and cultural "coördination" between China, Japan and Manchukuo; and (c) gradually impose *de facto* suzerainty over the whole of China, without provoking further international complications for the Japanese Government.

Let us see what the Japanese would like the anti-communist agreement to embrace eventually. In the domain of military action they want legalized access "in emergencies" to the ports, rivers and the strategic centers of China. The agreement would naturally mean the appointment of numerous Japanese military experts and technicians. Japanese munitions would be used wherever possible, as in Manchuria before 1931. Japanese officers would be engaged in various branches of the Chinese army, including aviation. Replacement of the present German advisers to the Chinese General Staff would be considered imperative.

Strategically it would mean, of course, regardless of whether or not a written pact were brought into existence, the beginning of joint preparations in Tokyo and Nanking for war against the U. S. S. R. In all probability the Japanese would at first concentrate their activity along the frontiers of northwest China and Inner Mongolia, laying down and fortifying air bases, and digging deep into the southern flank of Outer Mongolia and the eastern flank of Turkestan. With the conclusion of the Russo-Mongol alliance these preparations become more immediately necessary. If China's air fleet were made available to Japanese command, the bases could be used for raids that might strike decisive blows at the industrial plant and communications of Siberia and vitiate the offensive power of the Russian Army in the East.

Economically, the Japanese envisage a number of advantages in a joint anti-Red agreement. Japanese loans or credits would be made on a large scale to support Nanking's program of reconstruction and to finance its campaigns against the increasing "Red remnants" — for which enterprise, at the moment, no other foreign help is perceptible to Chiang Kai-shek. He would give security by mortgaging to Japanese financiers important remaining Chinese raw materials such as iron and coal, to pay for goods furnished by semi-government heavy industries of Japan, and by committing China to a policy of economic collaboration with Japan to the virtual exclusion of the Western Powers. This would mean the execution of the Amau Statement of 1934. Special arrangements would be made for the triangular

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trade of China, Manchukuo and Japan. In particular, economic coöperation between Japan and North China would become closer. In exchange for the latter's cotton, for example, Japan might be expected to contribute the war materials and money by which the northern militarists would disperse the Chinese Reds in the direction of Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang.

Culturally, ideologically, the effects of an anti-Red pact would, the Japanese hope, be far-reaching. Inherent in the Hirota program is the desire to exclude all "dangerous thoughts" from the curriculum now offered in the more advanced government colleges, universities and middle schools. This means an even stricter regimentation of thought than has yet been enforced by the sub-fascist dictatorship of Marshal Chiang. Its aim, from the Japanese standpoint, would be the Manchukuo and East Hopei ideal, with emphasis on Confucianism, the political philosophy of Wang An-Shih, and Wang Tao — which furnish the common ideological basis for Japan's "Kingly Way" in Manchukuo and Chiang Kai-shek's "New Life Movement" in China. Control of public opinion, with extreme penalties for all transgressors against "Sino-Japanese friendship," would obviously be necessary. We should probably see the formation of anti-communist associations, such as now exist in autonomous East Hopei, to fight the present anti-Japanese national liberation associations which flourish despite Nanking's efforts to suppress them.

If an anti-Red agreement were reached with Japan, China's international position would be much altered. The Chinese Government's hands would be virtually tied in the event of a Japanese clash with a third Power. Occidental sympathy for Nanking would tend to dissolve: the world in general would lose interest in the fate of a government which accepted nominal existence by the grace of an invader and used the latter's forces against a section of its own people in revolt. We know that precisely this kind of thing has happened several times in Chinese history.

Marshal Chiang could probably resign himself to all these implications, as the price of making peace with Japan, were it not for the internal difficulties which he would encounter. The Western Powers have after all done nothing to preserve him except to sell him munitions and airplanes and pilots in exchange for his peasants' good silver. Geneva's support proved only of sentimental value. It does not answer the question in Chiang's mind: "Who is going to come to my rescue if I go to war with Japan

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rather than submit?" The lifeline of rhetoric thrown out by the League to Haile Selassie cannot much encourage the Marshal.

If the Reds in China were really only the "bloodthirsty bandits" described by Kuomintang propaganda, if they did not comprise a deepening and broadening opposition to the Nanking régime, if they did not express the growing political will of the Chinese masses, Marshal Chiang could, as a manœuvre, accept Hirota's Third Point without grave consequences. The breathing spell thus attained might be held to be worth the sacrifices. The Japanese program would take several years to mature. If Chiang meanwhile could strengthen and consolidate his own command he might with some reason hope for a major change in world forces that would give him an opportunity to recover and perhaps to face Japan. But the difficulties of this course are clear. Any tactical advantages gained by temporary submission to Japan would be more than offset now by the mortal weakening — if not the prompt collapse — of Nanking's power.

In that event the Chinese Red Army and the Communist Party would become the decisive military and political factors in China. Nothing would more clearly expose the fundamental character and limitations of the Nanking government than a further sacrifice of national sovereignty under the guise of Sino-Japanese joint action against communism. The fact is that recent developments have bestowed upon the Chinese communists an important power of initiative in determining *national* policies. The Red Army is already in many ways a serious contender with Nanking for national leadership. And it probably is still far from its maximum influence.

This conclusion is not reached alone on the basis of the recent Red offensives in Shansi, Shensi, Suiyuan and Kweichow, nor on the astounding spread of partisan warfare in many distressed agrarian areas. With regard to the extent and importance of territory occupied, of total fighters mobilized, of equipment, organization and command, the Reds still offer only a secondary military challenge, whatever their political importance. But in the national crisis provoked by the Japanese advance, the Reds see a chance of vastly increasing their following. As Wang Ming said in his recent speech before the congress of the Comintern, of all the armed forces in China "only the Red Army comes out openly under the slogan of 'national-revolutionary war of the

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armed people against Japanese imperialism, in defense of the integrity, independence and unification of China.'"

But do the Reds really mean it? Would they really fight Japan if they were in power, as increasing thousands of students, intellectuals and members of the petite bourgeoisie now seem to believe? The writer inclines to give an affirmative reply. The rôle of the Communist Party as an active political and military rival to Nanking resides in its ability and will to carry through the creative regeneration of the Chinese masses. This premises a condition of national freedom. Without it the Reds have no function. Therefore, to the extent to which they succeed in leading the struggle not only for social and economic but also for *national* liberation, depends the validity of their claims to power. The Communist Party, which directs the Red Army, today sees very clearly that "only by a general mobilization of the entire Chinese people for a national-revolutionary struggle against imperialism," and only by the use of the "tactics of the anti-imperialist united front," can it hope to achieve its ideological aims. For the communists there is nothing to be lost by a war with Japan, and there is a socialist world to be won. For the warlords, on the contrary, there is everything to be lost, and nothing to be won but honorable mention in history.

This has been true since 1931, but several new phenomena make it truer than ever today.

First, the communists profoundly believe that the Kuomintang has lost not only its revolutionary impetus but also its remaining nationalistic character, and that this fact allows them to undertake the joint development of national and class liberation. Out of this thesis has come the present strategy of proposing "to the entire Chinese people, to all parties, groups, troops, mass organizations, and all prominent political and social leaders that they participate jointly with us in organizing an All-Chinese united people's government of national defense."

Secondly, many leading Chinese are now convinced that only by a strong alliance with Soviet Russia can China hope to survive in the contest against Japanese imperialism, and that such an alliance would become possible only under the leadership, or at least only after the legalization of, the Chinese Communist Party.

Thirdly, the Red Armies under Mao Tse-tung, Pang Teh-huai and Liu Tze-tan have expanded from Shensi far into neighboring Shansi, and partisan warfare and propagandizing is occurring in

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southern Suiyuan. Both these provinces are adjacent to Hopei and Chahar, which Japan now regards as her semi-protectorate. This situation suggests the possibility in the near future of a direct conflict between the Japanese "guest troops" and the "Red bandits." The most effective propaganda used by the Reds in Shansi called upon the provincial troops to "give the People's National Liberation Red Army a pathway to fight the Imperialist invaders." It seems to be definitely on the communist program to attack the Japanese troops now in occupation of Chahar and northern Hopei.

Suppose that happens? Suppose the Reds break through the walls of government troops now carefully separating them from the Japanese? Suppose they send off a column across northern Suiyuan and Chahar and establish contact with a source of supplies in Outer Mongolia? Or across Kansu and Chinghai to connect with the U. S. S. R. through Sinkiang? And suppose that Japan sends a punitive expedition deep into China against them? If at that moment a *fan-kung* agreement exists between Chiang Kai-shek and the Japanese, Chiang would be obligated to continue his own campaigns against the Reds in coöperation with his allies. But this procedure would invite disaffections which might permanently undermine his command.

There is no question that if the Chinese Red Army comes into serious contact with the Japanese its prestige would ascend more rapidly than did that of the 19th Route Army in Shanghai. This increased popularity would not be confined to students, intellectuals, and politically-conscious peasants and workers, as at present, but would draw enthusiasts from sections of the petite bourgeoisie and even the national bourgeoisie, who have already felt the economic, social and political effects of Japanese operations in Manchuria and China. And it must be remembered that all those elements are represented in Nanking's soldiery. It would therefore appear fatal for Chiang Kai-shek to throw an army against the back of the Reds rather than against the Japanese, once these had come into conflict and once the Reds had clearly demonstrated their readiness to defend the national interests against Japanese imperialism.

If the analysis is correct, what will Chiang Kai-shek do? It is impossible to examine his past conduct in detail here; but we may draw upon it for a certain amount of guidance in interpreting his feelings at the present time. It seems likely that he will

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find further pretexts to postpone a Sino-Japanese "settlement," but that when menaced he probably will agree to negotiate on the basis of the Hirota formula. The conferences will be prolonged as much as possible. In the end he will refuse to sign any treaty on the Hirota basis. That will not rule out the possibility of a verbal agreement, or something on the order of the Ho-Umetsu understanding — which is, however, extremely unlikely to satisfy the Japanese. Chiang will then face the consequences of his position, which in this case will mean the definite detachment of North China above the Yellow River and the creation of a second Manchukuo. Chiang himself will not sanction this, but will again shift the responsibility to the northern militarists.

Meanwhile it will be imperative for Chiang to continue with the only positive side of his policy — the relentless suppression of the communists. During the coming months he is likely to make a supreme effort to annihilate the Red Army as a military factor in China. He still seems to believe this possible. As his whole strategy in this stage is to avoid the making of a "premature" decision, he cannot afford to run the risk of having his ten-year enemies, the communists, force this decision on him by precipitating the war with Japan which he is sacrificing so much to delay. He showed his determination to prevent this at all costs when he rushed heavy forces into Shansi to restrain only 20,000 Red Army troops whose phenomenal drive threatened to carry them into Hopei and into conflict with the Japanese.

With the amputation of North China, however, Chiang Kai-shek will have exhausted his sphere of manœuvre. If he is able to live through this period without being overthrown from within, without losing important forces to the side of the "anti-Japanese Red Army," then the next stage will be framed in terms of inescapable war or submission. Until the eleventh hour he will wait for Japan to sink into the Pacific, or go to war with Russia, or with America, or . . . But when the bombs begin dropping at his feet it is possible to believe that he will fight.

There remains, however, the possibility that the Chinese Red Army may deprive him of that last power of decision. If it does, then Chiang will be left nothing but the direct and open choice which he has adroitly avoided until now, the choice inexorably posed in Hirota's Third Point: Japan, and the preservation of capitalism, but the loss of China's independence; or communism, and the end of capitalism, but China still sovereign.

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THE DICTATORS DISCOVER SPORT

By John R. Tunis

THE dictators have discovered sport. This was inevitable. Middle-aged and older persons have their roots in the ground, have affiliations with former régimes. The hope of the dictators, therefore, was to win over youth to the new conception of life, the new system. They found that they could best succeed through sport. From being a simple source of amusement and recreation, it became a means to an end, a weapon in the hands of the All Highest. It became nationalistic. The ideal of sport for sport's sake became an object of ridicule. The real preoccupation of those who directed athletics became the mass production of cannon fodder.

Nobody would say that in most democracies, and especially in the United States, athletics has yet reached a utopian state of perfection. But the commercialization of sport which we know affects only a relatively small number of persons in a few publicized branches of American sport. In the nations ruled by dictators, however, every boy and girl in the country is regimented and exploited.

It was not until the advent of Stalin that the far-reaching possibilities of sport as a means of influencing and controlling the young were appreciated. He it was who arranged the general scheme of sport in Russia. Mussolini adapted the Russian plan, with some changes. When Hitler rose to power in Germany in 1933 he went his colleagues one better. There naturally are differences in the manner in which sport is conducted in these three nations; but, as we shall see, the differences are not fundamental. In all of them sport no longer exists primarily for the amusement and recreation of youth, but as the serious business of everyone from the time the child can walk until the man or woman has passed military age. Details differ. But in all three nations it is true that sport is only an instrument in the hands of a leader. He uses it for three main purposes:

First, to keep the young people busy, and hence contented. You cannot grumble, agitate, propagandize, or join in seditious movements against the government in power if you have been marching or exercising all day in the open air. Regimented sport thoroughly tires out the young and so serves as an excellent

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sedative. It keeps the younger and naturally insurgent elements of the community from thinking too much about internal political conditions and lack of employment.

Second, the dictators have cleverly used sport as propaganda. No sensible person believes that a victory for the United States at the coming Olympic Games would furnish proof of American racial, intellectual, moral or physical superiority. Not so in dictatorship countries. In an international football match the national honor is at stake, and a victory calls for a day of rejoicing, for country-wide celebrations. Is France defeated by Germany in the Davis Cup tennis matches? A whole country hangs on the words of the blonde Teuton sitting beside the microphone in the Stade Roland Garros in Paris, and accepts the triumph as one more proof of the righteousness and strength of National Socialism. If Italy conquers England in football, Mussolini plays up the victory as another example of the superiority of a fascist state over a democracy.

Third and principally, sport in the lands of the dictator has for its end "the making of men capable of defense of the Fatherland." It does not matter that this defense may take the young men as far afield as the borders of China or the burning sands of East Africa. To greater or less degree, Italy, Germany and Russia are today armed camps. In each, pleasure, sport, individuality, are all subordinated to the assumed military needs of the nation. Sport becomes just one branch of army training. Can the moral degradation of the ideals of sport be carried further?

Just how all this works out in the three countries concerned will be explained. But first I digress to recall an incident that happened several years ago when I was standing late one afternoon in the lobby of a famous Central European hotel. Along came a group of war veterans; at least they might have been thought to be war veterans had their ages been right. Limping, hobbling, patched and battered, they were the football team of Czechoslovakia. Their Italian opponents that afternoon had gone out to win regardless of the rules and the umpire; they had hammered, hit and gouged their way to victory. And so would you in their places, knowing what would be the attitude taken at home to men who proved themselves so unworthy as to lose in an international contest of such obvious importance. The honor of Italy was at stake, and maybe something more than honor for each of the team individually.

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II

This is not the place to detail the enormous advances which Russia has made in athletics in the last twenty years, advances unequalled in any other country. Anyone interested in sport has heard of Lulko, the Moscow sprinter who does the hundred metres in 10.3, the same time that Eddie Tolan made in winning the event in the last Olympics. We all have read of the athletic prowess of the Russian young women. Whereas there were 600,000 practising sportsmen in the Soviet Union in 1926 there are 2,000,000 today. The Dynamo Stadium in the capital is one of the most complete athletic plants anywhere on earth, with a cinder track, a cyclist track, five tennis courts with a seating accommodation around one of them for 4,000, two basketball courts, three volley ball courts, a football field and two practice fields, a large gymnasium, a hotel of sixty rooms with baths, lockers and equipment — all this besides space in the stadium proper for seating 60,000 spectators.

The credit for the very real progress which sport has made in Russia (and I believe the Russians have obtained greater value from their program than the population of the other dictatorial nations), should go to Stalin. He was the first dictator really to discover sports; the others have merely seized upon the idea and broadened it. "Every citizen," said Stalin, "has a duty to be physically fit and ready to repulse any attack from outside." Of course he had no real interest in sport as sport, but only as training for physical health; he was interested in athletics for the masses because the soldiery of the nation comes from the masses and a physically fit nation means a fit army.

In 1930 Stalin signed the decree organizing physical education throughout all Soviet Russia. Private sporting clubs and organizations were abolished and athletics of every kind were placed in the hands of the state. The Council of Physical Education which governs sport today is composed of eighty members, including some of the most important leaders of the Communist Party. It meets once a month to discuss policies. Control is decentralized through committees directing sport through the workmen's syndicates, the peasants' coöperatives, the army, and the OGPU. Sub-committees range from those which have authority over local sport in each republic all the way down to sporting committees in each factory which are chosen by the workers them-

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selves. In principle, each factory has its own sports ground. An average sports ground for factory workers in Russia will contain several soccer football fields, a track, half a dozen tennis courts, volley ball courts, and other facilities. M. Robert Perrier in his brilliant book, "Les Camarades Sur Le Stade," states that in Leningrad football is the popular sport, with cross country running next. Leningrad, for instance, has seven large sport clubs, five belonging to factories and two to the municipality, as well as thirty-five clubs attached to small industrial plants. There are approximately 250,000 athletes in this city alone, among them 28,000 who in 1934 had already passed the "P.T.D." test.

The "P.T.D." test — "Ready for Work and Defense" — amounts to a kind of pentathlon. It is open to any citizen of any age or sex; those who pass it obtain a degree which is an honor, and which may indeed be considered such. The idea started in 1930, and has been developed so successfully that up to the present time almost 2,000,000 Russians have passed the test. The number could be equalled with difficulty in a country even as well advanced athletically as the United States. The test has recently been supplemented by a second one even more severe, requiring feats still more difficult. The first ten graduates of this second course were all officers of the Red Army.

Better than anything, the "P.T.D." shows just how Soviet Russia has militarized sport. The test of course includes the usual classical runs, jumps, vaults and so on, all of which must be accomplished within certain standards to obtain the diploma. For example, the 100-metre run must be covered within 14 seconds. Try that some time and see how easy it is to run 100 yards at the rate of 8 yards a second! But there are other requirements even more difficult. You must be able to throw a hand grenade 35 metres; ski ten kilometres; swim 50 metres with a gun; walk one kilometre with a gas mask on; ride; shoot; read a map; and give first aid. All very sporting. Those obtaining high marks are the *corps d'élite* of Russian sport. They are usually sent to one of the well-known athletic training schools in Moscow or Leningrad, where they may be turned into champions for the purpose of edifying and setting an example to the masses (there is no professionalism in Russia), or they may become physical instructors in schools, factories or the army.

The militarization of sport in Soviet Russia is taken as a matter of course. It is considered that every citizen has a duty

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to develop his body and put it at the service of the nation. It might strike an American as amazing that a body of workers playing football near their factory should suddenly, at the call of a whistle, stop playing, change into uniforms, and appear to do an hour's drill, crawling, running and jumping with their bayonets in their hands. It would not be anything out of the ordinary in a country where everyone, whether in the army at the moment or not, is expected to be physically fit and ready when and if called on to fight. Everyone in good health is a potential soldier; and every potential soldier must be in good health.

The Red Army itself is the sporting center of the country. In most cities it has the largest, best equipped and most luxurious sports ground. Specialization is strictly forbidden. In addition to regular drills and training, the private has several hours a day when he must devote himself to some form of unsupervised sport. The officers are capable sportsmen themselves, and are assisted by graduates of the various Institutes of Physical Education.

There are signs that as sport grows in Russia it will change somewhat, that the champion system no matter how rigorously forbidden will creep in (indeed, has begun quietly to creep in already), that competition with outside nations may some day be allowed. But the basic principle on which Stalin has organized Russian athletics, the idea that sport has only one function, to better the race and make the youth of the nation ready to fight — that idea will never be changed or supplanted so long as the dictatorship lasts. In Soviet Russia as in the other dictatorships sport and politics are inseparable.

III

Mussolini from the beginning appreciated the importance of athletics as a means of moulding the youth of Italy in the fascist tradition and for fascist ends. With the Soviet example before him he saw early that sport could be used to militarize the nation; he also saw that it was possible to go further than Soviet Russia had gone.

Mussolini obviously had an easier task than Stalin, for whereas the Soviet leader was obliged to educate the masses to athletics, Il Duce was dealing with a nation that already knew much about sport. For despite propaganda to prove that there was no such thing as sport in the peninsula before the war, Italian sport by no means dates from the March on Rome. There was sport and

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there were sporting organizations in Italy long before fascism. The Italian Alpine Club was founded in 1863, the Cycling Federation was formed in 1870, in 1910 the Cross Country Union came into being, while football clubs were started in Genoa and Turin about 1895. Recent figures give the members of the various sporting federations as around 800,000 persons. Some of these federations, such as the tennis federation with its 11,000 members, show a large increase over pre-fascist years; while others, like that of Alpinism with 60,000 members as against 40,000 in 1920, show a much smaller growth than has been registered in other countries, notably Austria and Czechoslovakia. The point is that there was sport in Italy before Il Duce seized power.[1]

Outside competition has never been permitted by the Soviet authorities, hence Soviet athletes have had no opportunity to measure their skill with foreigners. Mussolini had the idea of putting athletes to work in the service of the nation and of fascist ideology by entering them in international competitions. Matches with other lands have become a powerful weapon in his service, and just as graduates of small colleges in the United States receive a personal sense of satisfaction when their football team defeats the eleven of some large university, so in Italy victory over foreign lands becomes a salve, spread thickly on the national ego by the Duce. An Italian triumph in football, cycling, tennis, or any other sport, particularly if over old rivals like the French, is seized upon, written up and paraded as proof positive of the superiority of the race and its governing principles. While if natural athletes like the English are defeated, the victory becomes almost an occasion for a national holiday. Italians and Italian teams about to go abroad are "pepped up" by interviews with Il Duce; they receive telegrams of exhortation before beginning their matches and messages of congratulation afterwards if they have done well. When the cycling team in the *Tour de France* placed up in front, Achille Starace, President of the Italian Olympic Committee and at the same time Secretary of the Fascist Party, sent a wire expressing the confidence of Il Duce and the country. In short, it is impressed on the Italian athlete that "he represents not himself alone but the entire nation in a struggle for the existence of a national culture." "Athletes of Italy," shouts Il Duce, "remember that when you fight outside the borders of Italy, you carry the honor, the sporting prestige

[1] *Cf.* G. Salvemini, "Under the Axe of Fascism." New York: Viking, 1936.

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of the nation in your muscles, your bodies and your souls."[2]

In 1925, all athletics, sports, amusements for workers, and cultural training were made fascist (or as they say in Germany, *gleichgeschaltet*) and ordered to join a national organization called the *Dopolavoro*, or National After-Work Guild. This is another method of supervising the free hours of the populace and it is carried out in a hierarchic manner through sporting societies. Theoretically, the object of the *Dopolavoro* was to enable the mass of workers in factories and fields to enjoy cultural benefits and sporting facilities after work. Actually, all workers' athletic associations were obliged to join the *Dopolavoro*, a huge organization closely allied to the Fascist Party and governed entirely by party officials. Some of the finest homes of the old Socialist Party, such as the Spreti Palace in Ravenna and the Casa del Popolo in Rome, were given over to the *Dopolavoro*.

Thus sport ceased to be a free activity and became a function of the government. Inside each branch of sport arose a hierarchy, a relationship of master and servant, so that athletics gradually assumed the moral characteristics of the régime. If you wanted to play golf, tennis, football or any other sport, you had to belong to a club controlled by the *Dopolavoro*, a club whose officials were not of your choosing but named by some party official in Rome; moreover, besides regular club dues, you had to pay annual dues of 2½ lire to the National Dopolavoro Institute. In 1926 the Secretary General of the Fascist Party went so far as to declare that the Italian Olympic Committee was a dependent organ charged with the duty of supervising all activities and sports, a fact so far overlooked by zealots who have protested against the same thing under Hitler.

"The youth of Italy," said the Secretary, "is now entirely fascist. Since everything which is Italian is placed under the nation's flag, it was only logical that the sporting world should likewise be ranged under its shadow." Those sporting organizations which preferred to manage their own affairs were dissolved. In 1929 he announced that he had "named secretaries for the national tennis, skiing, boxing, swimming, football and cyclist organizations." All of these were placed under the supervision of the Olympic Committee, headed by a fascist official.

Signor Maraviglia, a member of the Fascist Grand Council, puts the case for sports in this way: "Sport is not an end to itself.

[2] *Corriere della Sera*, November 18, 1934.

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It is no longer a matter of personal choice. Organizations are not built up in accordance with personal tastes, but along military lines. In this transformation we see one of the most interesting and important phases of fascism. Fascism avails itself of the various forms of sport, especially those with large groups of participants as a means of military preparation and spiritual development, that is, as a school for the national training of Italian youth. By popularizing and militarizing sports, fascism accomplishes its greatest governmental work."[3]

In step with the regimentation of all sporting activities came the increasing militarization of Italian youth. At first the training was restricted to the *Fasci di Giovanili*, young men of 18 to 21. Then it was extended to younger boys, and today an Italian lad starts his military preparation at the advanced age of 6 as a member of the *Figli della Lupa*, or "Sons of the She-Wolf." At 8 he is enrolled in the *Balilla* and given gas-mask drill, shooting practice with rifles and machine guns, special gymnastics, route marches and a period under canvas in the field so that he can step into the next higher branch thoroughly trained.

Nor are the girls neglected. In *Roma Fascista* of February 19, 1928, it was explained that "The Fascist Girls" (*Giovani Italiane*) would hold their first meeting that spring at Rome in the National Stadium. "Each one of them coming to the capital will carry a musket, Model 91. Among the contests, one given the highest weight in the scoring will be target shooting." Here is the clear indication of what Fascism intends to do with this new institution. "Perhaps," writes the Secretary General of the Party, "someone will protest and murmur. Let the Young Fascists raise their muskets aloft in answer."

The final step in the militarization of sport came last summer with the institution of the new weekend called the "Fascist Saturday." By a governmental decree all work stops on Saturdays at one in the afternoon, when all fascists are obliged to report to "their respective bodies to undergo political, cultural, sporting, and especially military, that is fascist, training."[4] Luckily, salaries were not permitted to be cut, all good fascists being given the privilege of making up the hours lost by overtime work during the week.

To Mussolini's mind, games are useful if they result in interna-

[3] *Tribuna*, July 5, 1929.
[4] *New York Herald* (Paris), dispatch from Rome, June 15, 1935.

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tional victories and so reveal fascist superiority. The results are watched, collected, catalogued and exploited, at home and abroad. From this point of view sport is a big nationalized industry. But this is really only a minor part of what sports are expected to accomplish. The real business of sport is to make soldiers. Through his development, control and militarization of sport, Mussolini has succeeded in making every male from 6 to 55 an actual or potential soldier.

IV

Hitlerism, it is often said, is a youth movement. But the same observation applies to Communism and Fascism. Each dictator saw from the start the importance of having youth on his side. Mussolini and Hitler have merely taken a step forward — unless you choose to consider it a step backward — in adapting sport to their personal and party purposes. First Stalin militarized athletics in Russia. Mussolini added the idea of sport as national propaganda, as a kind of nation-wide and world-wide advertising medium. Hitler did both these things; like Stalin and Mussolini he saw to it that the boys were kept busy and tired, he used athletics and outdoor exercise to train them for the army, and he made international sporting events outlets for propaganda. Then he went further. He made sport one more means of breaking down opposition by ostracizing certain classes of citizens so that they could take no part whatsoever in organized athletics.

Sport in Germany is under the direction of the Nazi Party, which has delegated the responsibility of running it to the best advantage to Herr Hans Tschammer und Osten, a kind of dictator under a dictator. The Nazi Party, of which Tschammer und Osten is an official, has regimented every phase of German life. Nowhere is the control more rigid than in the ordering of athletics. Whatever happens in sport in the Fatherland does so upon the order of and with the approval of the Party; no sporting event takes place about which they do not know and of which they do not approve. Politics and sport are inseparable.

Tschammer und Osten, *Reichssportkommissar*, controls both the policies and activities of German athletics. Like other leaders of sport in other dictatorships, he is interested merely in sport as a means to an end. Like his Italian counterpart, he places tremendous emphasis on victory over foreign teams, and preparation for all international sporting meetings is carried on with the same

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attention to detail as in Italy. Other angles of sport are inconsequential. "I do not care about professionalism," he told a French journalist of my acquaintance. "The question is unimportant." Talk about fair play and sportsmanship is regarded as a symptom of weakness. Everything is a side issue which does not feed the one paramount purpose, to render the youth of the nation better soldiers and hence better able to carry out the purposes of the régime.

Mussolini's action in taking over control of all sport was copied in Germany, but carried a long step further, when athletic clubs and societies were given public orders to purge themselves of "undesirables." An incomplete list of leading Jewish athletes ousted from sporting clubs or barred from sporting competition would include Werner Schottmann, Germany's best 200-metre dash man; Marta Jakob, woman champion javelin thrower; Frau Friedleben, Dr. Daniel Prenn, and Frau Nelly Nepach (she later committed suicide), leading tennis players; Ernie Seelig, middleweight boxing champion; Jakob Levy, celebrated Hamburg sprinter; Gretel Bergmann, champion woman runner. Of course there were many others less famous. If you wish to engage in sport in Germany, you must, as in Italy, be a party member; but in Germany this means that you must be what is called an "Aryan," and able to prove it.

The Germans seem to have gone further than anyone in the moral degradation of sport. You must be a Nazi in order to be allowed to play; and if your Nazi sentiments turn out to be lukewarm, you cannot even keep the emblems of the victory you have won. In July 1935 the Blau-Weiss Tennis Club of Dresden was disqualified after winning a title because when several members of the team were questioned afterward by the *Gaudietwart*, a public official, they were so injudicious as to reveal doubts about the righteousness of Nazi policies. The official who disqualified the team explained his action by stating that "only those can be victors in the Third Reich who have mastered the National Socialist ideology and can show that they can hold their ground not only in sporting contests but in national life." As a warning to other sports clubs, the Sports Service of the German News Bureau announced that "in the future winners of athletic contests in the Third Reich may be only those who master National Socialist ideology." This doctrine was given official recognition shortly after the first of the present year when Kurt Münch, head of the Reich's Diet, in his New Year's message on "Politics in Sport,"

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published in the *Berliner Lokal Anzeiger*, declared that competition in German athletics was to be limited to those Germans who are sympathetic to National Socialism. He also asserted that the task of a sports leader in the Reich must be considered as primarily political and that all members of the Nazi Association for Physical Culture should become imbued with the spirit of National Socialism. Thus it is no longer merely a question of eliminating the "non-Aryan" from German sport. Sport is also a weapon to bludgeon the German young into the "right frame of mind."

The youth movement of the Third German Reich is called the *Hitler-Jugend*. This movement, started in 1926, was taken over entirely by the Nazi Party, and is today a part of the government with a huge organization directed by a 29-year old leader, Baldur von Schirach, whom Sir Philip Gibbs considers capable of succeeding one day to Hitler's position and power. Boasting 6,000,000 members, it is organized along military lines with squads, companies, battalions and regiments. Through *Wehrsport*, or military athletics, it aims to prepare the youth of Germany to step into the army trained and ready to fight. *Wehrsport* includes marching, trench digging, use of dugouts, creeping under barbed wire, bayonet drill, gas defense, and so forth; while the girls supplement their physical training by courses in first aid.[5]

The question arose early as to whether other youth organizations had the right to continue to exist. Says von Schirach: "Even after the seizure of power there continued to sit in Berlin the so-called *Reichssausschuss der deutschen Jugendverbaende* (National Committee of German Youth Organizations), a working community in which all German youth organizations, Marxist, denominational and others, sat side by side with equal privileges and sought in endless discussion to establish their right to exist. I took the liberty of putting an end to this unworthy state of affairs by giving the order to occupy the business premises of the committee. Then in a veritable blaze of demonstrations, the remnants of other youth organizations were crushed out of existence. Many became incorporated in the *Hitler-Jugend*, and at the beginning of 1934 the incorporation of the Evangelical Youth all but gave the finishing stroke; that is to say that there now remained outside the *Hitler-Jugend* only one Youth Organization, the Catholic. All the others had come over to us."

So far the Catholic Youth organizations have not succumbed

[5] I. L. Kandel, "The Making of Nazis." Teachers College, Columbia University, 1935.

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to the dictator, though their freedom of action has been restricted in many directions. Moreover, one suspects that, despite the claims of von Schirach, many Protestants have also failed to respond whole-heartedly. Like all propagandists, he makes large claims. The number he gives as being affiliated with the *Hitler-Jugend* is 6,000,000. Even if this is correct, less than half the youth of Germany are enrolled under Hitler's banners, for a dispatch from Berlin early in the year states that 9,000,000 young Germans are to be conscripted into a new Reich Youth League "to be drilled in sport, discipline and pre-military exercises, and above all in National Socialist *Weltanschauung* (World Outlook)." This is tantamount to a confession that voluntary membership in the *Hitler-Jugend* has not been effective after all. The whip is now to be cracked. Conscription is to do what appeals and pressure could only partially accomplish.

Sport and militarism go hand in hand in Germany, as they do in Russia and Italy. The only difference is that in Germany the connection is even more openly avowed and emphasized. A textbook entitled "Physical Training for Military Defense," by Hermann Teske, sports teacher in an army school near Berlin, states: "The aim of all physical training was and always will be *Wehrhaftigkeit*. German recruits are to be led away from the poisonous idea of 'sport for sport's sake,' which does not fit into the Nazi *Weltanschauung*. All German sports must have a purpose." The well-trained body serves the war machine, he states, and games such as football seem to him especially good preparation for war. He writes: "What the young peasant learns in the evening — running, jumping, tactical movements, fitting into the team, above all, fighting — all this is just what an infantryman needs in the battle."[6]

Could a dictator falsify further the ideals of sport as we conceive them? With every form of athletics organized and supervised by party officials under strict government control; with everyone who is not a member of an authorized sports club (*i.e.* who does not belong to the one government party) refused all athletic privileges; with international contests seized on for purposes of party or racial propaganda; with "victory" reserved for the politically and racially "eligible;" and with games turned primarily into preparation of young men and women for war — it is hard to see how sport could be further prostituted and debased.

[6] *Observer*, London, December 22, 1935.

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THE SWISS REARMAMENT

By Edgar Ansel Mowrer

COMPETITIVE rearmament is a permanent process of keeping up with the Joneses. Among practically equal rivals, the latest armament is bound to be the best, only in its turn to be surpassed by something newer. European experts now believe that the point of Germany's military superiority over France will be reached in something like 12 to 24 months. After Germany has attained the top of her military powers any delay in using them might see her outstripped by British or French preparations. The crucial period for Europe therefore is generally assumed to be the years 1937 and 1938. However, if the Germans realize that their opponents have become alarmed to the point of rapidly undertaking effective counter measures, then the date of the crusade (for that is the form it would take) might well be somewhat advanced.

Where might Germany attack? The fundamental aims of the Nazis were early formulated along approved Pan-German lines and there is no reason to believe that they have been seriously modified. The first aim, rearmament and the elimination of treaty shackles, has been virtually achieved. The second is the incorporation into the Third Reich of all those who speak German, as well as of other Teutons, now dispersed among such neighboring countries as Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Switzerland, Austria, Czechoslovakia, and a strip of Poland — not to speak of Denmark. The third aim is territorial expansion further east. This last is not yet practical politics. The immediate task for the Nazis is "racial integration." The greatest obstacle is considered to be France.

Could the Germans be sure that France would sit with folded arms while they "rescued" Austria and portions of Czechoslovakia, their temptation would be to leave her severely alone, if only because of the fear lest a contrary policy would risk involving Britain. But can they be at all sure that France, pacifist as she is, can stand aside and watch the Reich absorb odd bits of the European map? In the second place, such a policy would have two disadvantages. It would demand the completion opposite France of a German fortified line similar to the French "Maginot Line," which would be enormously expensive and might take too

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long. And it would leave the initiative of offensive to the French, who could bide their time and attack Germany at the moment they judged appropriate. Now in a military sense Nazi Germany represents a prolongation and intensification of the old Prussian militarism. The Prussian military tradition does not favor defensive wars. The pike in the carp pond does not wait for the latter to organize an attack against him. Therefore, despite the risk of galvanizing British opposition, the Nazis may have to contemplate settling accounts with "be-niggered" France in accordance with Hitler's suggestion in "Mein Kampf." This idea fits in with Ludendorff's stern theories as well as with the wild notions of professors of military science like Ewald Banse. As the Brunswick professor puts it, "With a neighbor like France one cannot have peace. One or the other country must disappear."

Assuming that Germany may feel it necessary to fight France, one comes to the question of how she would proceed. Military authorities differ as to the value of the "Maginot Line" of fortifications which France has built along her eastern frontier and which now is rapidly being carried northward into Belgium. But military authorities in general and the Germans in particular have today the greatest respect for fortresses. The alternative to a frontal attack on French fortified positions is to go around the obstacles, to the north or to the south, or both. Attack by the northern flank would be easier. Despite the new credits voted by the Dutch, and despite an awakened Dutch public opinion, Holland could hardly defend herself against a serious German blow. But such a campaign would almost surely bring Britain into the war. The invasion of Holland therefore would become advisable only if the Germans were convinced that they must in any case count the British among their active enemies. German strategists might well prefer an attack around the southern end of the French fortifications where they stop at Mulhouse — in other words, south of Belfort and through Switzerland. Britain's frontier, they hope, is not on the Jura. Contrary to widely held opinion, such an undertaking, though difficult, is by no means impossible for a military machine like the one which Germany is assembling. And if it is possible, we are safe in assuming that it has been considered. If it has been considered, and if it is found advantageous, no merely moral considerations would prevent it from being tried.

Invasion of Switzerland is nothing new. Since Cæsar com-

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pelled the migrating Helvetii to return to their home near the Lake of Geneva, numerous ambitious war lords have risked invasion of this territory. Some, like Charles the Bold, came to grief; others, like Napoleon, marched back and forth across Swiss territory much as they pleased. Swiss neutrality was respected in the Franco-Prussian War. During the World War the same thing happened, though both sides were tempted, as



Colonel Sprecher de Bernegg, Swiss chief of staff, later revealed.

In the years immediately following the war, hope of lasting peace through the League of Nations rose high in Switzerland. But as Germany gradually reverted to Prussianism other voices became audible. In 1931 a project for reaching Montbéliard, Belfort, Besançon and Dijon by way of Switzerland began to be talked about in German military circles. In 1932 Professor Banse ("Raum und Volk") insisted that favorable conditions for a

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German war with France included the "occasion or the authorization" to pass through Belgium and the Netherlands in the north and through Switzerland in the south. Only a fully rearmed Germany could seriously contemplate such a scheme. But by 1934 the German rearmament had made real progress. In 1935 the Swiss Colonel Hans Fry publicly discussed the possibility of a German attack. It remained for the violation of the Locarno Treaty on March 7, 1935, to shake the Swiss fully out of their self-confidence. For evidently Nazi dynamism would no more hesitate to violate Swiss neutrality than to tear up an agreement drafted largely to protect Germany, then disarmed and helpless.

Now the Swiss have no desire to be on bad terms with Germany. Nearly three million of them speak German. To them, before the advent of Hitler, the Reich was a spiritual and cultural source of primary importance. Even Hitler did not at first worry them. To be sure, they are liberal democrats. But Germany is their best customer and their chief source of imported goods. Nearly two billion Swiss francs "frozen" in the Reich were a sort of hostage for Swiss friendship. But the religious persecution in Germany, the mistreatment of the Jews, the killings of June 30, 1934, and finally the German attitude at the time of the Gustloff murder, convinced the Swiss they wanted no totalitarian régime. Recently the public in a Zürich movie house has been asked "not to hiss Adolf Hitler" when his picture is flashed; and for one to address inhabitants of Basel or Zürich in *hoch* (or *Reichs*) *Deutsch* is no recommendation.

On the whole, however, the Swiss were slow to estimate the new German régime correctly. Imagine the shock when on April 17 of this year the Federal Council (Cabinet) suddenly asked the legislative bodies for the amazing sum of 235,000,000 francs for national defense. In a long message the Council outlined its reasons: failure of the Disarmament Conference; disappointment with the League of Nations; visible threats abroad; the temptation to others inherent in being weak — in short, a recognition that the world had indeed entered that "age of bronze" heralded by Professor Banse. Germany was not specifically mentioned, but no single Swiss had any illusions as to the possible enemy against whom the "absolutely indispensable" in modern armaments to be acquired by such an expenditure might have to be used.

Now for a country like Switzerland, with its four million population, 235,000,000 francs (roughly $80,000,000 at present rates)

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is a tremendous sum. At the same rate of twenty dollars a head, the United States would have to appropriate and spend no less than $2,500,000,000. The Swiss are not poor. For years the military budget had been slowly mounting: 1928, 75,000,000 francs; 1929, 86,000,000; 1930, 87,000,000; 1931, 102,000,000. But few peoples reckon more closely than the Swiss or appreciate the value of money more keenly. Facing the same danger from the same source, Holland, with twice the population of Switzerland, this year appropriated for defense only half the Swiss figure. Obviously the Swiss statesmen who proposed so broad reorganization of their military machine were seriously alarmed.

The nature of the reform can be seen from a glance at the summarized items (in Swiss francs):

1. Air Defense:	
Passive defense	12,300,000
Ground defense	48,200,000
Air armament	55,300,000
2. Frontier Covering Force:	
New arms and accessories	21,000,000
Fortification works	25,000,000
3. Light Troops	14,100,000
4. Artillery	26,000,000
5. Engineers	9,900,000
6. Medical Service	800,000
7. Miscellaneous Material	8,000,000
8. Building and Construction	13,500,000
	234,100,000

In justifying such expenditures the Federal Council insisted on the special necessity of air defense and frontier cover. Herr Minger, Head of the Federal Military Department, expressed the intention of making the country invulnerable to invasion. Divisional Colonel Guillaume Favre insisted in Lausanne that Switzerland must not become a point of "least resistance."

One need only travel in the frontier districts from Basel to Lake Constance to realize how seriously the Swiss themselves have taken the government warning. In Basel the German danger is a chief topic of conversation. In Schaffhausen not an adult, whatever his political views, but believes that the nearby Reich plans to strike at France through Switzerland. In Bern the Federal Government officials, usually so cautious, so respectful of the duties of neutrality, cannot altogether hide their apprehensions.

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In Zürich argument is heard about the value of passive defense against air attacks and about the number of days it would take French troops stationed around Besançon, Dijon and Lyons to assist the retreating Swiss at the eastern edge of the Jura. Opinions on details are varied. Only on one point is there virtual unanimity. Foreigners incline to question whether the hotel-keeping Swiss have not become too soft and commercially minded to risk their existence against a Great Power. Not so the Swiss themselves. Most of them refuse to admit this even as a possibility. In their patriotism, they say, they are second to none. It is not long since the entire communist group of Schaffhausen went over to the Social Democrats because the communist theorists denied them the right of national defense if Switzerland were attacked. One gets the impression that with the exception of a few communists and a handful of pro-German fascists the Swiss would prove true to their traditional independence and fight.

Let us now consider the technical aspects of a German invasion of France through Switzerland.

Four million Swiss are grouped on a fairly small territory in the midst of three great nations, two of which, Germany and Italy, openly espouse a militarist philosophy. The country is officially neutral by the 1815 treaties; and that status was confirmed by the Act of London in 1921. Its population is mixed: 71 percent German, 21 percent French, 8 percent Italian and Ladine. Fifty-seven percent are Protestant, the rest Catholic. Geographically the land is not very unified. There are high mountains in the center and southeast; a kind of hilly plateau runs from Lake Constance in the northeast down to a point in the southwest corner where the mountain-gap at Bellegarde gives access to the Lyons district; to the west rise the chalky seams of the Jura.

Considerable difficulties would face an invader. But as a French expert writes, there are longitudinal valleys which would offer "facilities to the march of troops directed from east to west or those coming from the upper Rhine between Basel and Schaffhausen and marching towards the northern French Jura chain."[1] Obviously it is precisely such a march that would tempt the German General Staff. The present writer is no strategist, but the general problem as seen by military authorities is not difficult to understand for anyone who looks at the accompanying map.

[1] "Notions sur l'Armée suisse," by Colonel Aublet, *La Revue militaire française*, February 1934.

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Let us imagine a sudden German attack on France. The German Staff decides to remain upon the defensive for the entire length of the Maginot Line, behind equivalent or at any rate sufficient German fortifications. But Germany's available man power is almost twice that of France, so that even if she must station considerable forces in the east, enough are left over to constitute a sort of hammerhead in the southwest and south. The terrain that interests us lies to the south of the Maginot Line and of the Belfort fortress. Here is a narrow plain, unfortified because of French respect for the Treaty of Vienna of 1815. The Swiss at that time obtained from the Allies who downed Napoleon an undertaking that the French fortress of Huningue be dismantled. Article 3 of that Treaty reads: "Les Fortifications de Huningue seront rasées sans pouvoir être rétablies ni remplacées par d'autres ouvrages à une distance moins de trois lieues de la ville de Bâle." Here is a narrow but clear path for the right wing of a German striking force, as soon as it has passed the Rhine and entered Basel.

Switzerland is protected to the north by the swift-flowing Rhine and Lake Constance. On the western part of the frontier there are three bridges or groups of bridges, at Basel, at Waldshut and at Schaffhausen. From these gates an invader could sweep down across Switzerland for a distance of from thirty to a hundred and twenty-five miles and enter France through one or more of the Jura valleys — that at Porrentruy, that near La Chaux de Fonds, or that leading from Pontarlier to Dôle. Which means that a perfectly equipped motorized force could, if it met no effective resistance, emerge from the western defiles of the Jura just five hours after crossing the Rhine bridges. The task of the main portion of the attacking force would be to overrun and penetrate the Jura. At the base of the Jura the large river Aare runs roughly in the same direction as the line of the invasion; it therefore would not be an obstacle. But it is fed from the Alps by a number of swift streams which flow in a northwesterly direction right across the Swiss plateau and cut up a terrain which otherwise would not be too difficult. This would be the line of march of the German left, or turning force. Its advance might well be slow. But with four or five German divisions in a first wave, the same number in a second, long before the Swiss fighting forces could be mobilized (it took three days in 1914) all possibility of real resistance might be at an end. Nor could the French conceivably reach the Jura

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passes within the few hours here assumed as the period of the German passage. In other words, as matters now stand this lightning-like raid might succeed.

To meet this situation what can the Swiss do? They are a thoroughly military people with a magnificent military tradition. Their first-line troops, organized as a militia, can be put in the field within three days, 250,000 strong. Each man keeps his uniform and his arms in his house, and his horse — if he needs one — in his stable. His training begins early and is supplemented from boyhood by target practice. It is calculated that every Swiss male of military age fires nearly a hundred rounds a year. There are not quite three hundred career officers, most of whom are military instructors. The morale and physical condition of the troops are good. Of their courage there cannot be the slightest doubt. But the charge is made that the entire Swiss system is obsolete. There is, critics say, too much reliance upon rifle fire. What is the good of rifles against tanks and armored cars and airplanes? The Swiss have little aviation, an antiquated and deficient artillery, too few machine-guns. They still rely too largely upon guerrilla warfare at a time when it has ceased to be of any avail. Until recently their mobilization occurred in the center of the country. Even under the new system whereby the recruits in the frontier districts rush to their appointed place immediately, they would be swept aside and dispersed by a relentless German force so long as they lack proper fortifications and have no effective defense against air attacks.

The new German army, it is assumed, can immediately mobilize a million and a half men, out of which half a million could be available for the hammer thrust through Switzerland. The bulk of the French would be north of Besançon, and in any case it would take them a couple of days to occupy the Jura passes on the Swiss side and relieve the retreating Swiss. Switzerland risks being virtually eliminated as a war factor in the first twenty-four hours.

But though admitting these facts, Swiss military experts do not think that the situation any longer is as pictured above. "In the first place," they say, "in order to be successful, the gigantic motorized raid which you describe must be prepared secretly and carried out with very large forces. Four hundred thousand men simply cannot be massed near our northern border without news of it leaking across to us. Our *Thalwehr* and other frontier forces are ready at an hour's notice to blow the Rhine bridges.

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"Secondly, the German Army today is still unready to take the field, chiefly owing to the fact that the training and preparation of qualified officers takes time. By the time the German Army is all ready, our Swiss frontier will bristle at critical points with 'pill boxes' and other local fortifications. Our mobilization will bring us close to the frontier almost immediately and our best troops will have plenty of time to occupy strong positions prepared in advance while the Germans are bursting the frontier defenses. We shall not hesitate to sacrifice exposed centers like Basel. But the mountains just behind that city are so difficult that once we have fortified them, and once the French have placed long-range guns in the hills to the west, the famous 'trouée de Belfort' at the south end of the Maginot Line will be impassable. Therefore in order to traverse the Jura in the direction of Besançon the Germans must penetrate almost as far south as Solothurn, that is to say thirty or forty miles. Only two good roads are available. On the west side of the River Aare there is little space for an advance in mass. On the east the ground is cut by numerous tributaries of that river, and crossing is a hard job if the bridges have been blown. If you have motored from Zürich to Bern you must have seen that the so-called Swiss 'Plateau' is anything but easy country. Give us a year to rearm and reorganize our forces and we will be able to delay any German invasion until help arrives.

"Another point. The French General Staff seems to be worried lest we follow our old strategic conception and retire the bulk of our retreating army south and east into the high Alps, thus losing contact with the advancing French. Nothing of the kind.

"For all these reasons, therefore, we Swiss believe that by the time the Germans are ready to spring a surprise visit upon us, we shall be in a position to give them a surprise welcome. This being so, we very much doubt if the Germans, whatever their previous plans, will risk such an expensive violation of our neutrality. And the same argument holds good against a German attempt to enter Austria or Italy through eastern Switzerland, where the terrain is even more difficult. No, once our new plans are in effect, Switzerland will be reasonably secure even against the Germans."

Obviously, a decision as to whether if Germany attacked France she would try to operate via Switzerland depends in the last analysis on the German General Staff's estimate of the Swiss capacity of defense. Only the Germans know what that estimate is today or what it is likely to be a year or so hence.

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A MODERN COLONIAL FALLACY

By Ida C. Greaves

MANY of the spectres of modern civilization, supposedly banished by the Treaty of Versailles, have returned to stalk their old haunts. Of these, the question of colonial expansion is one of the latest to reveal its threatening potentialities. Japan, moreover, has shown that it is a threat not confined to Europe. One of the most disturbing characteristics of this development is the widespread sympathy with which the expansionist claims of such countries as Italy and Japan are received. Economic exigency is made to excuse, even if it does not justify, the breach of international covenants. Thus lenient critics held that the Japanese plunge into Manchuria had an economic basis; and now we are told that Italy expects to find in the temperate highlands of Ethiopia an outlet for her surplus population as well as raw materials which she lacks. Germany employs an analogous argument in keeping alive claims to her lost colonies.

This strenuous reiteration of the dogma that dense population, paucity of natural resources, or any other kind of national impoverishment, makes overseas colonies an "economic necessity" for the great Power in which these conditions develop, indicates a remarkable change of opinion from that of little more than fifty years ago, when the prospect of colonial acquisitions was anathema to good nationalists in Europe. Cobdenite England regarded international trade as of greater importance than overseas possessions; in France the few protagonists of colonial expansion in the 'seventies and 'eighties met bitter hostility from a public which thought that *revanche* for the loss of Alsace-Lorraine could be better pursued without colonial impediments; and in 1871 Bismarck replied to the advocates of a colonial policy for Germany with the sneer that for Germany to acquire colonies would be like a poverty-stricken Polish nobleman providing himself with silks and sables when he needed shirts. Clearly, until late in the century at any rate, these countries did not regard the colonization of backward areas as profitable undertakings.

Nevertheless, by the time the new century opened, all the nations that had believed colonies to be liabilities instead of assets were heavily committed to new colonial responsibilities. The next stage of imperial development was ushered in by the Cove-

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nant of the League, which declared that territories inhabited by people "not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world" formed a "sacred trust of civilization." It is in accord with this philosophy that the Powers holding mandates are supposed to administer them. Article 22 which established the mandate system is not free from ambiguity; but one thing clear is that it supplants the old method of "exploitation," which completely subordinated a backward territory to the interests of the ruling Power, with a new concept recognizing the rights of the indigenous inhabitants. If colonial possessions were expensive under the old conditions, they are not likely to become less so under the new, especially since the imperial Powers have declared that the principles embodied in the mandate system now guide the administration of *all* their colonies.

Obviously, however, overseas possessions still do retain some element of desirability; and since colonial expansion has again become an active manifestation of aggressive nationalism, it may be timely to inquire critically into the claims made on its behalf. As frankly put forward by Italy and Japan, and rather more circumspectly by Germany, these comprise two distinct contentions. One is that an industrial country has an "economic need" of territories producing complementary products and raw materials. The other is that such a country has a right to outlets for national "energies" which lack room for expression at home.

The methods by which colonial empires have been acquired and controlled have varied enormously at different times and places. There is no single set of characteristics applicable to all empires any more than there is a fixed concept of civilization. "Colony," for instance, is a word that in the course of history has changed its meaning considerably. But we need consider here only those types of colonies which answer the professed needs of the imperialist nations. They fall into two groups:

1. Those intended to serve as sources of commodities and raw materials not produced in the mother country.

2. Those intended to serve as outlets for emigration, where the "surplus" population of the ruling Power is expected to find better opportunities than at home. (Settlement under alien governments, as in South America, is not an acceptable alternative.)

In demanding from the rest of the world clemency for the illegal appropriations they have already made and charity for the wants that still remain unsatisfied, the aspirants to empire invite

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examination of the single and specific question: Can overseas colonies be regarded in any valid sense as "an economic necessity"? The answer can stand or fall quite independently of whether or not there are other reasons for wanting to acquire colonies. Before we accept the "economic" claim as just and reasonable, however, let us be sure that it is not being used merely to obscure the real motives. Let us ask ourselves how far colonial possessions are at present "necessary" to an industrial nation which wants supplies of certain complementary materials. Further, can imperial Powers be said to derive "economic benefits" from their trade relations with their colonies?

II

In the course of the maritime expansion of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, five European nations — Portugal, Spain, Holland, England and France — delimited trading areas in Asia and appropriated colonial territories in America. In the nineteenth century this was followed by the partition of Africa between new as well as old imperial Powers, and the annexation of islands in the Pacific. Germany, although a comparative latecomer among colonial empires, obtained several choice areas in this last distribution. But Italy and Japan were too late to find any regions possessing lucrative prospects and needing civilization or protection. Thus came into being two categories of states popularly described as the "Haves" and the "Have-Nots." And the motives and the methods of the early colonial expansionists are adduced as at once an explanation and a justification of similar conduct today on the part of the "Have-Nots." Germany and Italy have recently shown that for them nothing is ever out of date, and it is therefore not strange that colonial aspirations should be revived along with other ancient customs of the Cæsars and the Hohenstaufen. But though motives may derive from history, methods are empirical. And colonies now occupy a very different position in international trade than they did two or three hundred years ago. Modern conditions have no parallel in early colonial days, and historical comparisons that do not take account of the intervening changes in European conditions and world economy will be profoundly misleading.

In the sixteenth century the nations of Western Europe were pursuing almost identical systems of self-sufficing economy by old and primitive methods. They consequently had neither cause nor

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opportunity to trade much with each other. At the same time, they were becoming increasingly aware of the inadequacy of their own coarse products to provide the means for purchasing desirable Oriental luxuries and delicacies. When in the fifteenth century the Turks closed the caravan routes through the Levant, access to an alternative way to the Far East became a matter of urgent importance, and the new impetus to maritime enterprise resulted in the Great Age of Discovery. After having established an all-sea route to the East, Spain and Portugal next bent their efforts to obtain from the Americas the gold and silver necessary for buying the precious produce of Cathay and the Indies. Apparently they did not doubt that they could obtain everything they wanted as long as they had acceptable purchasing power to offer. They sought of the Mogul not political but trading concessions, and they found that gold and silver were always welcome to merchants in the Orient. These precious metals, however, proved difficult to obtain; and when the other maritime nations came to America they decided to produce for themselves the commodities which they could not raise at home — sugar, cotton, coffee and spices. By a still more direct method, Holland concentrated on extracting from the East Indies a regular supply of valuable commodities by means of an administration at least as oppressive as that by which the Spaniards wrung gold from Mexico and Peru.

Probably all these countries used the only means then available for securing the overseas products they desired. But does this mean that today a nation must exercise political authority over a territory from which it wants to obtain supplies? At the beginning of the modern era of expansion, as we have seen above, a nation had either to have gold and silver with which to buy exotic products, or tropical colonies in which to produce them. But the primary condition which either method was designed to remedy was the scarcity of the desired products. For the same reason, later on, European "penetration" of backward areas was justified by the argument that savage peoples had no right to withhold from the civilized world valuable resources to which they had happened to fall heir. The argument was forcibly applied to Congo rubber and Transvaal gold alike; and it has proved so successful that there are now no backward peoples left unconvinced. All the resources of the savage are at the disposal of civilization.

Europe has always been optimistic about the value of products from "backward" (usually tropical) areas. We saw the influence

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of this feeling at work, for instance, when the Congo Treaties prohibited the European Powers with territorial possessions in central Africa from controlling the exports of those colonies by means of discriminatory regulations. On the same principle the League of Nations mandates provide that all member states shall enjoy in all mandated territories (except the Class D areas which become an integral part of the mandatory Powers) the same rights to develop concessions and conduct commerce as the mandatory allows its own nationals. In contrast with this system, France once devised an ingenious scheme known as a *détaxe* for giving herself first choice of the products from her West African possessions. A tax was imposed on certain exports, but refunded on shipments destined for the mother country. It was expected that this plan would permit French importers to purchase supplies more cheaply than their foreign competitors, while at the same time the latter contributed to the colonial revenue. But the foreign demand did not prove sufficient to make the scheme of any practical importance, and France herself has had to support colonial production by imposing a duty on her own imports from foreign countries.

Indeed, market conditions now make it distressingly obvious that not a single commodity from the widespread areas of imperial exploitation has fulfilled the promise of its profitable beginnings. The fortunes of Congo rubber ended with King Leopold, and those of Malaya and the East Indies, which caused the eclipse of the Congo, have fallen heavily in the last decade. The spices that did so much to spread the ancient glamour of the East are now a drug on the market. Cloves are as difficult to sell as potatoes, and chemistry offers cheap synthetic substitutes for rare essences and condiments. Falling prices led to the restriction of copper production in Northern Rhodesia and the Katanga, just as they did in Peru. In recent years much publicity has been attained by a school of thought which glibly talks of the "White Man's Dividends" as forming the "Black Man's Burden." But although this emendation of patriotism apparently came from historians, it makes the mistake of writing seventeenth century conditions into the twentieth. The most discouraging thing that can be said of colonial investment and enterprise today is the truth. It reveals hard work and little gain.

Except for radium — and even this is now said to be challenged by a synthetic product — no single territory has any

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longer the monopoly of any commodity.[1] Manila hemp and Bengal jute, it is true, are still known by the names of their homes; but for a long time they have been fighting the competition of substitutes from other places. By and large, the same products are grown in Africa as in America, in India as in China, and under the imperial jurisdiction of several different Powers. The one characteristic all regions have in common is a pressing anxiety to sell their products. It cannot be said that Brazil is showing political partisanship in the sale of its coffee, the United States in its cotton, or British West Africa in its cacao. If a purchaser still feels that one exporter is making unfair terms, he can turn to others. The control of tin and rubber production was made possible only by agreement between different governments, and the rise in price affects their own nationals in the same way as it does citizens of other importing countries. Further, it is significant that in spite of American indignation at the unsuccessful Stevenson rubber restriction scheme in 1926, the New Deal introduced a drastic version of the same principle in order to raise the price of agricultural products in the United States, including those previously exported. The method therefore cannot be regarded as peculiarly imperialistic.

III

Let us now turn to the second point of inquiry, namely, whether any "economic benefits" accrue to a country which can buy complementary products from territories under its own flag.

Here we are confronted with the high cost of imperial responsibility in the form of protective tariffs which most imperial nations have imposed for the benefit of their colonial industries. In other words, the price of imports has to be increased, on behalf of colonial producers, beyond what would be paid to foreign sources for the same commodities. Not only do consumers in the governing country pay producers under their own flag more than foreigners pay them, but indirectly the cost of selling cheaply in the international market frequently falls on the imperial government. A tariff will maintain prices only when the home market can take a large proportion of the total output. In other cases the home country may often have to provide direct assistance for a dependency that cannot pay its way on its production. For it is only

[1] There are a few minor products which are exported only from one area because this has proved the cheapest source, *e.g.* camphor from Formosa and cinchona from Java.

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from commercial production that the taxes can be raised which pay for the colonies' administration. If these taxes are insufficient the imperial government must finance the deficit.

The French colonies have always needed provision from the home budget. In 1934 the amount reported in *Le Journal Officiel* was over 798 million francs, or three times as much as the French Foreign Office required. Although the Dutch colonies have traditionally been low-cost producers, and able to undersell others in the open market, the depression has caused a severe contraction in the prices of their products. As a result, the Netherlands Government has been forced to contribute an annual subsidy to the budget of the East Indies. In 1934 the amount was more than one million florins. British colonies reap bigger gains from protection in the home market than others whose imperial markets are not so great: yet both large and small ones have intermittently needed help from the Exchequer. Since the vast Tanganyika Territory was taken under mandate it has regularly had expenditures in excess of revenues; and the railway that serves the colonized area of Kenya represents a still unrefunded cost to the home government of over $20,000,000. This can hardly be regarded as enriching the mother country. On the contrary, it seems that only a rich metropolitan Power can afford prosperity in its colonies. There may of course be military and political reasons, in the view of the nations concerned, for incurring the expense; but they cannot be described as economic.

It is interesting to examine the position of the United States as a purchaser in the light of the fiscal burdens of imperialism. This country is conspicuously lacking in the tropical products which have been the chief goal of overseas expansion. Thus it is the world's greatest importer of coffee, which is also its largest single import. The enormous Brazilian industry developed chiefly in response to the growing demand from the North, as in a lesser degree the cacao industry did in Ecuador and as more recently banana plantations have done in several Central American republics. The United States buys all these products in the open market, that is, wherever the cost of production is lowest. These sources are also open to Great Britain; but by a scheme of imperial preference tariff rates she pays prices 25 percent to 100 percent higher in order to obtain similar products from areas inside her own empire. France does likewise, with a few variations in method.

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When we turn from cacao, bananas and coffee to sugar, however, we find the United States pursuing an even more expensive policy than these imperial Powers. Puerto Rico, Hawaii and the Philippines are large producers of sugar cane. In fact, they built up their industry on the prospect of free entry into the American market, and the amount of sugar imported into the United States at a price far above that prevailing in the open market has increased to over two million tons yearly. The valorizing effect that a specific duty on foreign imports has on home products can be clearly seen in the price of Philippine sugar; the price has been well maintained during the depression at the same time that production was increasing. On the other hand, Manila hemp, which is dependent on the international market, has fallen heavily in spite of restriction of production. Domestic sugar growers naturally would like to see the protected market privileges of the Philippine producers abolished by the grant of political independence to the Islands. The producers would get less for their sugar; but that would concern them alone, since the first law of tariffs is that the consumer pays, whoever benefits. If new territorial responsibilities were to lead this country into maintaining an "American standard of living" for the production of chicle, then chewing-gum would cost more.

IV

The cost of buying products at relatively high prices from political dependencies and the subsidizing of their budget deficits falls on income account; but colonial development requires in the first place heavy expenditure on capital account. The reason why Portugal's territories in Africa languish in comparison with England's is not because they are inherently less productive, but because the Portuguese Government has spent less on developing them. For the same reason the effects of French control are not so impressive in French Equatorial Africa as in West Africa, where there has been lavish expenditure on public works. It is easy to see that colonies today are a readier outlet for money than for anything else. It is also important to realize that without capital outlay neither the settlement of colonists nor production for export can take place. The story of centuries-long imperial development from mere trading posts to extensive areas of administration is at the same time the story of the steady growth of capital enterprise and investment. The transformation of jungle into

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plantation and garden; engineering that spans continents and harnesses rivers; irrigation that makes deserts bloom; the control of floods, pests and disease — all these achievements have the quality of romance. The cost is often ignored. Yet investment was the indispensable basis of this enterprise which has made every continent yield up an increase. Since no imperialist purpose has succeeded without it in the past, we can reasonably expect that none will in the future.

The extent to which people can be profitably employed as a result of migration depends upon the capital available for their use. The examples we have of this at the present time range all the way from the Chinese peasant who seeks hand-to-mouth subsistence in Manchuria to the English farmer who invests in extensive lands in Rhodesia. In between are the emigrants with a small amount of savings who take up as much land as they can farm themselves. This is the type of settlement which the United States and the British Dominions have encouraged. In addition there are those who emigrate to work as laborers where land and capital furnish them employment — the most common situation in South America. Since the days of the "Old Plantation," however, much imperial expansion has been accompanied by the export of capital and not of population; and in modern times it is in areas which have a dense indigenous population that plantations have been most successfully developed for the export of the foodstuffs and raw materials needed in northern countries.

Now even though the possession of colonies does not insure a supply of cheap imports, is there not still some advantage for an imperial Power in having a field for investments in territories under its own control? The question can be considered from two standpoints. One, do particularly attractive opportunities for investment exist in colonial areas from which foreign investors are barred? Two, is the export of capital to foreign countries more difficult or risky than investment under one's own national jurisdiction?

In the first place, it is apparent that the imperial Powers at present have no more of a monopoly of financial development in their own territories than they have of exports from them. There are British investments in Java, and Dutch and American investments in British Malaya. The most important working concession in the Belgian Congo is held by a British firm. In the Portuguese territories a large proportion of the capital is supplied by

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foreigners, while in the Asiatic possessions of the white Powers an increasing amount of business is being conducted by Chinese and Japanese immigrants. Secondly, foreign investors do not have to start enterprises of their own in order to share in the development of a colony. They can buy in the open market securities representing practically every type of undertaking. Such obstacles to this accustomed course as are now encountered have been erected not by the imperial country, but by the governments of other countries which do not want their capital to go abroad. The Stock Exchange lists in London, for example, show that colonial investments as a class do not invariably yield especially attractive returns. Moreover, colonial loans usually return a lower rate of interest than is paid on loans of independent countries of comparable size and resources. When we consider the position of the United States in relation to the export of capital, it is difficult to infer that its overseas investments have been handicapped by the lack of political dependencies. Such enterprises as that of the United Fruit Company in the Caribbean, and more recently the rubber-growing projects of the Firestone Corporation in Liberia and of the Ford Company in Brazil, prove — if proof is still needed — the importance of large scale investment for the development of backward areas. But they do not provide grounds for generalizations as to the connection between foreign investment and political control. The security of private investments in a foreign state is a problem quite separate from the imperialistic claims which we are examining here, but it nevertheless is difficult to ignore it entirely, if only because of the loud, but loose, declarations of "economic imperialism" to which it has given rise in recent years. For our purpose it will suffice to remember that if British investments do not threaten the sovereignty of Argentina, whereas United States investments do threaten that of Liberia, the explanation is to be sought in some other cause than foreign investments as such.

Before attributing any economic effects to political causes, we must distinguish clearly between the character of those investments that succeed and those that fail. There are plenty of examples of reckless enterprises that could never be made to pay by either imperial control or diplomatic protection. The most intense political support did not save the "concession régime" in the French Congo from failure, any more than the fact of a common nationality repaid British investors for their losses in the Cana-

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dian Grand Trunk Railway. The defaults that United States investors have suffered on their loans to South America are practically all attributable to an initial failure to recognize the limitations of the foreign trade of those countries, the only source for meeting interest charges.

When all the aspects of overseas investment are considered, then, it does not seem unreasonable to conclude that if countries like Italy and Germany have made little overseas investment, this is because they have little capital available for external use. And no military or diplomatic triumph will either increase this important asset, or provide a substitute for its function in developing production.

The imperialist nations have already tried forced labor — it was widely represented as civilization's educational crusade — but it has never proved successful for long. Since, however, nations do not appear to learn from each other's experiences, it may be worth noting that involuntary native labor for both public and private purposes has been condemned by successive reports of the League of Nations Commission on Slavery and Forced Labor. Therefore, if Italy had complained to the League that Ethiopia was not fulfilling an agreement that an Italian road should be built through her territory, and if the League had regarded this as a contract that Ethiopia must carry out, the use of compulsory labor would have been impossible. When, however, Italy secures the same opportunity by conquest, then she can conscript natives for labor service and call it civilization or education, as others before her have done.

V

We may summarize the contemporary economic relations between an imperial country and its dependencies by saying that in order to maintain an acceptable measure of prosperity in the colonies — and incidentally to meet the expenses of administration — the home government provides a protected market for colonial producers which enables them to continue production at higher costs than prevail in foreign countries. When this is not sufficient, it must give a direct subsidy from the imperial budget. By such methods it enables more investments to be made in colonial areas than would otherwise be profitable, but the profit is derived entirely from the expense of higher priced products borne by the home market. This is hardly a situation which can be said

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to confer "economic benefits" on the ruling Power. On the contrary, it seems that colonial possessions do involve the economic disadvantages that Cobdenite England and the early opinion of Bismarck attributed to them. Are we not, therefore, safe in holding that there are no imperial adventures at the present time which are induced by "economic necessity," and none which are likely to provide relief from financial stringency at home?

A nation may still, of course, attribute such political values to imperial status that it bears the relatively disadvantageous terms of colonial trade gladly. But from the standpoint of international equity, there is a difference between wanting a colony because it will be a cheaper source of certain necessary materials, and wanting it as an independent source of supply at any price. The territorial claims which are being made in the name of economic necessity today are only a pseudo-rational disguise for political motives. What the "needy" nations really want is an extension of their respective areas of national autarchy. To this end economic calculations are entirely subsidiary.

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THE PHILIPPINES IN TRANSITION

From Commonwealth to Independence

By Ralston Hayden

WITH the establishment of the Commonwealth of the Philippine Islands the United States took a bold step forward in the development of an important national policy and at the same time broke new ground in the government of dependencies. The government of the Commonwealth is unlike that of any other political entity under the American flag. In status and prospects it is unique among dependent nations and is without precedent in the international world.

The advance that has been made, however, has not solved the Philippine problem. While the law under which the new government of the Islands was created provides in effect that American sovereignty over the Philippines shall terminate in 1946, the Congress left for future determination such vital matters as the trade relations to be established between the United States and the Philippines after that date, the possible neutralization of the Philippine Republic, and the retention of an American naval base in the Islands. Hence the responsibilities of the United States in the Philippines continue for another decade and America has still to make important decisions concerning its Philippine policy. On their side, the Filipinos still face continuing uncertainty in matters vitally affecting their national existence. In the larger view, the future of the Islands is a question giving more concern than ever to the nations which have interests in the Far East.

II

The form and organization of the present Philippine government were determined by the Filipinos themselves. The Commonwealth constitution was drafted in Manila by a popularly elected convention that was genuinely representative of the best in Filipino character, intellect and political experience. In personnel and leadership it also represented the overwhelming preponderance of Philippine political power. It produced an organic law which was agreed to by all but one of its 202 members and which was subsequently accepted by the vast majority of the Philippine electorate. Few national constitutions have expressed more com-

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pletely the free and deliberate choice of a people as to the form of government under which they shall live.

Although in the main reflecting the influence of American political philosophy and practices, the Commonwealth government contains a number of features that have grown out of Philippine experience. Despite a distinct separation of executive, legislative and judicial powers, the executive is definitely the predominant branch of the government. The President is chosen by popular vote for a six-year term, and is not immediately eligible for re-election. While he holds office he has those powers vested in the chief executive of the United States plus important additional powers. He has an itemized veto in appropriation and tax bills; authority to recommend appropriations that cannot be increased by the legislature (except those for the National Assembly and the judicial department); authority to overrule the decisions of the auditor-general; power in prescribed circumstances to suspend the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law; and broad powers that may be authorized by the National Assembly in time of national emergency.

Evidence has already been given that President Manuel L. Quezon has the will and the capacity to utilize these extensive powers to the limit. The predominance definitely assigned the president under the constitution, and already established in practice by the first incumbent, is in harmony with the political instincts, traditions and practices of the Filipino people. So long as the office remains in wise hands the result will probably be a government well adapted to the actual needs of the country.

The legislature, called the National Assembly, is unicameral. The judges of all of the courts are appointive and their official independence is protected by every known constitutional device. The law of the Philippines continues to be a combination of the civil and the common law, with "appended" Mohammedan and customary law effective in certain restricted areas. In all of its branches the Commonwealth government is manned by officials who in experience, ability and sincerity of purpose compare favorably with those of other nations.

III

Perhaps the most significant fact about the position of the Philippine Commonwealth in the American constitutional system is that legally it is on its way towards complete separation from

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the United States. The conditions under which the organic connection between the United States and the Philippines are to be terminated, and the relationship between the American and Philippine government during the intervening decade, were provided for by an Act of Congress. Yet this Act became effective only after it had been voluntarily and legally accepted by the Philippine people. Hence, it may be argued, the constitutional status of the Islands rests not upon a unilateral expression of the sovereign will of the United States, but upon an agreement between the two countries. There would seem to follow a moral obligation upon both peoples to carry out the agreement loyally and in good faith, except as it may be modified by their common consent.

Moreover, the very nature of the arrangement that has been entered into implies American recognition of the fact that the Philippines possess virtually all of the attributes of statehood, in the international sense, except political independence. It is necessary, therefore, that the Filipinos be dealt with as a nation, although one which temporarily is in a special and subordinate relationship with America. For the terms of the "Independence Act" permit of no doubt that the United States is still sovereign in the Philippines. Under these conditions the American-Philippine relationship is more delicate and calls for more good will and more mature statesmanship on both sides than at any previous period.

In order to be able to meet the responsibilities of continuing sovereignty in the Philippines the United States has retained substantial powers over the new government. The most important of these powers are vested in the American President. The President is given the right to "intervene" for the preservation of the government of the Commonwealth and for the maintenance of that government as provided in the constitution thereof; for the protection of life, property and individual liberty; and for the discharge of government obligations under and in accord with the provisions of the Commonwealth constitution. In him is also vested the right to take over the customs houses should the Commonwealth fail to pay its bonded indebtedness or fulfill its contracts; the power to decide appeals from the auditor general of the Commonwealth; the power to approve or disapprove all acts affecting currency, coinage, imports, exports and immigration, as well as loans contracted in foreign countries and any

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amendment to the constitution; the authority to suspend the taking effect of or the operation of any law, contract or executive order of the Commonwealth government under certain specified conditions; and the authority to call into the service of the United States all military forces organized by the Philippine government. As the foreign affairs of the Commonwealth also remain under the direct supervision and control of the United States these are also for all practical purposes under Presidential direction.

The legislative and judicial branches of the American government also continue to exercise important powers in the Philippines. Thus all acts of the Commonwealth legislature shall be reported to the American Congress, and to it is reserved authority to amend or repeal any law in force in the Philippines upon the inauguration of the Commonwealth. The Supreme Court of the United States continues to have power to review certain cases from the Philippine Islands; and this power is extended to cases involving the constitution of the Commonwealth. Further indicative of the continuation of American authority in the Philippines are the provisions that until the final and complete withdrawal of American sovereignty all citizens of the Philippines owe allegiance to the United States, and that every officer of the Commonwealth government shall take an oath of office declaring that he accepts the supreme authority of the United States and will give it true faith and allegiance.

The extensive powers over the Commonwealth vested in the American President grant him the authority and presumably lay upon him the duty to see that the government is conducted in accordance with what McKinley called "certain great principles of government which we . . . deem essential to the rule of law and the maintenance of individual freedom," as well as in such a way as not to jeopardize legitimate American interests in the Islands or involve the United States in difficulties with foreign nations. Heretofore this duty has been performed by an American official of the Philippine government, the Governor-General, who had the usual powers and responsibilities of a chief executive under the American system. Henceforth there is to be no American official within the Commonwealth government and American control is to be exercised from without and only for the purposes set forth in the "Independence Law." The result of this situation is that although there is no direct American participation in the

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governmental process, the President is expected to see to it that in many respects the Commonwealth is governed in a definitely American manner.

In exercising his extensive authority the President will presumably rely on the information and advice furnished him by the "United States High Commissioner to the Commonwealth of the Philippine Islands." It is this official who (when directed by the President) would take over the Commonwealth customs houses; and presumably he would exercise whatever governmental authority the President might assume in the Islands in case "intervention" became necessary. Under normal conditions, however, the High Commissioner has only the position of a legally authorized and specially privileged observer. Assisting him in his work is a staff of experts, headed by legal, financial and economic advisers. The administrative connection between the High Commissioner and the President is through the Bureau of Insular Affairs and the Secretary of War — the same route formerly followed by the Governor-General.

Ideally, both the High Commissioner and the Commonwealth President will feel that the former has the three rights, and only the three rights, attributed by Walter Bagehot to the British constitutional sovereign: the right to be consulted, the right to encourage, the right to warn. Granted the possession of these rights and granted that he exercises them wisely, a properly qualified High Commissioner will need no others. Indeed, he should have no others, for the High Commissioner is not intended to be a super-president. On the other hand, as a trusted, confidential counsellor entirely detached from Philippine partisan politics, yet thoroughly informed concerning local and world conditions, the High Commissioner can render services of the highest value to the chief executive of the Commonwealth. Proper collaboration between these two officials should make it unnecessary for the High Commissioner ever to recommend that the American President exercise his drastic powers of control over the Commonwealth, unless, perhaps, at the request of the Commonwealth President himself.

Personalities often play a greater part in determining the character of public offices than do the laws that create them. In the present case the High Commissionership should develop ideally. During a highly successful administration as the last Governor-General, Frank Murphy became thoroughly acquainted

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with the problems of the Philippines, won the confidence of all elements in the Philippine community, and manifested in a practical way his sympathy with the national aspirations of the Filipino people. As the first High Commissioner, Mr. Murphy has clearly demonstrated his belief that the authority of the Commonwealth should be respected and enforced. It has been his policy to avoid harassing intermeddling, and as a matter of good faith to give full recognition to the rights of the Philippine people and the dignity of their official representatives. His tactful and wise administration of his office has already accomplished a great deal towards making successful the new government and the American-Philippine relationship established under the "Independence Act." He has done this, moreover, with an intelligent conception of American interests and in a manner well calculated adequately to safeguard them. In this work he has had the understanding and constructive coöperation of President Quezon. Upon a continuation of such relations between these two officials and their successors will depend in considerable degree the success of the bold step that America has taken in turning the process of Philippine government so completely over to the Filipinos while remaining responsible for the manner in which that government is conducted.

IV

The most serious problems faced by the new Commonwealth are those of public order and national economy. The two are closely interrelated. If the latter can be solved the former will not prove insurmountably difficult. This is not to say, however, that there is no danger of internal disorder in the Philippines. The possibility arises from three sources: economic unrest, political discontent, and unstable or dissatisfied minority racial groups. Agrarian unrest, played upon by unscrupulous local leaders, has caused a number of minor uprisings in recent years. In certain sections of the country many tenants and agricultural laborers continue to live under well-nigh intolerable conditions. To these malcontents is now added a growing class of dissatisfied industrial workers, including the employees of the great tobacco factories, the bus companies, the lumber and coconut mills and the longshoremen. Hopeless, ignorant and unbelievably credulous, the agricultural and industrial laborers who live on the margin of subsistence provide a fine field for subversive activities by the

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political "outs" and by a small but energetically-led communist party. Violence and bloodshed have often attended the struggles of these depressed classes to better their lot, even during the period of relative national prosperity made possible by the duty-free access of Philippine goods to the American market.

There is no accurate gauge for measuring the extent of political discontent in the Philippine Commonwealth. No one questions, however, that at the time it was inaugurated the Quezon government had to face a considerable amount of quite virulent dissatisfaction. General Aguinaldo and Bishop Aglipay of the Independent Filipino Church had been independent candidates for the Commonwealth presidency against Mr. Quezon, President of the Senate. Neither of them possessed political experience, had the backing of any permanent party organization (although Aguinaldo had his "Veteranos" and Aglipay his church), or enjoyed the advantage of any considerable campaign fund. Senate President Quezon and Senator Sergio Osmeña, the vice-presidential candidate, headed a joint ticket agreed upon by both of the national parties, whose organizations extend to virtually every barrio in the Archipelago and command considerable financial resources. Senate President Quezon also enjoyed the advantage of being president of the majority party and the recognized head of the Filipino participation in the existing government.

Yet in the election Aguinaldo polled 179,401 votes and Aglipay 148,006, a total of 327,407, against Quezon's 695,299 and Osmeña's 810,666. Both opposition candidates directed their campaign to the masses. They told the people that the sacred cause of independence had been betrayed by the official leaders and that the Commonwealth meant continued exploitation of the country for an indefinite period by a selfish oligarchy supported by American bayonets.[1] After the election Aguinaldo declared that he had been defeated by fraud and appealed to the President of the United States. For weeks his angry followers, often to the number of a thousand, held nightly meetings in the grounds of his home near Manila, talking sedition and at times openly proposing the assassination of the Filipino government leaders. The extreme precautions taken to protect the life of the President-elect revealed how seriously these and other threats were regarded.

[1] The same appeals, made by other and less worthy leaders to the ignorant and depressed masses in the Tagalog provinces around Manila, had previously been in part responsible for the Sakdal uprising of May 1935.

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No implication is intended that General Aguinaldo is likely to lead a revolt against the Commonwealth government or to countenance political assassination. Indeed, the General has consistently declared that it was his restraining influence that held his more radical followers in check. This probably was the case. However, the number of votes polled for Aguinaldo and Aglipay in the existing circumstances, plus the feeling of many of the masses that the ballot is valueless to them because elections are won by fraud and wealth, plus the fact that for many years all legitimate opposition parties have been swallowed up by the majority through coalition, fusion or some other mutually agreeable working arrangement, plus the fact that the "outs" are now able to employ the old immediate independence cry that for so many years kept the "ins" in power — these all add up to make a total of political discontent that is far from reassuring.

The two large native minority groups in the Philippines are the Igorotes, the 400,000 primitive, pagan hill people of the Mountain province of northern Luzon, and the 500,000 Moros (Mohammedans) of Mindanao and Sulu. The alien minorities are the 75,000 (or more) Chinese and approximately 20,000 Japanese. If the Commonwealth remains solvent, it probably will be able to deal with all of these minorities as successfully as have preceding Philippine governments. But a breakdown of public order due to other reasons might make these groups a serious menace to the safety of the state.

The dangers to public order that have been discussed are in considerable degree offset by a number of other factors. Perhaps the chief among these is the generally reasonable and peaceful character of the Filipinos. They are instinctively inclined to compromise and their leaders are adept in arranging agreements that prevent fights to the finish and clean-cut decisions. Nor is there either unity or capable leadership among those who might desire to challenge the authority of the government by force. The President and Vice-President, on the other hand, and many of their political associates in Manila and the provinces, are statesmen of experience and proven ability. Under reasonably favorable conditions they should be able to deal successfully with discontent among their own people.

In any country, however, the ultimate guarantee of the public peace is the government's possession of sufficient power to preserve it by force if necessary. This guarantee exists at present

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in the Philippines and will continue to exist during the ten-year Commonwealth period, unless there is a disastrous economic breakdown. The Commonwealth President has at his disposal a loyal and efficient constabulary, supported by the new national army. The whole military establishment is being organized and directed under the guidance of Major-General Douglas MacArthur, United States Army, and an able American staff.

Finally, no successful rebellion against the Commonwealth is conceivable because should the Philippine government fail to protect itself the President of the United States is authorized to intervene to preserve and maintain it as provided in its constitution. Probably no widespread rebellion against the Commonwealth will occur. Certainly none would have the slightest chance of success. This does not mean that occasional small but costly revolts are beyond the realm of possibility. Should there be a serious economic breakdown the existing economic and political discontent would be extended and intensified and might produce disorder that could be suppressed only by the stern use of considerable military force. The solution of the problem of public order, therefore, as of most of the other problems of the Commonwealth, will depend primarily upon the continuation of the economic prosperity of the Philippines and the financial soundness of its government.

V

During the next five years it should prove possible to maintain the basic economic situation in the Philippines because the Islands will continue to enjoy their present favored position in the American market. Even during this period, however, further economic development will be checked by quotas that have limited the duty-free importation of sugar, coconut oil and cordage into the United States, and by the uncertainty of the future. The immediate fiscal position of the Commonwealth is sound. This favorable situation has been produced, however, only by rigid and relentless economy, backed by a courageous use of the Governor-General's veto power for the purpose of protecting the treasury. It is disquieting that in its initial session the new National Assembly should have appropriated for 1936 considerably more than the estimated revenues for this year.

In the sixth year of the Commonwealth, however, the economic picture changes. Beginning then, the Tydings-McDuffie Act im-

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poses upon Philippine products destined for the United States a schedule of export taxes which increase by regular annual increments from 5 percent of the American tariff to 25 percent in the tenth year. In 1946 independence is to be attained. Thenceforth the full American tariff will be applied to all Philippine goods imported into the United States. The primary purposes of the export taxes are to compel the Philippines to diversify its products, decrease production costs and seek non-American markets. But both Filipinos and the Americans resident in the Islands are virtually unanimous in the conviction that these purposes cannot be accomplished in the allotted time. There is grave danger, moreover, that before the end of the period the following Philippine export industries would be seriously depressed, or in some cases destroyed: sugar, molasses, alcohol (from molasses), coconut oil, copra cake, desiccated coconut, cordage, tobacco scrap, cigars, embroideries and buttons. Now these industries comprise about 90 percent of all Philippine exports. Upon them depends the livelihood of millions of Filipinos and the financial structure of many provinces as well as of the Commonwealth Government itself. In jeopardizing them at a time when serious economic and political discontent already exist in the Philippines the economic provisions of the Tydings-McDuffie Act endanger not only the prosperity of the Filipino people but the financial and political stability of the Commonwealth.

The imposition of the prescribed export taxes, and the uncertainty in which the Tydings-McDuffie Act left post-independence trade relations between the United States and the Philippines, might fail to produce the dire consequences so widely feared. But there can be little doubt that the application of the full American tariff to Philippine products when independence had been achieved would soon be followed by economic ruin and political and social chaos. Leading Filipinos believe that the only way in which they could avert these disasters would be by becoming a part of the economic and political system of their great industrial and military neighbor to the north. Most of them agree with the President of their Constitutional Convention, who stated publicly that such a course would mean "economic pauperism and political extinction" for themselves and their descendants.

Assuming that under the provisions of the Tydings-McDuffie Law the Philippine Commonwealth will be threatened with seri-

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ous dangers during the second half of the coming decade, and that the Philippine Republic to be established in 1946 will not have a reasonable chance for an independent existence, what, if anything, should be done at the present time by the United States? One answer to this question is that the United States should do nothing: that the Filipinos asked for this law, have accepted it, and now the next step is "up to them." There are three weaknesses in this answer. The first is that such an attitude ignores America's inescapable moral responsibility for this Asiatic people that it conquered and over which it is sovereign. The second is that by the terms of its own law and the facts of the actual situation the United States would be compelled to step in, possibly by force of arms, and reëstablish peace, order and governmental stability should they be destroyed in the Philippines prior to the final independence of the Islands. In 1898, when the Filipinos were little more than half as numerous as they now are; when, relatively speaking, they were unarmed, disunited, undeveloped and unorganized; when they were not within the effective sphere of influence of a great and jealous Asiatic power, it was necessary to send 80,000 American troops across the Pacific in order to establish American authority over the Islands. The effort that would be required to reëstablish our effective rule there might be much greater under present conditions.

In the third place, should an economic and political breakdown occur in the Islands prior to the termination of the ten-year period, independence would become impossible in 1946 and would remain impossible for some time thereafter. The United States would be virtually compelled to stay in the Philippines regardless of its wishes or interests. The conclusion is that whether or not the Filipinos are willing to gamble with their future by failing to request an alteration of the terms of the agreement into which they have entered, America should take prompt steps to protect both itself and its ward from the dangers of the present situation.

This end can be accomplished, and the Commonwealth and the Republic given a fair chance of success, only by a considerable revision of the economic provisions of the Tydings-McDuffie Act. Filipino acceptance of this law was secured in part by the declaration of President Roosevelt that, "Where imperfections or inequalities exist, I am confident that they can be corrected after proper hearing and in fairness to both peoples." The President subsequently indicated that he would call an American-Philippine

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conference to consider the trade relations between the two countries. Preparations for such a conference are already being made by an American inter-departmental committee composed of representatives of the Departments of State, War, Agriculture and Commerce and the Tariff Commission. In the Philippines a committee appointed by the Governor-General in 1935 and an Economic Council created by the National Assembly are carrying on a similar work.

To put the Philippine Commonwealth and American-Philippine relations upon a sound basis there should be modifications of the Tydings-McDuffie Act extending the time and altering the conditions under which the Filipinos are to be required to make the far-reaching and difficult economic adjustments that are prerequisite to genuine political independence. The most simple and effective action would be the substitution of a mutually beneficial reciprocal trade agreement, which would continue after the establishment of independence, for the graduated export taxes to be levied prior to 1946 and the full American tariff to be imposed beginning July 4 of the latter year. Such action would greatly reduce whatever danger there may now be of a serious economic collapse even before the termination of American sovereignty, and prevent the disasters that would probably follow independence under the existing plan. The continuation of preferential trade between the Philippines and the United States after independence apparently would require an alteration of the most-favored-nation clause in commercial treaties between the United States and a number of other nations. All of these treaties expire or become subject to denunciation prior to 1946, however, and as each of them comes up for continuation the United States could properly request that the other party thereto agree to except the Philippines from the effect of the most-favored-nation provision upon the ground that twenty-five years of free trade between the United States and the Philippines cannot be abruptly terminated with fairness to either country.

The formulation of an American-Philippine trade agreement would naturally involve a reconsideration of the quotas of duty-free sugar, coconut oil and cordage now assigned to the Islands. However, the weight of expert opinion is that the limitations imposed by these quotas will not seriously injure any of the industries in question, but merely prevent their further expansion

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upon the artificial basis of a free American market. Continued expansion would make it still more difficult for the Philippines to achieve economic independence of America; probably, too, it would be resisted by American interests which fear Philippine competition, as well as by other Americans who believe that the United States should rid itself of the Islands as quickly as possible.

Efforts may be made, also, to put the Commonwealth government in complete control over the Philippine currency, over import and export duties and over foreign affairs. Such alterations in the law would be of doubtful wisdom for two reasons. First, American authority in the Islands should not be further reduced as long as the United States continues to have the responsibilities of sovereignty there. Second, a further extension of autonomy in these matters is not necessary because the American President is already in a position to permit the Commonwealth any liberty of action that may serve Philippine interests without impairing those of the United States. It is doubtful, indeed, whether any alterations in the political provisions of the Tydings-McDuffie Act can be advantageously made at this time. The Philippine leaders cannot be expected to acquiesce in any reduction of existing autonomy nor can the United States safely reduce its control. More important still, if the Philippines are given a fair chance at economic prosperity and stability the Commonwealth will probably be successful and American interests will be adequately safeguarded without any modification of the political provisions of the law.

VI

If we look both backward and forward — backward through the thirty-eight years of the American-Philippine connection, forward to the end of the Commonwealth period — we cannot escape the conclusion the United States is bound both in honor and interest to take whatever steps are necessary to assure the success of the government which has been established in the Islands. I believe that ever since 1898 the American people has intended, practically unanimously, to set up a régime of political liberty in the Philippines. Selfish economic interests may have played a part in the passage of the Tydings-McDuffie Act. But in the minds of the American public as a whole it was a measure intended to bring one step nearer the consummation of the his-

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toric American policy of preparing the Philippines for independence. If there are sound reasons for believing that the economic provisions of the law jeopardize the accomplishment of this purpose those provisions should be altered. The failure of the Commonwealth — even the eventual failure of the Philippine Republic that is to succeed it — would be first of all an American failure. It would be a particularly bad failure, too, because it would mean that the United States had not met its obligations towards a weak and dependent people over whom it had extended its rule by force.

The case for assuring the success of the Commonwealth is equally clear from the standpoint of self-interest. It would be costly and thankless to cope with any economic-political collapse that might occur in the Philippines before 1946. And if such a collapse occurred it might well defeat the fundamental purpose of the Tydings-McDuffie Act — the early separation of the Philippines from the United States. Whether both countries, or either of them, will desire this separation when the allotted ten years shall have expired, cannot be said definitely now. Already there is a growing realization among thinking Filipinos that their long sought "independence" from the United States may mean nothing more than immediate freedom to starve and ultimate domination by some other nation. Very possibly there may be a real demand in the Philippines for an extension of the ten-year period as its end approaches, or at any rate for the prolongation of some sort of political tie with the United States. A decade hence America too may wish to continue some connection with the Islands. Whatever sentiments of this sort may develop, however, there can be no question that it will be to the advantage of the United States to be able to withdraw honorably from the Philippines in 1946 should it then wish to do so. From the purely selfish American viewpoint this freedom of action should be preserved at any reasonable cost.

In addition to the motives of honor and interest just mentioned there are two other reasons why America should give the Filipinos a fair chance to carry out successfully the program that has been laid down for them. The Philippine Commonwealth represents the finest and most hopeful effort that has been made by a powerful western state to set up a dependent people of another race as an independent and stable member of the family of nations. Success in this project will encourage the progressive

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and liberal elements in every imperial nation to insist upon a generous recognition of the legitimate national demands of subject peoples. It will arouse in dependencies impatiently demanding greater liberty and ultimate independence a greater confidence in the possibility of obtaining these ends without resort to desperate measures. In short, the success of the American-Philippine experiment will be a contribution of undoubted value to the peaceful solution of the admittedly difficult world problem of imperialism. Conversely, failure in the Philippines — whether before or after independence — would add to the danger of international anarchy which threatens the world today. If there is any one contribution to world peace which it is clearly America's duty to make, this is it.

Finally, there is at stake the contribution to world civilization that would be represented by the successful establishment of an independent and secure Philippine nation. The Filipinos are a gifted and a patriotic people. They represent a remarkably successful synthesis between an ancient Oriental culture and two types of Western civilization. In the enthusiasm awakened by the attainment of their long-coveted autonomy they have already displayed surprising vigor in laying the foundations of a distinctive and progressive national life. If they are given reasonable economic opportunities, I feel confident they will do their share towards saving and enriching modern civilization. Should the United States terminate its relations with this people under conditions that would jeopardize their survival as a nation, it would violate a trust which it has assumed to civilization and abandon the principles of its own moral and political institutions. The American people would never knowingly sanction such a course. They should support the President in the action that he has indicated will be taken to avoid it.

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A NEW ERA IN GREECE

By William Miller

SINCE last November Greece has undergone a series of changes, frequent even for that volatile country. The monarchy has been restored, a non-political cabinet has been formed, and four prominent personages — Venizelos, Kondyles, Demertzes and Tsaldares — have died. The country is now governed by General Metaxas, a man who secured a very small following at both the last elections, but who (owing to the inability of the two large "Venizelist" and "anti-Venizelist" groups to come to an agreement) has not only succeeded to the heritage of Demertzes, but has received a vote of confidence from the Chamber and has been able to adjourn it for five months.

Many of the changes of régime in Greece have been bloodless. So it was when Otho was deposed in 1862, when Constantine was expelled in 1917 and again in 1920, and when George II was euphemistically "given leave of absence" in 1923. Similarly the Republic was abolished without a shot being fired, and the King returned to Greece without opposition, after a fanciful plebiscite, the accuracy of which no one admitted without a smile, but the result of which most people accepted as an accomplished fact. The Greek people was weary of revolutions, of which the writer has witnessed seven in twelve years. The business classes wanted stability under any form of government that was democratic, whether it was a "crowned democracy" or a republic, for in modern Greek the word *demokratía* has two meanings: "democracy," which is not necessarily republican, and "republic," which is not necessarily democratic but may be conservative. There have never been large numbers of convinced Republicans or convinced Royalists in Greece. Political parties there are personal and are not separated by marked differences of program or principle. Greek revolutions, as those elsewhere, have been the work of resolute minorities, and since 1843 when Bavarian rule was abolished and the way opened for constitutional government, have invariably been the work of the army, which has learned what Tacitus called the fatal secret that it could make and unmake rulers. It was the march of the "Military League" from the Goudi barracks in 1909 which inaugurated the recently closed chapter of Greek history, for it introduced Venizelos to Greek

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politics; and absent or present, by the affection and antipathy which he inspired, he dominated the scene till his death deprived his friends of their real if exiled leader, and his foes of their sole bond of union. For the real division of parties had long been not into Royalists and Republicans but into Venizelists and anti-Venizelists. As long as he lived his supporters used his name as a battle-cry; his enemies, however much they might differ among themselves (and the Venetians had a saying, "five Greeks, five Generals"), were united in opposition to him. He might assert, as he often did, that he had abandoned politics; but politics, not the translation of Thucydides, were his real interest. The Peloponnesian War bored him, the European situation enthralled him, and to the end he exercised political influence from Paris by his letters to M. Rouphos, an ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs, in the last of which he exclaimed: "Long live the King!"

In southeastern Europe everything is possible except the probable; real events far exceed in interest and dramatic force the imaginative creations of novelists. Hence one extraordinary result of the monarchist revival, which was the work of Royalists and especially of that tardy convert to the monarchy, the ex-Republican, Kondyles, "the General Monk of the Greek Restoration" as he called himself — namely, the unexpected phenomenon of the opposition of the ultra-Royalists to the King and his support by the Venizelists. What the ultra-Monarchists wanted and expected was a monarch who would be "their man," a party chief not an umpire between and above parties, a Greek Bourbon, who would have "learned nothing and forgotten nothing" in his twelve years of exile, who would ostracize their political opponents and keep "the King's friends" always in power. In other words, they wanted a system which would have continued the fatal schism that for twenty years had divided Greece into two irreconcilable factions.

But even before his return King George II announced that he intended to be "King of *all* the Greeks," not of the Royalists only, and he had no sooner landed at Phaleron than he made a significant change in the draft proclamation prepared for him by Kondyles, altering the phrase "my government" to "my governments." He then accepted the resignation which Premier Kondyles had tendered merely as a matter of form, awarded him the Grand Cross as a consolation prize, and appointed a non-political man, Demertzes, as Prime Minister of a service cabinet from which all the political leaders were excluded. He granted a general

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amnesty, which displeased the intransigents, and summoned a conference of all the party leaders, including M. Papanastasiou, who, as first Prime Minister of the Republic, had abolished the Monarchy in 1924. He listened daily to what every political visitor had to say without expressing any opinion himself, and is understood to have intimated to the male members of the royal family (with the exception of his brother, the heir apparent, Prince Paul, who is his constant companion), that he did not consider their speedy return to Greece would be wise until the political situation became more settled. A royal uncle, as George I found in his early years at Athens, might be a source of trouble to a reigning nephew. Already the opinion of one had been quoted against him; and Athens, blessed with twenty daily newspapers, is productive of rumors. This self-denying ordinance must make the King's life lonely, but preparations are being made for the reception of his sisters at the Palace. The force of character which he has displayed has surprised many who knew him before his exile, and this has given him the advantage, denied to the average monarch, of coming into contact with all sorts and conditions of men instead of being confined within the circle of courtiers. He is said to have learned much in England, where most of his exile was spent; but it must be remembered that monarchy in the British Empire, with its centuries of tradition, is different from monarchy in Greece, where in one hundred and ten years three of the five kings — all foreigners — were deposed (one twice), one was assassinated, and only one died in Greece in his bed.

It is, therefore, too soon to prophesy whether the restored monarchy will last; for the Greeks, like the Athenians in the days of St. Paul, love "some new thing." Already the King is understood to have threatened, as his grandfather once did, to leave if his good intentions were thwarted. At present, however, if there were another and a genuine plebiscite, there undoubtedly would be a very large majority for the "Georgian" monarchy. Nevertheless the King has already experienced the difficulty which lies at the root of the national character, otherwise so brilliant, that of getting men of the same calling to work together. Teamwork is uncongenial to his individualistic subjects. Hence the failure of the repeated and lengthy negotiations between Liberals (under Venizelos's successor, M. Sophoules) and Populists (under the late M. Tsaldares) for the formation of a coalition government, not so much owing to any fundamental difference of principles as to the

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innate desire of both parties to hold the key positions in the Cabinet. After six months the only possible solution was a neutral ministry and the adjournment of Parliament until the autumn, with a Commission of 40 taking its place meanwhile.

The death of Kondyles removed a man of strong will and natural ability who might have aspired to be a miniature Mussolini overshadowing the monarch. But the disappearance of Venizelos has much more profoundly affected the political situation. History will probably class him with Trikoupes as one of the two great men produced by Greece in the first century of her independence. It is significant that both fell from power at a time when they seemed to be omnipotent, and that both died in exile, the modern equivalent of the ostracism of Aristides. Both had large ideas, both were too big for a small country, just as giant trees overshadow and stunt the growth of the smaller vegetation. One of Venizelos's leading opponents frankly expressed this opinion in the Chamber: "Let him go, and let us small men govern the country." Thus while abroad his death deprives Greece of an incomparable asset — for his was the only Greek name known everywhere, indeed for some foreigners Greece meant Venizelos — on the other hand at home his removal has already diminished the intensity of political rancor. What this was only those can realize who were in Greece at the time of his death and funeral and saw the articles, headlines and even caricatures published by a section of the anti-Venizelist press. Fortunately his body was not brought to Athens, else its faithful Cretan bodyguard might have reacted with dire results against any insult offered to his memory. Happily his successors are not prominently associated in the minds of their antagonists with the events of the bitter struggles of the last twenty years, which permeated social as well as political life at Athens to such a degree that it was difficult for the partisans of either side to meet in neutral drawing-rooms, and foreign hostesses sometimes found it desirable to have separate "at home" days, one for Venizelists, the other for anti-Venizelists. Now there seems to be a fair prospect that the King's policy of "drawing a veil over the past" and looking to the present and the future may be accomplished. It would be of much assistance if the newspapers would cease publishing articles on the history of that recent period until the passage of time allows an impartial view of it to be taken.

Besides the death of Venizelos and the moderating influence

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of the sovereign two other causes have contributed towards the pacification of parties: the result of the January elections and the critical international situation. The elections resulted in a dead heat, the two principal combinations securing respectively 143 and 142 seats. The fifteen Communists held the balance, just as in England in 1886 the 86 Irish Nationalists did between Liberals and Conservatives, thus tempting both sides, Gladstone and Carnarvon, to pluck the forbidden fruit of Home Rule and thereby obtain office by the Irish vote. Similar accusations were bandied about in Greece, where communism, a new danger in an individualistic country, inspires alarm. To resort to another election, which would have been the fourth in less than four years, would have been certainly fatiguing and probably futile. For the people, which had also had the plebiscite, was weary of voting. Moreover, as the last elections were undoubtedly "free," there was no reason to suppose that the result, at least under the same system of voting, would have been different. It would thus not have been worth the trouble and expense — a formidable consideration with candidates — to consult the electorate again.

Still more cogent was the argument derived from the threatening external situation. Greece, though a small country, occupies an important geographical position. Partly a Mediterranean and partly a continental state, she has to frame her foreign policy with regard to her neighbors by sea and her neighbors by land. She possesses valuable naval bases at Argostoli, Navarino, Suda Bay, the Gulf of Volo and Lemnos (which last she would fortify if the Turks fortify the Dardanelles), all liable to be coveted by great maritime Powers at war in the Levant. Her interest and desire are to keep out of a possible Anglo-Italian conflict, though as long as Italy holds the Dodecanese, with its almost wholly Greek population, there can be no doubt on which side Greek sympathies would lie, in accordance with the historical traditions of more than a century. But it would be difficult for Greece to remain neutral, especially as the British could, as they did in 1915, offer Cyprus in exchange for her active or even passive assistance, in other words for the free use of one or all of those ports. Venizelos, indeed, stated that Mr. Lloyd George had once proposed to him to exchange that harborless island for Argostoli. But the strategic value of Cyprus to the British Empire is said to have been lately enhanced by the project for making it an air-base. Meanwhile Italy has converted Leros into an aviation station

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and thus that island might be a menace to Greece as well as to Turkey. In her capacity as a continental state and as a signatory of the Balkan Pact, Greece is also concerned with her liabilities under that instrument. Venizelos was specially anxious lest she should have contracted responsibilities to her Balkan allies which might involve her in war with an extra-Balkanic Power, in other words, Italy. Suppose that Greece's ally, Jugoslavia, were attacked by Bulgaria or by Albania, both of them Balkan states and neither a signatory of the Pact. Greece would then be liable to assist the Jugoslavs; but would that liability be extended outside the Balkans, if Italy actively supported her two Balkan protégés against Jugoslavia? It would appear from the decision of all the Greek party leaders to support the present government's foreign policy that this would not be the case. Such a difficulty could not arise if the principle of "the Balkan peninsula for the Balkan peoples" were recognized. But, although the Hapsburgs and Russia have no longer their Balkan pets or peons, Italy uses her two favorite Balkan states (and Hungary and Austria) for the encirclement of Jugoslavia. In these circumstances the Foreign Office is the most important department in Greece.

Like Demertzes, General Metaxas assumed the Foreign Ministry together with the Premiership, at the same time retaining in his own hands the Ministries of War and Aviation. This is more than any single person, however energetic, can manage. It is intelligible that the Premier, a former Chief of Staff whom the Germans called "the little Moltke" for his strategic attainments, should be also Minister of War, especially as in this way he is to keep control of the army and see that it is really "absorbed in its professional duties" — to use the official phrase which not infrequently means the opposite. But he has never been specially interested in foreign policy, and in these days of diplomacy by conferences a Foreign Minister must be often on the road — or in the air — on his way to and from international gatherings. Thus the Premier had to hurry his measures through the Chamber in order to attend the meeting of the Permanent Council of the Balkan Entente at Belgrade, proceeding later to Geneva for the discussion of the Dardanelles question which had just been raised by the Turkish proposal to fortify them. In fact, a modern Foreign Minister must be like Odysseus, long absent from his Ithaca, the Foreign Office, leaving his Penelope unprotected from foreign suitors. In the discussion of possible

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nominees as Foreign Minister, M. Michalakopoulos, an ex-Premier who has four times held the Foreign Office, was naturally mentioned. A close student of foreign affairs (and incidentally of FOREIGN AFFAIRS), he has travelled in many European countries, speaks several languages, including English, and was suggested for the post by Venizelos, an excellent judge of such a matter. But M. Michalakopoulos is supposed to have somewhat pro-Italian leanings and to be not so popular as some others at Belgrade, an important point for Greece. In the end the King appointed a non-party man, Colonel Skilakalis.

If a clear grasp of the international situation be the first essential for Greece at this juncture, another is the complete unity of the army; for in these days a foreign policy which does not have armed force behind it is academic. After the insurrection of March 1935 a number of officers, some of marked professional capacity, were eliminated from the armed forces because of their participation in it, just as several experienced diplomatists were removed from the service because they, or their relatives, were Venizelists. That the officers retained in the army should oppose the reëntry of their discharged colleagues, against whom they fought little more than a year ago, is only natural, but it is not in the national interest. The time may come when Greece may need urgently all her available military ability. The King may here be a determining factor. He is the head of the armed forces, and they are said to be impressed by his energy and firmness. Of the latter he gave proof when on March 5 he rapidly replaced General Papagos, then Minister of War and the leader in the *coup d'état* which deposed M. Tsaldares from the premiership in October, by General Metaxas, because General Papagos had brought him complaints of a group of officers about political matters. The King showed at that time that he meant to end the interference of the officers in politics, and that if they would not amend, he would leave for Oropos and London. Since that episode the army has been quiet, and our nights have been undisturbed by rumors of a *kínema*, the word which appropriately expresses both a cinematograph and a military revolution, which in Greece is suggestive of "the movies." As a young man the King was associated with the army at the taking of Yanina in 1913 (the anniversary of which he attended this year), and he has paid surprise visits to the Athenian barracks and reviewed the Greek fleet as a sign of his interest in the country's defenses. His father was specially popular

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with the army, which he led to victory in the two Balkan wars.

The diagnosis of a physician after examining the Greek body politic, then, would seem to be that the fever which has agitated it for the last twenty years has ceased, and that there is hope that it will not be recurrent. The patient is weary of revolutions, changes of the form of government and even elections. Nature calls aloud for repose, and so far there are signs that it may be found under the shelter of the constitutional monarchy. George II has taken George I as his example. But it must not be assumed that because he has done so well during these early months of his second reign the future of the monarchy is thereby assured. If times become bad the cry may be raised that the Monarchy costs more than the Republic, and that the abolition of the Senate does not compensate for the increased civil list. The heir apparent is unmarried, eligible princesses are nowadays scarce, and marriage with a Greek lady might arouse jealousies in a country where there is no aristocracy. Besides, southeastern Europe is volcanic soil; even the tactful George I had his ups and downs. But there seems to be no likelihood of the rise among the present leaders of another dominating personality who would embarrass and overtop the monarch; and no young man has given proof of political eminence such as Joseph Chamberlain prophesied of the young student, Venizelos, when he met him fifty years ago. Venizelos's second son, who has now entered politics, is no exception to the general rule about great men's heirs.

Barring accidents — and such might arise from a European conflagration which spread to Greece — the course of Greek politics seems likely to run smoothly. Like the Danube after issuing from the Iron Gates, the stream should be monotonous but useful, for the banks on either side are low and commonplace. There should thus be an opportunity for unobtrusive, practical social work, such as the improvement of hygiene, the better paving and lighting of the capital, the amelioration of highways, and the definite settlement of the claims of the foreign bondholders. These questions do not bring Greece "into the news" as did the wonderful triumphs of Venizelos abroad. But happy is the Balkan country which does not provide sensational headlines for the papers but pursues the even tenor of its way, solving its internal problems without the intervention of foreign Powers. Whatever the validity of these prophecies, the saying of Trikoupes is as true as ever: "Greece wishes to live, and live she will."

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MASS MOVEMENTS IN SPAIN

By Lawrence A. Fernsworth

SPAIN has been widely pictured as in the grip of communist mobs engaged in arson, murder and plunder. Yet if we look closely at the forces of mass revolution on the march there we see that as yet the Moscow variety of communism is merely a detail on the canvas. To this particular observer at any rate, the cause of democracy has seemed to be on a firmer footing since Azaña became Prime Minister a few days after the elections of February 16 than when he first took office after the Republican revolution of April 14, 1931. However, in Spain the tides of political action have a way of veering suddenly in the night; and so it remains to be seen what will be the effect of Azaña's translation to the presidency on May 11.

Immediately after the declaration of the Republic in 1931 a violent antagonism asserted itself between the revolutionary masses (except the Socialists) and the government. If one looks back at the news reports of the first two years one reads about wave upon wave of revolutionary outbreak. Finally, even the Socialists abandoned the government. The 1936 Azaña ministry, however, came into power on the basis not only of a binding agreement with a number of "proletarian" parties but of a certain toleration by other revolutionary groups. Moreover, when the new government took hold it showed that it was cognizant of those past errors which made its predecessors distrusted. So far the parties have shown a loyal disposition to abide by the terms of the pact. The resulting stability is a fact, notwithstanding the scattered incidents of mob action which in their global aspect are somewhat appalling. This gives grounds for hope that the government, by adopting a realistic attitude toward the disorders, by refusing to be incited to undue acts of retaliation and repression, and by an understanding attitude toward the needs of labor, may avert the prophesied red doomsday.

As to the long list of church and convent burnings and similar occurrences, often produced by the deliberately provocative acts of fascist elements and their kind,[1] the important thing would

[1] See the debate in the Cortes and in particular Azaña's speech, April 3. See also the ministerial declaration in the Cortes on April 5 and 16, in which Azaña charged: "We are witnessing a complete plan of aggression against the public peace and the Republican régime."

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appear to be, not what happened, but what might have happened yet did not. The spread of mob action was in each instance checked, without undue violence, after the initial outburst. It would well have suited the fascist and other anti-popular elements for the government to have resorted to cruel repression after the classic Spanish manner. Indeed, their manoeuvre was to place the government in the dilemma: either violent repression or failure in its duty. The first would once more have given the Right the pretext for accusing the government of terrorism, as they had done in the Casas Viejas affair — not without justice, although they themselves had been guilty of far worse cruelty in Asturias; the second course would have offered grounds for charging the government with weakness. Indeed the government of the "first biennium," April 1931 to November 1933, had fallen into just such a trap. If it had done so again it would almost surely have released mass retaliation; the issue would have been pitched between the "proletariat" and the reactionary forces, and the Republic would have been crushed between them.

II

The electoral pact was effected between a group of three left parties, forming the Republican wing, and three revolutionary parties, the Socialists, the official (Moscow) Communists, and a Syndicalist fraction. The "Popular Front" so constituted has 286 deputies in a Cortes of 470 members. Of these 286 seats, 118 belong to the "proletarian extreme;" the Socialists have 99, and are thus the strongest individual party in the Cortes; the official Communists have 16 seats; and the Syndicalists and others have three. The terms of the pact constitute a minimum program of social legislation and include such features as land colonization, public works, and the enforcement of existing social laws. The Socialists make certain reservations: they have a program of their own which goes beyond the pact, such as the nationalization of land and the turning over of industry to the workers. It is part of the Socialist tactic that, while supporting the government, they shall not collaborate in the ministry, thus preserving their independence for the future and standing absolved of responsibility for the acts of a *bourgeois* régime.

The Socialist Party is an old one with roots deeply sunk. It maintains contact with its members through the *Casas del Pueblo*, which are social, recreative and cultural centers scattered all over

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Spain, in some places nearly as powerful as the local governments. The party controls Spain's most important trade organization, the U. G. T. (*Unión General de Trabajadores*) or Workers' General Union, with a membership said to have been as high as 2,000,000 and which perhaps numbers 1,500,000 at present. It was this organization which sponsored the 1934 revolution in Madrid, Asturias and other parts of Spain, except Catalonia.

Curiously, the most revolutionary leader and spokesman of the Socialists is a man who formerly represented its right wing and who during the late dictatorship consented to be one of the King's privy councilors, Largo Caballero. He is the leader of an important body of extremists in the party, particularly the younger elements. It is worthy of note, however, that another bloc of extremists is wary of him, affirming that while he abounds in strong words he did not reveal himself as a man of action during the 1934 uprising. This group follows Gonzales Peña, now a deputy, who led the Asturias revolution and thereby demonstrated himself a man of action. Caballero's strength lies in the fact that he has the party's bureaucratic apparatus in his hands. His swerve to the extreme left is explained by his dissatisfaction with the treatment accorded the Socialists by the first Republican government. He also became aware of the deep dissatisfaction of the many workers and peasants who felt that, despite their loyalty to a *bourgeois* government, they had been used and were now being cast aside, as in Germany and Austria. Moreover, the peasants considered themselves defrauded of their lands. Caballero, fearful lest the masses be captured by the Syndicalists or the Communists, raised his revolutionary cry.

Note must be taken, however, of opposite currents in the Socialist party, strong currents which are not without their disruptive possibilities. The opposition is in the center and in the right. That of the center is the most insistent, its leader being Indalecio Prieto who, like Caballero, was a minister of the "first biennium" and who was requested by Azaña to head the new government when he assumed the presidency. Although disposed to do so, Prieto refused in view of the opposition on the left. He accuses Caballero of trying to establish a dictatorship within the Socialist Party. Prieto is an opportunist, but also a man of action and a most agile politician. His strength lies in the small *bourgeoisie* belonging to the party. His tendency is to watch developments and take advantage of them, it being said that he is quite

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as capable of repressing as of accepting revolutionary action. He inspires confidence by the fact that once he has decided upon a course of action he is capable of following it out to the end. No doubt Azaña felt that Prieto at the head of the Republican government would be a valuable factor in stemming the revolutionary tide. On the right of Prieto are the reformists, led by Julian Besteiro and Saborit. They are the intellectuals who believe in a process of slow revolution.

The showing made by the official Communists in the recent elections has caused some surprise. After having no great strength in the past, this party now has 16 deputies. The explanation lies not in any sudden increase of strength on their part but in the Spanish electoral laws. Under this system they obtained places on a number of Popular Front tickets in return for their support. The victory of the Front swept them in, not as Communists but as members of the ticket. The fact is that although Moscow has been maintaining close contact with Spain during all these revolutionary years — her first appearance on the scene is said to have been in 1927 — and has had her party nuclei and her field workers, the strength of the Soviets has remained negligible. The real Soviet plan seems to have been to assume a passive attitude toward Spanish democracy as providing a bulwark against fascism, to allow a free hand to the revolutionary activities of the proletariat as preparing the soil for revolution, and to wait. All this would be in accordance with the rules laid down by the Seventh Congress of the Communist International, well explained by Ludwig Lore in the pages of this review last January. Recently there returned to Spain a hundred or more Spaniards who had taken refuge in Russia following the 1934 movement. After having been trained in Russian revolutionary concepts and technique, they are now expected to sow the seed at home. There is little evidence to support tales of Moscow's lavish expenditures in Spain. Such money as she sends is devoted largely to press propaganda, particularly to maintaining the official Communist papers, mostly weeklies and the Madrid daily, *Mundo Obrero*.

Spanish individualism, a very real thing as everyone who has had much contact with Spaniards knows, is a strong obstacle to the spread of the Moscow brand of collectivism with its notions of submerging the individual in the state. The Spaniard will not submerge himself in anything. He has no concept of the life-of-the-bee collectivity essential in communism. New generations of

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Spaniards will need considerable "behavior conditioning" before they are ready for it. It may be observed, however, that the Spaniard's individualism does not necessarily imply indiscipline, as is so frequently said. My own observation is that the Spaniard, and in particular the worker, is quite amenable to what he considers a reasonable and proper discipline; though he can be persuaded, he can not be driven. Those Spaniards who traditionally have held to the formula, *hay que pegar*, meaning that in order to govern it is necessary to rain blows on the governed, have not understood their own people.

Account must here be taken of a movement which is increasing in strength, that of the Unified Youth. This is a recent amalgamation of the Socialist Youth and the Communist Youth. It has an aggressive and militant nature, goes in for sports and cultural activities, and has as its principal object the preparation of youth to give solid support to the revolutionary parties. It further proposes to meet on equal terms the strong-arm tactics of the youth organizations of the Right. Though new, the movement is growing, and it is said now to have some 60,000 followers.

Such then — Socialists, official Communists and a Syndicalist fraction of no great importance — is the picture presented by the Popular Front's extreme wing.

Standing aloof from the Popular Front is the Unified Marxist Party (*Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista*), a consolidation of two political fractions, the *Trotskistas*, inspired by Trotsky in exile, and the Workers' and Peasants' bloc. Both have their main strength in Catalonia. The leaders are Andreu Nin, a disciple and former collaborator of Trotsky in Russia, and Joaquim Maurin, former leader of the bloc. The party claims 10,000 enrolled members and an influence over some 60,000 workers. They have scattered centers throughout Spain. They consider that the Socialists and Communists are committing a great tactical blunder by compacting with a *bourgeois* régime; that in the end these parties will but have served the ends of the *bourgeoisie*, gaining nothing for themselves or the workers. The workers, perceiving this, will abandon their leaders. That, think the Unified Marxists, will be the psychological moment to capture the workers and carry the revolution through. It may be said that in 1934 this group showed some strength by organizing various revolutionary parties into the Workers' Alliance and intervening in the revolution of that year.

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III

The revolutionary parties just named, whether within or outside the electoral pact, constitute the political wing of the revolutionary movement, that is to say, the organizations that accept political action. But there is another and important revolutionary wing, the Anarcho-Syndicalists, who do not believe in political action, styling themselves apolitical. The Syndicates are trade unions with the social philosophy of anarchy. Their organization is known as the C. N. T. (*Confederación Nacional de Trabajo*) or National Confederation of Labor. It is bound up with another organization known as the F. A. I. (*Federación Anarquística Ibérica*). The C. N. T. thus stands in the same relation to the anarchist organization as the U. G. T. stands to the Socialist Party. During the past two decades and more they too have been engaged in a life-and-death struggle for the allegiance of the Spanish worker. While the Socialists control the workers of Madrid and the interior cities, the Syndicalists, whose activities radiate from Barcelona, have a considerable strength in all the ports. They sponsored numerous revolutionary movements during the first years of the Republic, including the Barcelona general strike of September 1931, which culminated in the impressive movement of December 1933. Though this failed, it had the effect of demonstrating the Anarcho-Syndicalists' strength in many parts of Spain. They have claimed a membership of a million, but in two years of outlawry their membership fell greatly. At the national Congress just held at Saragossa they reported that their "troops" had risen again to 600,000. The Anarcho-Syndicalists, as will soon be seen, have taken steps to end their old enmity with the Socialists and to wage revolution together with them.

The outstanding peculiarity of the Syndicalists as a labor body lies in their *Sindicatos Unicos*, or unified syndicates. These represent the grouping of labor syndicates according to industries, as for instance in metals or textiles where a dozen or more trades are frequently included in a single industry. This system has a revolutionary significance, for it is the goal of Syndicalism for each syndicate completely to possess and control its particular industry all the way from planning and management through production and distribution.

The Syndicalists are the adherents of the First International and of its apostle, Bakunin, although they have made their social

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philosophy less Utopian and more realistic to adapt it to Spanish temperament. In particular they emphasize "the sovereignty of the individual." They have a double aim, the destruction of the state and of capital, and, as a corollary, the establishment of a confederation of free communes. *Comunismo Libertario* they call the new social order which they envisage and in which the central idea is the liberation of the individual from the state. The name distinguishes their projected social order from the state-ordained and state-controlled communism of Russia. It would have two main categories of action, economic and social. It is the communism most commonly in mind when reference to that doctrine is made in Spain.

As set forth at the Fourth International Congress of the C. N. T. held in Saragossa during the first twelve days of May, the economic mechanism would be as follows. Each factory or shop is to be governed by the shop council, which would have the additional function of maintaining contact with the other shop councils and with their respective syndicates. The Council of Statistics and Production is to be the coördinating organ between syndicates and it "shall establish a network of contacts among the producers of the Iberic Federation." This body, therefore, is a kind of superior economic council intended to regulate the entire economic system of the new society. In the rural districts it is to have the collaboration of the agricultural councils. Its principal function is to control production and consumption. It is likewise to maintain contact with the political bodies known as communes, which also have certain functions of trade control both within their own confines and among each other. The economic council is to take care of the surplus and supply their necessities. Finally, it is to promote foreign trade.

Money is to be abolished and credit for a day's work becomes the unit of value, each credit being good for a year. Thus the able bodied person is entitled to consume only upon proof of having produced. Each commune is to make provision for the young, the aged and the incapacitated. No doubt some exchange medium would be established for trade beyond the communes and abroad. (One wonders, however, whether in the end some form of capitalism would not again appear on the scene.)

As to the social aspect, the report of the recent congress states: "The political structure of our revolution is based on the individual, the commune, the federation." The individuals of the towns,

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the villages and the localities are to be grouped into free communes, the communes into federations of districts or regions, and finally the federations into the Confederation of the Iberian Peninsula, a super-organization taking the place of the abolished state. It is to be known as the CICAL, from *Confederación Ibérica de Comunas Autónomas Libertarias*, ruled by the general *junta*, or council, just as the federations and the communes have their respective *juntas*. Authority, so repugnant to anarchist ideology, is considered abolished: only the will of the people, as expressed through the communes, prevails. The various councils may be dissolved or their officers dismissed at any moment by the communes, since they have no fixed terms of office as in the state. The people preserve the most absolute liberty of criticism. Although the economic council and the CICAL are quasi-independent bodies, they have related functions and are to converge in the National Congress.

Some other aspects of *Comunismo Libertario* in action will be interesting. It is opposed to the idea of crime and punishment. "Corrective action is to be based on medicine and pedagogy . . . whenever any individual, the victim of pathological phenomena, offends against the harmony which must prevail among men." Women are to have complete equality with men. The family, "the first civilizing nucleus of the species," is to be preserved, but is to be based upon mutual accord, not marriage formalities. Armies are to be abolished as dangerous to the liberties of the people, although they may be employed to bring on the revolution, and are to be disbanded immediately thereafter. Armed communes are considered the best defense of popular liberties. The proletarians of other countries are to be persuaded to oppose any aggression against the Spanish Confederation.

Religious liberty is permitted "within the sanctuary of the individual conscience," but there must be no ministers, no rites, no churches but the free air. The report of the Saragossa Congress says:

> Religion has a primordial origin and objective . . . to give unity to that spiritual inquietude which the investigation into the beginning and the end of things, closely bound to being and to not being, to the life and the death of things, is capable of awakening in man. . . . [Also] to serve as a civilizing element of the human species before the conquests realized by science. . . . God, in the abstract, the personification of the end of good, of goodness, of beauty and of justice, might have served, and indeed did serve, so long as God was enshrined in the heart and in the sanctuary of the family. But since God

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died in the heart of man, and his image was exiled from the hearthside . . . religions have failed. . . . The idea of God, instead of serving man as a guide and a sustaining force, a firm buttress of morality and justice, has become the cloak which conceals and sanctifies all monstrosities, while the militant defenders thereof have become the champions of privilege and of sumptuosity, sustained by the extortion of the working classes. . . . Civilization is not, as pretended, the product of religion, but religion is the product of a civilizing sense latent in good men. . . . If religion were cleansed of its parasitical elements, the religious orders and the clergy, there would disappear those causes of friction which exist between religion and the people.

The foregoing extracts illustrate the essentially mystical character of the Spaniard, a mysticism which interweaves itself with his realistic sense and which would make it impossible for him to accept the stark realism of Russia. They shed light, moreover, on the attitude of masses of Spaniards toward the Church.

Education is to be liberal and scientific and train the individual to have an independent criterion; there is to be no regimentation. The individual is to have access to the arts and the sciences, and the right of research insofar as is compatible with productive activities. Man's bent "to surpass, to create in an artistic, scientific or literary way," is to be given full scope. "The producers must not divide themselves into the manual and the intellectual classes, but all shall be both at the same time." And again: "Since evolution is a continuous line, even though at times it is not straight, the individual will always have aspirations, desires for greater enjoyment of life, to surpass his forefathers, his kind, himself, and society cannot smother those desires."

These lines would seem to express a great spiritual driving force which must be taken into account in considering Spanish mass movements and which is quite as important as the economic motivation. If the Spanish workman is impelled by a desire to better his material condition, he moves also in an aura of mysticism, and is imbued with a spiritual *élan* which causes him deeply to feel that he has a destiny of his own, an inalienable right to opportunities that will enable him to follow it out to its end.

IV

The Socialists and the Anarcho-Syndicalists, as well as other revolutionary groups, are veering toward a new tactic, that of unified action. This tactic is the consequence of the failure of the various revolutionary movements during the past five years. The history of their respective revolutionary attempts has been, that

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whenever one side went into action the others stood aside because the movement was not just their kind. Indeed, in the "first biennium" the Socialists collaborated with the government in putting down the Anarcho-Syndicalists and sending their leaders into African exile. The following revealing picture of what happened in 1934 is given in a press report of the Saragossa Congress:

> The Asturias delegates said that they aided the revolution. Those of Madrid said they were in contact with the revolutionaries — the Socialists — and even though they decided to take no part, many of their members actually did participate. Those of Barcelona said that when requested to aid the revolution they agreed to do so, believing that it had a nationalist, and not a separatist, significance. But although in the beginning they aided the revolution, in the end they were eliminated by the separatists themselves, who even attempted to assassinate some of the Syndicalist leaders. The Saragossa leaders said that when required to aid the revolution there, they replied they would do so when they saw the Socialists in action in the streets.

There is nevertheless to be noted in the foregoing report a tendency to collaborate which was lacking in previous movements. And this tendency is now finding issue in the negotiations looking toward solidarity. Some months ago Largo Caballero took the initiative for a pact with the Anarcho-Syndicalists of a purely tactical nature, each side retaining its identity and its doctrines. There is also a tendency on the part of other groups to make common cause, and in fact they have been invited to do so. Indeed, Nin and Maurin of the Unified Marxists were the organizers three years ago of the Workers' Alliance which had precisely that end in view.

The Anarcho-Syndicalists gave at Saragossa a more positive form to the unification movement by adopting proposals which have now been transmitted to the Socialists. By accepting these proposals the U.G.T. would confess the failure of their past policy, would cease to support the government, would recognize that "the existing political and social régime must be destroyed," and that "only by unified action is it possible to defend the revolution and ward off the attacks of national and foreign capital." The Socialists are invited to convoke a congress to consider counter proposals, and this they have done. Both sets of proposals are to be studied by a joint committee and the final report submitted to all the members for approval or rejection. An interesting point in the Syndicalists' proposals is the third article which reads: "The new social régime born of the revolution shall be determined by the free election of the workers, freely united."

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This appears to be an admission that the revolution, should it come about, might result in something that would be neither socialism nor syndicalism as at present conceived by their respective organizations. The answer of an Anarcho-Syndicalist leader who was asked by this writer what might be expected to follow the success of a unified revolution, was as follows:

> The historic law of revolutions will prevail. A realist idea always follows a revolutionary movement. It is impossible to elaborate a theory of the future. It is possible, and even probable, that something neither Syndicalist nor Socialist will be born of the revolution. The important thing is that it shall be the working class which commands.

V

Can the Republic weather the storm? Can it ride through the revolutionary waves that from all sides beat upon it, coming to a safe harbor at last?

The various revolutionary groups have a theory of what might be called the gestatory period of revolution. "Revolution," according to the report of the Saragossa Congress, "is merely a phenomenon giving status of fact to a state of things that has long been in the collective conscience. . . . It is a psychological phenomenon which takes shape in an organization with power to realize its biological finality." The creation of favorable psychological and material conditions, this is the two-fold aim of the revolutionists. Clearly the Republic's immediate task is the creating of counteracting conditions favorable to itself. Here there arise three related problems. The first is to capture the confidence and the good will of the masses; the other two are to effect their economic and cultural improvement.

Spain is witnessing the spectacle of the participation of new social classes in political power. The inevitable consequences are conflicts and violences. Long submerged multitudes are feeling their strength, are making an unaccustomed assertion of rights, are turning in violent protest against those whom they feel have for so long deprived them of those rights. Señor Azaña in a recent speech in the Cortes caught the spirit of protest when he said: "A society cannot found itself upon the cruel sacrifice of the masses for the benefit of privilege, in order to raise pyramids which shall serve as the sepulchres of a demi-god, call it king or call it state." The common man in Spain, if at times unruly, is human and simple and, withal, proudly respectful of self. He is quick to respond to whoever, or whatever, is *simpático;* he is

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just as quick to repell the *antipático*. If the Republic can capitalize these reactions by convincing the worker of its interest in his welfare, it will have made a great advance toward capturing his good will and would have an uncommonly rich resource of human material from which to draw strength.

In the field of economics, the provision of work for the worker and of land for the peasant constitutes the most immediate task. Important strides have been made in both directions although it remains to be seen with what permanent effect. The forced return of many thousands of discharged workers may prove a greater load than business and industry can bear. Thousands of peasants have been placed on the land, yet there is complaint that these lands are mostly arid and that the peasant cannot make a living from them. It is questioned, also, whether the solution adopted is suited to the Spanish peasant. The government has important irrigation projects in mind, but they will take time. The giving of land to the peasants does not suit the purpose of the revolutionary leaders, particularly of the Anarcho-Syndicalists, who consider that it creates a new class of *petite bourgeoisie*, in league with capital and the state. Here, then, is a potential brake on the revolutionary movement.

But to provide work and land is but to start the task of "reanimating Spanish economy," as Señor Azaña has expressed it. Among outstanding problems may be mentioned the improvement of wage scales with their implications of increased consumption and production; a policy for the improvement of foreign trade; a new structure for the national finances.

Because of reduced wages, the worker is condemned to buy the barest and cheapest necessities, and rarely has a penny to save. Articles which should be classed as necessities are luxuries, not only to the workers but to the middle classes. When higher standards of living ensuant upon higher wages have made staples of food and wear and convenience into necessities, priced so that all can afford them, Spanish production and foreign trade will be stimulated immensely.

With respect to foreign trade Spain is in an exceedingly bad way. High tariffs, a somewhat antiquated system of customs regulations, blocked credits, and a lack of aggressiveness in seeking trade on the part of the Spanish exporter have all had their share in creating an unfavorable trade balance and in establishing a diminishing curve for trade in general. Until a few years

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ago remittances from Spaniards abroad were a compensating factor, but these have now vanished. The amount of clearances owed Great Britain on May 1 is put at $26,500,000 and payments are seven months behind. In the case of the United States the situation is worse. During eighteen months practically no payments have been made excepting on cotton and rubber, which are considered prime materials. The total amount due the United States for imports on May 1 equaled the sum of United States sales to Spain during twelve months, about $47,000,000. In addition there are the blocked earnings of American companies doing business in Spain. Under such conditions Great Britain is putting up bars against Spanish imports, and the United States is withdrawing from the Spanish market.

Some headway toward improved state finances was made during the "first biennium," but the gains made were undone in the following two years. It is a hopeful sign that the government is determined to end the old system of budgetary extensions and extraordinary budgets which covered a multitude of sins. A costly and corrupt system of tax collection by private monopolies stands in need of reform. The oil and tobacco monopolies are restrictive, both of state revenues and of trade; also, one might add, of good fuel and tobacco. The bureaucratic army of civil employees who work only half a day when they work at all, is top heavy.

Some indication has now been given of the forces which would impose a new and revolutionary social order upon Spain, and of the remedies which the Republic has at hand as a possible means of healing discontent and averting revolution. Prophecy cannot be attempted. No one who has observed the determined persistence of the revolutionary forces, their resurgence after repeated repressions, can doubt that the revolutionary tide is deep and strong. Time and again I have seen thousands of bronzed men who, after toiling all week, after traveling all night in uncomfortable third class trains, stand in a bull ring of a Sunday for three hours or more, silent, almost immovable, their faces uplifted toward orators expounding the doctrine of salvation through revolution. On the other hand, no one who observes the earnestness with which another class of men are bent upon creating a new Republican Spain, will reject the possibility — and the hope — that in the end they will triumph.

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INDUSTRIAL LABOR IN INDIA

By B. Shiva Rao

INDIA'S rapid progress along the path of industrialization has left big gaps in her social legislation. The enormous growth of her population (from 319,000,000 in 1921 to about 370,000,000 in 1934) and the economic depression of the last six years have only increased the need for reforms.

The industrial expansion has been going steadily ahead behind tariff walls built upon a basis of "discriminating protection" — a policy accepted by the Government of India on the recommendation of the Fiscal Commission after the World War. The outbreak of hostilities had revealed, as in a flash, the almost complete dependence of India on her imports of manufactured articles from abroad, even for the most essential commodities. In 1916 the Government appointed an Industrial Commission headed by Sir Thomas Holland and composed of a number of distinguished men, both British and Indian, to investigate the possibilities of industrial development in India. Though the conditions of labor were not mentioned among the assigned subjects, the Commission nevertheless dealt with that problem with great lucidity and foresight. Referring to the alleged inefficiency of Indian labor, it wrote:

> If the children of workers are provided with education under tolerable conditions of life, a new generation of workers will grow up, who will learn to regard mill work as their fixed occupation. Better housing is a most urgent necessity, especially in the large congested industrial cities. Facilities for healthy amusement, shorter hours of work (though a reduction of these may for a time decrease output), and other measures for economic betterment, such as cheap shops for the sale of articles required by the millhands, and co-operative societies, are almost equally important. . . . The problem, not only on moral grounds, but also for economic reasons, must be solved with the least avoidable delay, if the existing and future industries of India are to hold their own against the ever-growing competition, which will be still fiercer after the war. No industrial edifice can be permanent, which is built on such unsound foundations as those afforded by Indian labor under its present conditions.[1]

One of the best informed witnesses before the Commission was Major Norman White, then Sanitary Commissioner with the Government of India. In an admirable note on industrial development and public health he commented on the almost complete

[1] "Indian Industrial Commission's Report, 1918," paragraph 236.

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neglect of industrial hygiene in India, and attributed it to the fact that labor in India had been in the past "both plentiful and cheap." Three diseases he mentioned as being the most potent causes of industrial inefficiency — malaria, hookworm, and tuberculosis. Of the first two, he said: "Both are almost universally prevalent in India; both exercise their malign influence from earliest childhood and seriously interfere with bodily and mental growth and development; both, by undermining the constitution, render the body more prone to infection with other diseases. Directly and indirectly they are responsible for an enormous mortality bill." He included tuberculosis "because of the special risks with regard to the spread of infection entailed by large aggregations of labor in any but the best hygienic conditions."

India did not have long to wait for a tragic illustration of Major White's penetrating analysis. Before his note was a few months old two successive waves of influenza had swept the country, killing in less than a year from ten to twelve million people.

The natural sequence to this should have been the immediate appointment of a Public Health Commission with the conditions of industrial labor as one of the subjects for its attention. Instead there was named a Fiscal Commission to report on the desirability (or otherwise) of India's definitely adopting a protectionist policy. The plain fact is that just at this time Indian Nationalism was rapidly becoming a formidable force under the leadership of Mr. Gandhi, hitherto a friendly critic of the British Government. Political discontent was growing in India, and across the frontier Afghanistan was in no friendly mood. Mr. Montagu, Secretary of State for India at the time, devised a dual policy intended on the one hand to placate the right-wing Nationalists, and on the other to isolate Mr. Gandhi as far as possible, by winning over the capitalist elements. Mr. Montagu had in 1911 made a fervent appeal on behalf of the Indian workers in one of his earliest speeches in the House of Commons;[2] yet he was responsible eight years later for a scheme of reforms that practically ignored the interests of the workers. True, the franchise was extended to 7 or 8 million people; but the workers were not among them. In the Central Legislature, which would have had the most to do with

[2] His actual words were: "The leaders of Indian opinion must set their faces against the degradation of labor, and they need to be specially vigilant, because India's working classes, besides being themselves unorganized, are not directly represented on the Legislative Councils, whose Indian Members come almost exclusively from the land-lord and capitalist classes."

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labor legislation, landlords, mill-owners and chambers of commerce had special representatives, in addition to their right to contest general seats, while labor had but a single nominated member in the Lower House out of a total of 141, and none at all in the Upper House with its 60 members. The position of labor in the Provincial Legislatures was hardly better.

On the question of fiscal autonomy for India, both the Joint Parliamentary Committee which considered the Reforms Scheme and Mr. Montagu himself laid down in categorical terms that "whatever might be the right fiscal policy for India, for the needs of her consumers as well as for her manufacturers, it is quite clear that she should have the same liberty to consider her interests as Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa."

To appreciate the significance of the step taken by Mr. Montagu, brief reference should be made to the long and bitter controversy concerning the control exercised by Lancashire for more than half a century over India's tariff and labor legislation. Incredible as it sounds, the best friend of the Indian industrial worker proved to be the Manchester Chamber of Commerce — whatever the motive. It was Lancashire's representatives in the House of Commons who had espoused the Indian worker's cause and exposed the harshness of the Indian industrial system. Whenever there occurred a move to shorten the hours of work or stiffen the administration of factory laws, a memorial from Lancashire was always to be found operating the springs of initiative. But with the grant of limited fiscal autonomy to India in 1921 Lancashire had to alter its methods: when dictation through the India Office became no longer easy or profitable, it gave way to a policy of cultivating the goodwill of the Indian capitalists.

II

It would, indeed, be easy for those who measure progress in terms of legislation to point out the improvements effected in the conditions of Indian labor as a result of legislative action. Despite the exclusion of the worker from the electoral rolls and his inadequate representation in the legislatures, the Factories' Act has been considerably revised in the last fifteen years, notably by the reduction of the maximum number of hours of work per day from 12 to 9. Conditions of work inside the factories are being gradually improved so as to lessen the strain and minimize the risk of

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accidents. The Mines Act, which had so long withstood improvement, was amended in 1923 by a limitation on the weekly hours of work. The number of women working underground is being rapidly reduced, and within the next year or two the prohibition will become absolute. The scope and the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, passed in 1925, were considerably liberalized eight years later. There is in force a Trades Union Act for the registration of trades unions and a Trades Disputes Act for the creation of conciliation and arbitration machinery. A great deal has also been done to improve the conditions of plantation labor by the repeal of the Workmen's Breach of Contract Act, thereby releasing workers from conditions approximating serfdom. The Government of India has claimed with pride that its record in regard to the ratification of the conventions of the International Labor Conference (of which India is a prominent member) is more creditable than that of many other members of that organization. Lastly may be mentioned the work of the Royal Commission on Labor presided over by the late Mr. J. H. Whitley, which made a study of the conditions of industrial and plantation labor in India and drew up an illuminating report in 1931. Notwithstanding the financial difficulties and the political preoccupations of the Government of India since the publication of the report, some of the recommendations of the Commission have been translated into action. The plea is often made that this catalog of achievements, though not an exhaustive one, affords evidence of an honest and courageous attempt to deal with the admittedly serious problems of industrial labor in India.

But the optimistic point of view implied in the preceding paragraph leaves out of account certain fundamental considerations. It is pertinent to inquire how many of the 26 million of India's industrial workers come under the influence of legislative action. Less than 5 million are engaged in organized industry. The rest, who constitute the vast majority and are described as unprotected labor, remain outside the range of the labor laws. Two instances will suffice to explain what in reality unprotected labor means — the tanning industry and the indigenous cigarette manufacture.

Tanners are all drawn from the untouchable classes, since no caste Hindu will handle leather. Describing conditions in the tanneries, the Royal Commission on Labor referred in its report to the "lack of sanitary arrangements and drainage;" to "the earth space being littered with evil-smelling refuse and sodden with

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pools of filthy water;" to "the absence of washing arrangements, and, in the majority of cases, also of latrine accommodation." Boys commence work about the age of 9 (there is, in fact, no restriction in regard to a minimum age); the hours of work are based on the old principle observed in the ginning factories thirty years ago of "sunrise to sunset" and often exceed 13 per day, with a brief interval of barely more than half an hour for food. Holidays are practically unknown; wages vary a great deal, but even in some of the best tanneries when the industry was doing well they ranged for adult workers from 6.5 to 8 dollars a month. Most of the workers in this (as, indeed, in every other) industry are in debt, the rate of interest being commonly 75 or 100 percent, but going up in a number of cases to as high as 300 percent.

Indigenous cigarette (*beedy*) manufacture is spreading rapidly in some of the provinces. The Royal Commission described the conditions of this work in the following passage:

> Many of these places are small airless boxes, without any windows, where the workers are crowded so thickly on the ground that there is barely room to squeeze between. Others are dark semi-basements with damp mud-floors, unsuitable for manufacturing processes, particularly in an industry where workers sit or squat on the floor throughout the working day. Sanitary conveniences and adequate arrangements for the removal of refuse are generally absent. Payment is almost universally made by piece-rates, the hours are frequently unregulated by the employer and many smaller workshops are open day and night. Regular intervals for meals and weekly holidays are generally non-existent.

Child labor is extensively used in the industry, children usually commencing work at the age of 5 or 6. Regulation of any sort is unknown and children work from 9 to 12 hours a day on a wage not exceeding, in many centers, 5 cents.

It would be easy to elaborate the point about unprotected labor in India. There are mica, carpet and shellac factories where more or less similar conditions obtain, without the slightest interference from the Labor Department of the Government. The Royal Commission condemned them in strong terms and urged legislation, particularly to protect children from a system worse than that of indentured labor, by the enforcement of a minimum age for employment and the regulation of hours of work. Although four years have elapsed since the publication of the report, it is only within the last few months that the Government of India has undertaken a preliminary survey of the problem.

Another class of unprotected labor, very numerous, is that en-

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gaged in construction, road making or drainage works. This work is entrusted to contractors who determine for themselves the wages they will pay. The Government and the local bodies are concerned only with the completion of the work according to schedule, and have no direct interest in the human agency responsible for it. Here again, the Royal Commission suggested legislative action to obtain a modified form of fair wages clause in the contracts and a minimum age for employment — without any tangible results so far.

It is only labor engaged in organized industry which is in some measure afforded legislative protection. The new Factories' Act, it is true, provides for a nine hour day, and is a great improvement on its predecessor in many ways. But its effectiveness is impaired by the very small staff maintained by the Provincial Governments for inspection and the extremely light punishments imposed by the courts for infringement of its provisions.

Then there is the Workmen's Compensation Act under which the aggregate amount of compensation paid has been steadily rising every year; but even now a considerable number of cases receive extremely small amounts or go without payments altogether. There is no obligation on the part of an employer to pay compensation unless a worker compels him to do so within a definite period (which may vary from 6 to 9 months) of the date of the accident. But how many workers in India are aware of the procedure of the Act, or even of the existence of the measure? How many, again, of these can afford to go to court (though the procedure has been simplified and cheapened) against their employers and be certain of either winning their cases or of retaining their jobs? In some cases workers have been content with a very small part of the amount legally due them for injuries sustained while working because in that way they hold their jobs.

In theory, the Trades Union Act enables workers' organizations to register themselves and enjoy certain privileges. But no employer is compelled by the law to accord recognition to such unions, and among the privileges of membership is not included immunity from dismissal.[3] The law affords the worker no protection against the employer; and with unemployment acute everywhere, the workers naturally hesitate to associate themselves

[3] No employer would directly connect a worker's dismissal with active membership in a trade union; but some excuse is generally found to discharge those who take a leading part in organizing a union.

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openly with their unions. Nevertheless, it is of interest to note that there are about 200,000 workers in the different unions, the railway organizations being on the whole most efficient.

The Trades Disputes Act, intended in theory to bring about conciliation between capital and labor in the event of disputes, has remained practically a dead letter, except when a general strike is threatened. The best comment on the futility of the Act was made by the Royal Commission, when it observed that only in four out of about five hundred possible cases had the Government agreed to set the machinery in motion.

The Government of the province of Assam, where most of India's tea is grown, declared before the Royal Commission that four years after the repeal of the Breach of Workmen's Contract Act a considerable portion of the workers on the tea plantations of Assam were under the impression that the Act was still in force. When questioned on the point, the Government's official representatives observed that there would be "grave risks" if steps were taken to acquaint the illiterate workers with the fact that they were no longer bound by contracts of the old type.

Such, in brief, is the position of even protected labor in organized industry. The illiteracy of the workers, their dependence on the money lenders, the almost universal prevalence of bribery and corruption, and the vastness of the unemployment problem render the protection of the law illusory to a large extent.

III

One may ask how far legislation has dealt with the really vital problems of the Indian worker. India is essentially an agricultural country: nearly three-fourths of her people are dependent, directly or indirectly, on the land. It is from among those who are hopelessly in debt in the village, the superfluous population whom the land cannot support, "the ne'er-do-wells" and "women of equivocal status," as the census report observed, that migration in search of employment takes place to the industrial centers. As a rule the hiring is done at the factory gates from among the hundreds who clamor there every morning. The fortunate few who secure temporary work must have in their possession cash for an initial bribe of a few dollars; and at every subsequent stage, whether it is the grant of leave or promotion, there is a bribe, either to the time-keeper, the foreman, or some other immediate superior. Wages in India are paid by the month, and seldom is

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it a living wage. Wages vary from province to province, and from industry to industry; but five to six dollars a month may be taken as a rough average. Agricultural wages are much lower, in some areas going down to about 8 or 10 cents a day. In any case, the worker must borrow sufficient money for his maintenance during the first five or six weeks after he has obtained employment. From the strain of factory work, to which he is unaccustomed, he seeks escape in the liquor shop or the opium den. The vast majority of the workers are consequently in debt at the ruinous rates of interest already alluded to.

Outside the factory, the life of the worker is even more pitiable. Generally when he goes to the city to seek employment he leaves his family behind. Housing conditions are appalling in all the industrial areas and prostitution is rife. The sex disparity in India's chief cities is worthy of note. In Calcutta it is 468 women, in Bombay 554, and in Rangoon 477 to 1,000 men; but in the working class areas the disparity is bound to be even more striking. Social vice is rapidly on the increase, and according to the estimate of Sir John Megaw (who retired as Director-General of the Indian Medical Service in 1933) the number of persons suffering from venereal disease cannot be less than 13 million.

Bombay city affords one of the worst examples of housing, though other industrial centers do not lag far behind. In Bombay, according to the census report for 1931, the average number of occupants per room in single-roomed tenements, which form over 80 percent of the total number, is just over four persons. Of Bombay's population 33 percent live in single rooms occupied by five or more persons at a time; while in some of the working class areas of the city, over 90 percent of the inhabitants live in single-roomed tenements. A lady doctor, appointed by the Government of Bombay to investigate housing conditions in the city some years ago, found six families in one room, 15 feet by 12. The number of adults and children living in that room was 30.

Considerations of space prevent me from going into further details regarding the life of the industrial workers. Until the war, the capitalists periodically had to face the possibility of a shortage of labor in the industrial areas. But such a fear does not exist today, due to the rapid increase in India's population and the great decline in the price of agricultural commodities which has driven millions of the unemployed into the industrial areas. Organization among the workers is feeble, though for a period shortly

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after the war it showed considerable promise. Naturally, from their own point of view, the British authorities have always been suspicious of mass organization in India, however legitimate its purpose. The police are vigilant, and there is a friendly understanding everywhere between them and the employers. In all disputes, whether strikes or lockouts, the police act in coöperation with the employers. The settlement of industrial disputes is regarded by most provincial governments as primarily a matter of "law and order;" and by intimidation, coercion and pressure of various kinds (such as by prohibiting meetings and by inducing shopkeepers to withhold credit from the workers) the police generally succeed in "settling" such disputes.

IV

It is against this background that the problems of the industrial workers have to be considered. The limitations of legislation have already been pointed out, both in regard to the comparatively small number it affects and its severely limited influence over even that minority. It is clear that labor legislation is becoming increasingly difficult to enact in India. The momentum from Geneva seems to have largely spent itself, and there is evidence of much greater reluctance on the part of the Government of India to ratify conventions than in the earlier years of the International Labor Organization. Moreover, employers in British India have asserted with unmistakable emphasis, both in the Central Legislature and at Geneva, that they will oppose all fresh labor legislation, unless it is introduced simultaneously by the Princes in the native Indian States. Some, notably Mysore and Travancore, are copying the measures passed in British India so as to level up conditions within their own borders. But the majority of the States do not accept their obligations, though the Simon Commission argued with cogency that it is India, not British India alone, which is a member of the League of Nations.

The new Constitution undoubtedly does greater justice to the working class than Mr. Montagu's creation. The extension of the franchise to 30 or 35 million people will confer the vote on an appreciable number of workers; furthermore, a larger number of seats have been reserved for labor interests, both in the provincial legislatures and in the Federal Parliament. But the real question is whether under the new Constitution the pressing problems of the workers will be dealt with effectively and promptly.

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On the whole these problems have changed little, except to increase in magnitude, since they were first envisaged by the Industrial Commission in 1916. Despite all that has been attempted in the intervening years, they clamor more loudly today than ever before for immediate solution.

There remains only one feature to add to this dark and sombre picture. Mr. Gandhi's movement and the general race awakening which followed the War have had a profound reaction on the masses, especially on the urban industrial proletariat. They have witnessed the extensive use by the Indian Nationalists of certain weapons — direct action and civil disobedience. True, right wing Nationalists, who will probably be installed in power in many of the provinces as a result of the general elections to be held toward the end of 1936, have been loud in their denunciation of the safeguards with which the new Constitution bristles. But the workers will remember the numerous promises made to them by the leaders of the Indian National Congress during the years of agitation: the reduction of taxes, a school in every village, a house for every family, old age pensions, maternity benefits, unemployment relief, sickness insurance, etc. Such a program will obviously require large funds for its execution, and these will not be forthcoming in a time of acute financial stringency like the present, unless India's defense expenditure can be curtailed in a drastic manner. But defense is a Crown subject, beyond the control of the Federal Parliament and of the Executive. It is from the ministries in the autonomous provinces that the workers will expect almost immediate redemption of these promises, unmindful of the consideration that a program of social and economic reform on a basis of reduced taxation is a contradiction of terms.

For a time it may be possible to suppress manifestations of economic discontent among the workers in the same way as the British have dealt with the Nationalist movement; but it will be a short-lived phase. The Indian workers, especially in the industrial areas, can prove astonishingly tenacious in a fight: they have carried on strikes for months without any visible resources to fall back upon. It is difficult to resist the conclusion that sooner or later a great clash is inevitable. The racial and religious divisions, of which so much is heard today, will give way under the new Constitution to a reorientation of forces on an economic basis.

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THE AUSTRIAN ROOTS OF HITLERISM

By M. W. Fodor

NAZI Germany is determined to incorporate little Austria into the Reich. Were it a democratic Germany, one could hardly advance a weighty argument against its efforts: union would be the clear fulfilment of the wish of two sister nations. But Hitler's Reich belongs to a Party which persecutes Jews and Roman Catholics; and although in Austria today there undoubtedly is oppression of those who hold views different from those of the government, the advent of Nazi rule would expose as many as a million persons to ruthless persecution merely because they are devout Roman Catholics or happen to be Jews, or because they are democrats, socialists or communists.

The direct Nazi assault on Austria in July 1934 failed. It had been arranged with too much revolutionary *élan*. Both in Germany and among the Nazis in Austria there was over-confidence and a failure to take account of realities. The plan was to capture Austria by fomenting a revolution from within, all of it so arranged that it should appear to the world as an outburst of domestic unrest. Money and propaganda flowed across the frontier under the direction of Dr. Josef Goebbels. Bomb outrages planned from Munich kept the population in constant terror. German agents, equipped with plenty of money, organized the Nazi storm troops. Groups of dissatisfied Austrian youths were spirited across the frontier and enlisted in the so-called "Austrian Legion," there to be trained by German military drill sergeants in readiness to hurry to the "aid" of the brethren at home whenever revolution should break out in Vienna or in the western provinces.

The failure of the Nazi *putsch* of July 25, 1934, did not end German hopes for the conquest of Austria. Habicht, the "*Landes-Inspecteur*" for the Austrian "*Gau*," who was the soul of the *putsch*, was allegedly thrown over. Hitler hurriedly sent ex-Chancellor von Papen as his Special Ambassador to Vienna. Von Papen spoke indignantly of "that individual" Habicht and diligently waved the olive branch. In reality, he was commissioned to continue by persuasion and intrigue what Habicht had failed to attain by terror and crude Prussian force. His task has been facilitated by the simple-mindedness of Austrian governmental methods. Instead of seeking reconciliation with the defeated Aus-

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trian Socialists, the sworn enemies alike of German Naziism and of Italian Fascism, Schuschnigg (following the lead of Dollfuss) attempted to take the wind from the Nazi sails by an imperfect imitation of Nazi methods. To this the Nazis rightly reply, "But we could do it much better and more thoroughly. . . ."

The Pan-German ideal, and its present incarnation, National Socialism, both had their cradle in the old Austrian Empire.

For many centuries the Hapsburg Emperors in Vienna ruled over the bulk of the German race. In the days of the Holy Roman Empire, however, there was no need for a Pan-German movement. In that conglomeration of nationalities, compounded of Germans, Czechs, Poles, Hungarians, South Slavs, Italians, Dutchmen and Spaniards, the Teutonic element always played the leading rôle. The Holy Roman Empire came to an end in 1806, after a thousand years of life, nearly 600 of them under Hapsburg and Austrian rule. But following the fall of Napoleon, 39 German states came together in the *Deutscher Bund* under the leadership of Hapsburg Austria. It lasted until the defeat of Austria by the Prussians at Sadowa in 1866.

For over six hundred years, then, the Germans of Austria played the leading rôle in the German world. The collapse of the *Deutscher Bund* found them quite unwilling to abandon their traditional predominance. The result was the rise of a German Nationalist movement in Austria. It began in 1867 under the banner of such democratically-minded persons as Georg von Schoenerer, Engelbert Pernstorfer and Victor Adler. A strange team! A few years later Schoenerer was to become the founder of the pro-Hohenzollern, Pan-German and anti-Semitic movement which was the forerunner of Hitlerism. Victor Adler was to become the founder of the Austrian Social Democratic movement. Until 1932, that is until the rise of Hitler, it remained Pan-German in its orientation.

Georg von Schoenerer's program — Pan-German, anti-Semitic, "*Los-von-Rom*" — influenced Hitler's mentality at least indirectly. The Schoenerer family castle stood at Rosenau, in the Waldviertel part of Lower Austria, only seven miles distant from the village of Spittal where the family of Adolf Hitler had lived for centuries. Adolf's father, Alois, was the village cobbler. Schoenerer's demagogic campaign in the seventies and eighties of the last century, which had a sweeping success both in the German parts of Bohemia and Moravia and in this Waldviertel

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region, could not have failed to touch him. And when, with the help of his first wife's money, he succeeded in preparing for a civil service examination and became a customs' official, he undoubtedly took some of his Pan-German and anti-clerical creed with him. First he went to Braunau, and later to Leonding. The innkeeper's wife in Leonding, Frau Wiesinger, in whose arms Alois Hitler died, told me that only a few minutes before he suddenly died she offered him two newspapers, but that he refused them with the remark: "They are black!" (meaning Clerical).

Schoenerer had committed the mistake of trying to recruit his followers chiefly from the ranks of the upper bourgeoisie. Not till the end of the eighties did one Vogel, a printer in Bruex, Bohemia, make an attempt to organize the workers on a Pan-German platform; and even so the movement failed to receive any real impetus until at the beginning of the present century two interesting new men brought it fresh life. They were Dr. Walter Riehl, a lawyer and government attorney, and Rudolf Jung, a railway engineer.

Riehl, who had started life as a Social Democrat, made the acquaintance of Jung in 1903 in Reichenberg, Bohemia. Riehl was a candidate for the post of judge; Jung was in the service of the State Railways. Together the two launched an energetic movement for a new labor organization along Pan-German and anti-Semitic lines. On October 31, 1909, they convened in Prague the first All-Austrian conference of the "United German Workers' Federation." Riehl's political program was not smiled upon by the judges of the courts in which he practised and he had to leave the government service; nor were Jung's government employers pleased by his Pan-German activities, with the consequence that he was transferred to Iglau. There Jung made the acquaintance of Hans Knirsch, the man who was to become the third of the triumvirate which founded the National Socialist Party in Austria, and hence indirectly in Germany. In November 1910 they launched what they called the "Deutschsoziale Arbeiterpartei." It made such progress that at the general elections to the Austrian Reichsrat in 1911 it obtained three seats.

The next step was the elaboration of a party program. This was done at a meeting in Iglau in 1913. The essence of the program, marking an important milestone in the history of National Socialism, was as follows: "The party is the representative of the working class of the German people. We are separated from the dogmas

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of passionate class warfare, however, by our *voelkische* (racial) ideal, and by our realization of the fact that in a state like Austria where nationalities are mixed the German workers must demand national citizenship as a matter of self-preservation. Our motto must be: 'Work in German districts only for German workers!'" The idea of international workers' organizations was rejected. The party was against social and political reaction, and declared that it would combat all mediæval, clerical and capitalistic privileges as well as all *fremdvoelkische* (anti-racial) influences, "especially the ever-increasing Jewish spirit in public life." In 1916 the party took the name "Deutsch-Socialistische Arbeiter-Partei," and in May 1918 the name "Deutsche National Socialistische Arbeiter Partei" (D.N.S.A.P.). About that time Dr. Riehl chose the *Hakenkreuz*, or swastika, as the emblem of the movement, taking it from the Baltic freebooters of von der Goltz who wore it as a decorative badge on their helmets.

After the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy the Sudeten-Germans were separated from the Germans of Austria proper. As a result the D.N.S.A.P. was split into two parts, one in Czechoslovakia, one in the new Austrian Republic. To counteract this event an "Inter-State National Socialist Office for the German-Language Territories" was established in Vienna under the chairmanship of Dr. Riehl. The Sudeten-Germans were represented in it by Jung, Knirsch and Hans Krebs. In Germany there were then only the beginnings of similar movements — one in Duesseldorf under the leadership of an engineer named Brunner, another under Julius Streicher in Nueremberg, another in Munich under an iron-turner named Anton Drexler.

The first important Inter-State National Socialist Convention took place on December 13, 1919. By that time the Munich leaders, Anton Drexler, and his propaganda chief, a house painter named Adolf Hitler, were already in correspondence with Dr. Riehl's organization. Another link between the German and Austrian movements was furnished by the fact that an early collaborator with Drexler and Hitler, the first President of the Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, Herr F. Harrer, was a journalist well acquainted with the ideology of the Austrian movement, especially in its Sudeten-German form. On February 6, 1920, Dr. Riehl sent an invitation to Drexler asking the Germans to cooperate with the Inter-State movement. This letter undoubtedly was responsible for the fact that the German National Socialist

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Party — N.S.D.A.P. — was founded two weeks later, that is, on February 24, 1920.

In a letter to Dr. Riehl shortly thereafter (March 1, 1920), Drexler and Hitler explained that their organization regarded as imperative the complete union of all German tribes, "without regard to present State connections." They wrote: "Our aim is to give the German nation the position in the world which is due it on the basis of its culture and size; and this cannot be achieved until the present separation between the German tribes is eliminated, until our people is united. As far as negotiations are concerned, Herr Adolf Hitler comes into consideration on our behalf. He is co-signatory of this letter, and he is a native of Austria. Herr Hitler is the *Werbeobmann* of our local grouping of the party." There follows a discussion of the advisability of establishing a center for the organization. The letter then explains that the fight against Berlin is tactical, and concludes: "We wish to reaffirm that our Fatherland is called neither Prussia nor Bavaria, neither Austria nor Saxony, but Germany." Though Drexler was then chief of the party, the style of the letter reveals Hitler's authorship. And at the next Inter-State party meeting (Salzburg, August 16, 1920) he appeared as Germany's representative.

The close connection between Austrian and German National Socialism continued until 1923. Hitler frequently visited Austrian National Socialist meetings, as well as Inter-State assemblies. His last appearance at an Inter-State party meeting was in Salzburg in August 1923. At this meeting came his breach with Riehl. The question under discussion was the attitude which the Austrian National Socialists should adopt in the coming Austrian elections. Riehl believed that the National Socialists should participate in the elections and win their way to power through legal means. Adolf Hitler was for abstention and an armed *putsch*. Hitler's ideology was accepted and Riehl resigned (September 15) both as Chairman of the Inter-State bureau of the National Socialists and as President of the Austrian D.N.S.A.P.

Seven weeks later Adolf Hitler made the famous Munich "beer-house" *putsch*. It was a fiasco. The failure in Munich brought disaster across the frontier in Austria. The Austrian party broke up and remained insignificant until Hitler secured his first great victory in September 1930. That success was gained not with arms but by the Riehl method of seeking power through the ballot which Hitler had scorned and refused to approve for Austria in 1923.

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In the intervening seven years, from 1923 to 1930, Austrian National Socialism remained without significance. The thinned ranks were divided into two camps, one looking to Hitler, the other following Riehl. But when Hitler obtained his six million votes in the German elections of September 1930, there was a galvanic reaction. Alfred Eduard Frauenfeld, a thirty-year-old clerk employed in the Vienna Bodenkreditanstalt, undertook to reorganize the Hitler wing of the Austrian movement. When the bank failed and he lost his job, Frauenfeld began devoting all his energies to the task and succeeded in enormously increasing the party following. Within three years the membership in Vienna rose from 300 to 40,000. Each fresh victory of Hitler in Germany provoked an increase in the number of National Socialists in Austria; and in the spring of 1933 Frauenfeld felt confident that within a few weeks the power in Austria would fall almost automatically into his lap. When I asked him at that time what he intended to do in case the Dollfuss Government offered resistance, he answered that he was prepared to seize power by force, *i.e.* by a *putsch*. I asked: "Have you sufficient rifles to carry through an armed change of government?" Frauenfeld answered: "No, we have no arms here; but we can have as many as we want sent across the frontier at Kufstein at an hour's notice."

This was a gross miscalculation. As soon as the Austrian régime realized the danger of a Nazi *putsch*, the regular army, police, and irregular forces (Starhemberg's *Heimwehr*, Schuschnigg's *Sturmscharen*, etc.) were increased to the point where they could prevent the smuggling of arms from Germany. If Frauenfeld had been a more experienced politician he probably would have foreseen this. Nor was much more understanding shown by Habicht, a Nazi deputy in the German Reichstag who since 1933 had resided at Linz, in Upper Austria, as *Landes-Inspecteur* of the Austrian Nazis. It was the lack of arms which defeated the Austrian Nazis when the crucial moment came in July 1934.

The *putsch* gave an excuse for the Austrian Government to start a wholesale persecution of the Nazis. The party organization, formerly very thorough, was broken up; Nazi officials were eliminated from the government offices; and the army and the police were purged as nearly as possible of Nazi cells. As a result, although idealistically the Nazis still remain strong, their attempts to organize a cohesive new party have so far failed. The leading Nazi functionaries, Frauenfeld and Proksch, are living as exiles in

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Munich and Berlin; Habicht, too, is back in Prussia. The bulk of the 17,000 other young Austrian Nazis who sought refuge in Germany are enlisted in the so-called Austrian Legion.

We know the rôle of Hitler since 1933. What has happened to those other Austrians who stood with him about the cradle of National Socialism? Dr. Walter Riehl, the real spiritual father of National Socialism, is a practising lawyer in Vienna. He lives in comparative poverty because he still defends Nazis before the courts more for idealistic than financial reasons. His political influence at the moment is almost nil. He is hated by Hitler, who never forgives those who contradict him. And his requests to be permitted to organize a "nationalist" group (German Nationals) within the Fatherland Front have always been firmly rejected by Dr. Schuschnigg.

Rudolf Jung and Hans Krebs, the two Sudeten-Germans who were co-founders with Dr. Riehl of the Austrian National Socialist movement, have fared somewhat better. Last year, when the German National Socialist Party in Czechoslovakia was dissolved, and the law for the more efficient defense of the realm made possible the suppression of the German Nazis in Czechoslovakia, Krebs boarded a small canoe on the Elbe and floated by night down the river until he reached German territory. Jung too escaped to Germany. At the recent elections in February 1936 both were elected members of the German Reichstag.

Of the Germans who collaborated most closely with Hitler in the early days, Herr Harrer died many years ago. Anton Drexler, the iron-turner, who was the head of the Munich branch of the party of which Hitler was the propaganda chief, is living in Munich, forgotten and in poverty, probably philosophizing about the gratitude of men whom one helps to greatness.

Let me add a short postscript to round out the story of Hitler's Austrian connections. With the exception of his stepsister, Frau Angela Raupal, who recently married a German professor and keeps house for Hitler at Obersalzburg, all his relatives live in Austria. His only sister, Paula Hitler, the image of her eight-years-older brother, lives in modest circumstances in Vienna. His aunt, Frau Theresa Schmidt, his mother's only sister, lives with her four sons and two daughters in the ancestral village of Spittal. The graves of Hitler's father and mother are in the church yard of Leonding in Upper Austria.

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THE RISE AND FALL OF ABYSSINIAN IMPERIALISM

By Robert Gale Woolbert

THE collapse of the government of Haile Selassie represents the disappearance of the last stronghold of native imperialism in Africa. There was a time when it was thought that European civilization, instead of being imposed on the peoples of northeast Africa by the Great Powers themselves, might reach them indirectly through the expansion of the Turkish, Egyptian and Abyssinian empires. The first of these disappeared as a vital force in Africa when it was supplanted early in the nineteenth century by the Egypt of Mehemet Ali. Mehemet extended his rule to Nubia, Sennar and Kordofan. One of his successors, Ismail, who became viceroy in 1863, was very ambitious to extend Egyptian rule still further. His troops pushed up the White Nile, and down the east coast of Africa until he controlled it as far as Cape Guardafui. Mehemet had ruled his empire largely with Turkish, Albanian and Circassian officers; Ismail preferred Europeans and Americans. Of the latter, mostly veterans of the Civil War, no less than forty-eight served him between 1869 and 1878. But Ismail's grandiose projects, including the building of the Suez Canal, had led him to mortgage Egypt up to the hilt. The inevitable consequences ensued: bankruptcy, European intervention and civil war, the last culminating in the British occupation of 1882. The Sudan was lost with the fall of Khartum in January 1885. The Red Sea from Massaua south was abandoned to the Italians in the same year. Thus ended the attempt to create an Egyptian Empire in Africa.

That Abyssinian imperialism did not succumb so easily is partly accounted for by geography. The center of Abyssinian power was located in a virtually inaccessible highland surrounded by deserts and it was not believed to be especially rich in readily extractable resources. Hence, the cupidity of the European Powers was naturally directed into more lucrative fields. The only imperialist states that sought to subjugate Abyssinia were Egypt (Abyssinia represented a constant danger to the Egyptian colonies in the Sudan and on the Red Sea), and Italy, who as a late-comer in the scramble for Africa had to take what the larger Powers disdained. Geography alone, however, will not explain the vitality of the Abyssinian state, and especially its ability to expand. This was due above all to the series of outstanding men who have ruled Abyssinia since the middle of the last century: Theodore (1855–1868), John (1872–1889), Menelik (1889–1913) and Haile Selassie. Of these, Menelik was the most remarkable. To him goes the major credit for the creation of the empire of the Abyssinians — Ethiopia, as it has come to be called.

During the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the traditional Abyssinian kingdoms of Tigré, Amhara, Godjam and Shoa were in chaos. The country was torn by the struggles of the feudal aristocracy; the monarchy ceased to exist in all but name. From this state of decay it was rescued by the energy of one Lij Kassa, the son of an Amharan chieftain, who eventually became Theodore III. At his coronation in 1855 Theodore is said to have sworn

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that he would reunite under his authority all the ancient provinces of the empire. During his turbulent reign he succeeded not only in reaffirming the imperial power over traditional Abyssinia, but in initiating the process of permanently subjugating the peripheral peoples. In 1846 he soundly defeated the army which Mehemet Ali sent against him from the Sennar. Among Theodore's most persistent foes were the Moslem Gallas of Wallo, who during the previous century had been lording it over Amhara and other Christian provinces. They were especially troublesome when Theodore was engaged with the Egyptians or was bringing the ruler of Shoa into line. Expedition after expedition he sent against them, finally reducing them to some semblance of obedience. Towards the end of his reign Theodore began to dream of new worlds to rescue from the infidel: Nubia, the Somali country, Egypt and Jerusalem. But no sooner would he undertake expansion in one direction than his vassals and the Galla would rise in his rear. His megalomania, coupled with heavy drinking, finally unbalanced him to such an extent that he committed grave acts of violence against foreigners, which were avenged only by Napier's march in 1867–1868. When the British reached Magdala, Theodore, rather than surrender, blew out his brains.

Following his death there were several years of chaos while the various claimants contended for the throne. Kassai of Tigré, aided greatly by the rifles and artillery left him by the British, won in the end and was crowned as John IV. The new Emperor, like Theodore, had an intense desire to extend his realm, partially as self-protection against Ismail's expansionist activities. Two Egyptian armies sent to invade Tigré were defeated by John in 1875–1876. Twice in the next three years Colonel Charles Gordon went to John's court to make peace for the Khedive, but received scant satisfaction either time.

John's principal internal preoccupation was the suppression of Menelik, youthful Negus of Shoa, who had been a serious contender for the imperial crown after Theodore's suicide. He made no secret of his ambitions. However, since he was not yet in complete control of his own domain, he had to bow before John and await his opportunity. This was furnished with the arrival of Italy, who began in the late seventies to send explorers to Shoa, and in the eighties to indicate political ambitions along the Red Sea. Menelik used the Italians and other foreigners for his own purposes. Before granting them the right to explore his domains he demanded the gift of large quantities of modern arms and munitions with which to seize the imperial power. That he consorted with the Italians naturally annoyed John tremendously, especially after the Italian occupation of Massaua in 1885. This proved to be merely the opening wedge for an Italian advance into the northern highlands of Abyssinia, John's homeland. Menelik never lost an occasion to weaken the emperor's position when the latter was called into some far corner of the empire; and when in 1889 John was killed at Gallabat in a battle with the Mahdists, Menelik at once proclaimed himself Negus Neghesti. At the same time he signed with Count Antonelli the treaty of Uchiali, which according to the Italians placed Abyssinia under their protection. But once he was solidly ensconced in power Menelik pursued a strictly national course. This "ingratitude" led to the war between Abyssinia and Italy which culminated in the battle of Adua on March 1, 1896. This victory over the Italians removed the last serious external danger to

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Menelik's power. He was now free to continue with the consolidation of the empire of Ethiopia, a process virtually completed in its territorial aspect by the beginning of this century. Let us examine more closely the circumstances surrounding the establishment of this empire.

First of all there was the personality of the man himself, a rare combination of astuteness and ruthlessness. Menelik was a born ruler. But that in itself

would not have sufficed. The fact that he was ruler of Shoa, rather than of another of the ancient Abyssinian regions, was very significant. Like Prussia and Piedmont, with which some have gone so far as to compare her, Shoa was a frontier region *par excellence*, where several peoples, religions and languages came together and where a dynasty had to be resourceful and strong in order to survive. The Christian, Amharic-speaking population of Shoa was in fact in a minority. Ruling thus over diverse subject peoples, the Shoan ruling class governed, in a way, an imperial state in miniature.

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Another important advantage for Shoa followed from her position on the borderland, especially the southern borderland. The other three kingdoms were likewise in contact with alien tribes, but their positions were not as favorable as that of Shoa. When the Tigréans and Amharans sought to expand into non-Christian territory, they were forced to leave the plateau for the desert lowlands, where they encountered the fierce tribes of the Sudan and the Danakil and a climate they could not withstand. Godjam was somewhat more favorably situated for expansion, as along her southern frontier lay the best parts of the high Galla country — Kafa, Jimma, Walega — the happy hunting ground for Abyssinian raiders. But Godjam was separated from the Galla by the deep valley of the unbridged Blue Nile; and she was completely cut off from communication with the outside world, whence could come the firearms that alone would subjugate the primitive peoples of southern Ethiopia. Shoa labored under neither of these handicaps: the southern Ethiopian plateaux lay open to her, unprotected by any appreciable obstacles of terrain; and, thanks to Italy up to 1890 and to France thereafter, Menelik was able to obtain vast quantities of modern firearms. In a very real sense Italy made possible the inception of Menelik's empire, and France made possible its completion — which is interesting in view of the events of the last twenty months.

Menelik realized perfectly that he could achieve the imperial dignity and power only if he were able to muster sufficient military force to overcome his rivals. Therefore, the arms he obtained from Europe were employed not only in fighting his Abyssinian competitors, but in acquiring new lands to the south, east and west of Shoa on which he could draw for additional supplies of man power and food. Thus as a step in his conquest of the central power in Abyssinia he acquired "colonies." Once having achieved the imperial title, he proceeded to conquer more "colonies" in order to entrench his position, both at home and as a power in the world.

It must be emphasized that this process was, like most historical processes, not fully understood by those who participated in it. Like his ancestors, Menelik expanded because it was either expand or perish. His family had created Shoa as the House of Savoy had created Piedmont, piece by piece. In Shoa most of the pieces were inhabited by the Galla. Consequently the dynasty had developed a technique of ruling alien peoples, which was to stand it in good stead when the Shoan kingdom had become the Ethiopian empire.

The technique of Shoan expansion was typically African. The neighboring non-Christian peoples were periodically raided. Cattle, grain, slaves, and other useful property were seized to the accompaniment of much wanton destruction of life and property. When the Galla had been stronger, they had inflicted such treatment on the Abyssinians; now that the latter were on top, they acted in the same way, only with more devastating results because they possessed firearms. Whole regions were pillaged and depopulated. In the official chronicle of Menelik's reign we find the description of a *razzia* of this sort that took place against the Galla in 1881: "He marched all night and fell upon them suddenly. He took a large amount of cattle as booty, and exterminated a great number of Galla. . . . On the following Friday he pillaged the high plateaux of the Arusi. It was impossible to count the number of cattle which were taken and that of the Galla who perished that day." But the

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Galla, "who were as numerous as the sands of the sea," returned to the attack. They were again defeated. "Not a single Galla escaped, for they were pursued to the top of their great mountain called Tchilalo and exterminated. The number of cows captured was 65,712." [1] Even making considerable allowance for the enthusiasm of the chronicler, it is plain that these raids in grand style were very profitable adventures for Menelik and dire calamities for the Galla. They were euphemistically called "tax-gathering expeditions." Just what services the Shoans rendered in return for these "taxes" is difficult to say. Until the late eighties they did not occupy these "colonies" permanently. The French explorer, Jules Borelli, reported that in 1887 there was not a single stable Shoan post south of the Hawash.

By that date, however, Menelik's policy had begun to change. He found that if he were to ensure his supply of booty and slaves he would have to set up a permanent administration in the lands where he gathered his taxes, for others were poaching on his preserves. John, to keep Menelik in check, had invested the Negus of Godjam with the rich empire of Kafa. But when the Godjamites sought to invade their new possession, Menelik defeated them. In 1887, Menelik, fearful lest the Italians or British forestall him, conquered Harrar, where he razed the famous great mosque and erected a Coptic church on its site. These new territories he proceeded to garrison with troops according to the *gebbar* system, which was a form of slavery. In the conquered area each Abyssinian soldier and his family had attached to them one or more families of the subject people, who thereby became *gebbar*. The latter were obliged to support the Abyssinian family, giving them not only all the food and shelter they required but every sort of service, for which they received no compensation. These *gebbar* were thenceforth attached to their Abyssinian owner and could be taken by him wherever he went.

Thus Menelik embarked on the new policy of territorial acquisition among the Hamitic tribes of southern Ethiopia, a policy he pursued with ardor after becoming emperor in 1889. The Arusi Galla, the Sidamo, and the kingdom of Walamo had been subdued by 1895, when he had to turn his attention to the Italian invasion in the north. After Adua, expansion was resumed, aided by the French, who hoped to employ Menelik's power in their designs on the Sudan. Upon his accession, Menelik had been asked by the Powers where he thought his boundaries were. Though this problem had never presented itself to him before, he naturally decided to give himself plenty of leeway. On April 10, 1891, he therefore sent a circular to the Powers containing his version of Ethiopia's boundaries. On the west, for instance, they extended as far as Victoria Nyanza and down the White Nile to Khartum. French and Russian agents accompanied the various Abyssinian expeditions sent to annex these territories. One actually reached the White Nile above Fashoda, but had to turn back before effecting a junction with Marchand. Another succeeded in overthrowing the centuries-old empire of Kafa. Thus one African empire was absorbed by another. These expeditions — gigantic *razzias* — had by 1900 at least nominally reduced Walega, Boran, Bale, Ogaden, the Nilotic tribes in the southwest, and the Beni Shangul in the west — thus virtually completing the creation of the Ethiopian Empire. There remained only two gaps: Jimma,

[1] Guébré Sellassié, "Chronique du Régne de Ménélik II," Paris, 1930, I, p. 171–172.

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a rich Moslem state ruled by the Sultan Abba Jiffar as an Ethiopian protégé until 1935, when the country was annexed by Haile Selassie; and the Danakil and Aussa sultanates, which formally submitted in 1909, though they had for some time been *de facto* under Shoan suzerainty.

Needless to say, the "colonial administration" of Menelik was of the crudest sort. Even with the best intentions on the part of the court at Addis Ababa, it was not easy to disabuse the governors in the conquered provinces of the ancient Abyssinian notion that they could do as they pleased with the land and the people they ruled. In the nature of things they became so many local despots, only very distantly controlled by the monarch. The type of government the subject provinces might have, therefore, depended on the character of their governors, many of whom devoted their principal energies to extracting as much from their charges in the form of ivory, gold, slaves and other movable wealth, as they possibly could before being recalled or sent to another post. Haile Selassie sought during his brief reign to ameliorate this state of affairs, and to that end created several "model" provinces, governed by men chosen for their intelligence and integrity from among the younger elements, Abyssinian or Galla. This admission of representatives of subject peoples into the imperial administration was in itself a marked innovation. But it was the beginning of what must have been a very slow process and one may well wonder how long it would have taken to regenerate Ethiopia through the medium of its own ruling class.

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THE BRITISH POSITION IN EGYPT

By Vernon A. O'Rourke

TWO facts underlie the present Anglo-Egyptian tension. First, the two nations have never been able to reach an agreement on the four matters which Great Britain reserved in her Declaration of 1922 establishing Egypt as an independent state. Second, the recent Mediterranean crisis has forced Great Britain to construe her rights under this Declaration broadly and to refuse concessions to Egyptian nationalism. Though the Declaration purported to establish Egypt as a sovereign state, it stipulated in Part Three that:

> The following matters are absolutely reserved to the discretion of His Majesty's Government until such time as it may be possible by free discussion and friendly accommodation on both sides to conclude agreements in regard thereto between His Majesty's Government and the Government of Egypt:
> (a) The security of communications of the British Empire in Egypt;
> (b) The defense of Egypt against all foreign aggression or interference, direct or indirect;
> (c) The protection of foreign interests in Egypt and the protection of minorities;
> (d) The Sudan.
> Pending the conclusion of such agreements the *status quo* in all these matters will remain intact.

Despite Egypt's frequent attacks on the validity of these reservations, international law regards them as binding, since Great Britain was recognized in the peace treaties to be Egypt's Protector. To make her position more secure, Great Britain sent a note to the other Powers, outlining her new position in Egypt and warning them that any aggression against that territory would be considered an unfriendly act "to be repelled with all the means at [her] command." Great Britain has openly intervened in Egypt's internal affairs upon several occasions. In addition, she has constantly, though quietly, exercised influence through the British High Commissioner in Egypt.

The foregoing does not mean that Egypt possesses no international personality. Outside the realm covered by the special British prerogatives, Egypt has complete jurisdiction. She has her own Ministry of Foreign Affairs and her own diplomatic representatives in most countries of the world. She is not a member of the League or the World Court, but she is generally invited to attend the League's conferences on economic and social questions. In view of this we can say that Egypt is a "client" state of Great Britain, possessing a good measure of autonomy but limited in her external relations by the reservations of 1922.

Unfortunately these reservations were formulated without Egyptian cooperation. Great Britain alone retains the right to construe their applicability to each case as it arises. Egyptian leaders are profoundly dissatisfied with the arrangement. Since 1922 they have worked unsuccessfully for the conclusion of a treaty with Britain. Successive attempts to remove or at least modify the reservations were made in 1921, 1924 and 1927. In each case failure was due to the extravagant demands of the *Wafd*, the party of the extreme Egyptian nationalists. The last effort was undertaken in the spring of 1930. This time

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success was almost realized. Inasmuch as the draft treaty then drawn up will probably serve as the point of departure for future negotiations, we may profitably scrutinize some of its provisions.

Article 2 recognized Egypt's right as a "sovereign independent state" to become a member of the League of Nations. Article 10 abolished the position of British High Commissioner in Egypt. Articles 5 and 8 established a defensive alliance between Egypt and Great Britain. In Article 9 a solution was found for perhaps the most stubborn issue in Anglo-Egyptian relations — the quartering of British troops in Egypt. The British Army was to be confined to certain places in the Suez Canal zone. Great Britain was authorized to maintain near Ismailia a certain number of ground troops and air effectives in cooperation with the Egyptian forces; all her other troops were to leave Egypt as soon as the treaty was ratified. After twenty years the question of the final withdrawal of all British forces would be raised, leaving to Egypt the duty of guaranteeing the security and liberty of navigation in the Canal. In case no agreement could then be reached, the question might be referred to the League of Nations. By these concessions Britain considerably modified the first two reservations of the Declaration of 1922 dealing with the defense of Egypt and the Canal. No other draft treaty had ever considered the allocation of British troops to certain zones nor their eventual withdrawal from the soil of Egypt.

However, the negotiations foundered on the question of Egyptian emigration to the Sudan. The British insisted that the problem be regulated by the Governor-General of the Sudan, an appointee of both Egypt and Great Britain. The spokesman for Egypt held out for no restrictions upon emigration. Before another attempt could be made to find a formula acceptable to both sides regarding this relatively unimportant question, Nahas Pasha, Egyptian Premier and chief negotiator at London, was replaced by Sidky Pasha as a result of parliamentary jockeying at Cairo. Questions of a constitutional nature at once became all-absorbing in Egypt, and from that moment the country's political history has revolved around attempts to establish a stable parliamentary régime. In view of these unsettled conditions, Great Britain asserted on several occasions that she would re-open treaty conversations only with delegates enjoying the complete confidence of a popularly supported Egyptian Government. Until recently this was impossible due to the conflict between the *Wafd* and the conservative ministers appointed by King Fuad. In order to diminish the *Wafd's* representation in Parliament, Sidky obtained the promulgation of a new constitution in October 1930. This only increased the bitterness of the domestic political conflict, and treaty discussions could not be resumed.

The situation was still further complicated in the fall of 1935 by the Mediterranean crisis precipitated by Italy's war on Ethiopia. England felt obliged to take numerous military and naval precautions in and near Egypt. On September 8, Nahas Pasha, leader of the *Wafd*, warned Britain that she could expect no help from his country except "on the basis of coöperation between equals." The British High Commissioner, Sir Miles Lampson, assured the Egyptian Government that the British Government would keep it informed and enter into consultation with it "regarding any development of the international situation which may closely concern Egypt." On several occasions steps were in fact taken to consult with Egyptian authorities. None the less,

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the Liberals, taking over the rôle usually played by the *Wafd*, raised the cry of British interference. On November 7, Mahmus Pasha, their leader, criticized Premier Nessim Pasha for governing without a constitution and asked the British point-blank whether they would use the emergency to tighten their control over the country. Shortly afterward, Sir Samuel Hoare stated that the time was not opportune for the conclusion of a treaty with Egypt and that neither the 1923 nor 1930 Constitution was suitable for Egypt's requirements. This was resented by practically all parties in Egypt; rioting broke out at once and continued intermittently until February of this year.

Meanwhile, an unexpected consequence of the Hoare speech was the formation of an Egyptian "United Front." On December 9, leaders representing the Wafdists, Liberals, Shaabists, Nationalists, Saadist Wafdists and Independents joined hands in opposing the dictatorship of Nessim and in asking for a treaty with Great Britain. Early this year the British High Commissioner replied to the United Front by declaring that his government was ready to open treaty negotiations as soon as Egypt had established a government in which all parties were represented. This forced Nessim's hand and he resigned, but not before he had obtained the restoration of the 1923 Constitution. The old electoral law was reënacted and a new Parliament was to be elected in May.

The essential instability of the United Front was shown in January when it was unable to agree on a coalition cabinet. King Fuad thereupon was obliged to set up a non-partisan "business cabinet" under Ali Maher Pasha to govern until after the elections. On the other hand, the United Front did succeed in reconciling internal differences enough to select an Egyptian delegation satisfactory to all parties to negotiate with the British. It was composed of six Wafdists and one member of each of the five important minor parties, with Nahas as chairman. Because of its representative character, the British agreed to receive it. The Wafdists, on their part, are satisfied in that they have the controlling voice. Moreover, any treaty agreed upon must receive the approbation of the new Parliament which is strongly Wafdist. The British and Egyptian delegations met early in March.

Great Britain feels that the "facts of modern warfare" make the continued military occupation of Egypt indispensable. She feels that a reduction of the British forces and their limitation to a certain zone along the Canal might provide just the incentive needed for Italy to seek further expansion in northern Africa. She considers that the defense of the Canal cannot be separated from the problem of the defense of Egypt as a whole. Hence the British need a naval base at Alexandria, a new air base at Abukir, and a new military station at Mersa Matruh to control the desert between Libya and Egypt. They argue that once it is agreed that they are to have full right to defend Egypt, the country will quickly receive other benefits, such as the abolition of the hated Capitulations. So long as British military tenure was uncertain, foreign nations felt obliged to cling tenaciously to their Capitulatory rights.

Egyptian leaders are unwilling to sign any agreement sanctioning the continuance of British garrisons at Cairo and Alexandria in time of peace. They feel that the treaty of 1930 adequately safeguarded the safety of their country, while the integrity of the Suez Canal was sufficiently insured by allowing British troops and air forces to be stationed at Ismailia. The "facts of modern

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warfare" existed in 1930 when Great Britain consented to these provisions; why should they be modified now? Egyptian politicians think that the country's independence and the safety of the Suez Canal could be preserved by: (a), the allocation of British troops to territories along the Canal; (b), a treaty of alliance with Great Britain providing for coöperation between the armies of the two nations in case of a *threat* of war; (c), a strong Egyptian army (the establishment of which England has prevented); (d), the use in an emergency of British troops stationed east of Egypt; and (e), the use of Alexandria as a British naval base during periods of stress. Under no consideration must British forces be granted the right to occupy any part of Egypt proper in times of peace. The Egyptians do not see why they should agree to further British occupation in return for the abrogation of the Capitulations. They feel that once the occupation has been terminated, Egypt can readily abolish these extraterritorial rights. This does not mean that Egypt is unaware of the advantages of having the British protect her from foreign aggressors. She is not struggling for release from occupation by one Power in order to substitute that of another. During the recent crisis Egypt has given ample evidence of her anti-Italian sentiments.

Though the success of the present negotiations depends primarily on finding a mutually acceptable military formula, there will remain for settlement the further question of the Sudan. In the note which the United Front sent to the High Commissioner asking for the resumption of negotiations, no mention was made of the Sudan, the stumbling block of the 1930 conversations. The Anglo-Egyptian convention of 1899 set up a condominium in which theoretically each country would share equally. From the start, however, Great Britain has dominated the administration of the Sudan, and has gradually managed to eliminate Egyptian influence more and more, going so far in 1924 as to remove all Egyptian battalions. In 1930 the British were willing to offer ample undertakings with respect to Egypt's water supply and to withdraw the restrictions upon the use of Egyptian soldiers in the Sudan. Further, they promised that there should be no prejudice to "Egyptian rights and material interests" and "no discrimination in the Sudan between British subjects and Egyptian nationals in matters of commerce and immigration or the possession of property." In spite of these assurances, Nahas Pasha and the *Wafd* continued to demand the right of unrestricted immigration, which London wished left to the control of the Governor-General. At present the British seem more anxious than the Egyptians to arrive at a definitive settlement in the Sudan; and they may, therefore, force a discussion of the matter if an agreement on the military problem can be reached.

After several months of conversations, there is little evidence that the two sides are nearing an agreement. Egyptian party leaders believe that Great Britain is unwilling in any way to accede to the fundamental Egyptian demand that British forces be removed from Egypt in time of peace. The newspaper *Al Ahram* goes so far as to charge Great Britain with permitting Italy to occupy the Lake Tana region as a means of frightening Egypt into consenting to continued British occupation. The recent death of King Fuad may conceivably aggravate the growing unrest, since he exerted a moderating influence in Egyptian politics.

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TRENDS IN GOLD PRODUCTION AND MONETARY STOCKS

By Walter B. Kahn

DURING recent years there has been little more than a spasmodic relationship between gold and most of the world's currencies. Yet despite the depression and the vagaries of monetary policies, the position of gold has remained unchanged in one respect — there has been an unlimited willingness to accept it everywhere. No tariffs or quotas restrict its flow in the settlement of international balances. Labor spent on producing gold in Russia buys more machinery than the same labor devoted to wheat production. Colombia can buy airplanes with gold better than with coffee. This universal usefulness of gold implies that its position is due not only to its monetary use but to its economic character apart from legislation. Governments, private corporations and individuals everywhere have therefore found gold mining an attractive enterprise regardless of prevailing monetary theory.

The following table, compiled by the American Bureau of Metal Statistics, shows the trend in the world's gold production since the World War:

	Fine Ounces (in thousands)	*Change from Preceding Year (in percent)*	*Index (1925–29=100)*
1913	22,929		
1920	16,126		
1921	15,984	− 0.9	
1922	15,445	− 3.4	
1923	17,786	+15.2	
1924	19,050	+ 7.1	
1925	19,031	− 0.1	98.0
1926	19,369	+ 1.8	99.7
1927	19,446	+ 0.4	100.1
1928	19,583	+ 0.7	100.8
1929	19,673	+ 0.5	101.3
1930	20,722	+ 5.3	106.7
1931	22,371	+ 8.0	115.2
1932	24,306	+ 8.6	125.2
1933	25,503	+ 4.9	131.3
1934	27,630	+ 8.3	142.3
1935	30,660	+11.0	157.9

We see that from the low point in 1922, world gold production had increased by 1935 almost 100 percent. The 1935 figure is 58 percent greater than the average for the years 1925–1929. The average annual rate of increase in the past six years has been about 7.7 percent.

These figures offer an interesting contrast to those used in the discussions of several years ago about an impending gold shortage. Undismayed by the well-established fatuity of forecasting shortages, the Gold Delegation of the Financial Committee of the League of Nations issued an Interim Report on September 8, 1930, setting forth its estimates of the future production of gold. The Delegation presented two estimates: one a summary of official or semi-official calculations of probable production in the various countries, the other a re-

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vised estimate by the late Mr. Joseph Kitchin. Mr. Kitchin's estimates run consistently higher than the Gold Delegation totals. The actual figures for 1935 exceed Mr. Kitchin's expectation by nearly 60 percent. Production in 1930, the very year during which the estimates were compiled, exceeded the estimates for that year by over 6 percent. But although the report became obsolete promptly enough, the effect of these discussions about a gold shortage has persisted, so much so that the present relative abundance of gold production seems to deserve attention.

The greatest increase in production both in percentage and amount has taken place in Russia and Siberia. The Russians state their expectation of doubling their 1935 output of 5,650,000 fine ounces by 1939. In 1930 the figure was 1,300,000. The Transvaal, which formerly produced almost half of the world's gold output, has remained nearly stationary at a little over ten million fine ounces; it now accounts for only about one-third of the total. The other principal gold producing regions, with their production for 1935, are: the United States, 3,619,000 fine ounces (in contrast to 2,285,603 in 1930); Canada, 3,283,000 (2,102,000 in 1930); Australia, 1,365,982 (622,000 in 1930); Africa, excluding the Transvaal, 1,819,000 (1,037,000 in 1930); Latin America, 1,168,000 (606,000 in 1930); the Japanese Empire, 981,000 (592,000 in 1930).

The annual production of gold must be considered not only in terms of the previous annual production but also in terms of total monetary stocks. The argument used to be made that unless monetary gold stocks increased as rapidly as the amount of work they had to do (as measured by total production, or total trade, or some other generalized statement of economic growth), the price level would have to fall. Cassel's figure of about 3 percent (compounded year upon year cumulatively) used to be taken as standard; and the apparent unlikelihood in 1930 of increasing monetary gold stocks by this amount during the following ten years was what aroused the alarm of the Financial Committee of the League. As a matter of fact, the 1935 production of about 634 million United States gold dollars is approximately equal to 5 percent of the gold reserves of the fifty principal countries, which were estimated by the Federal Reserve Bulletin to be $12,850,000,000 as of December 1934. (Here, as elsewhere in this article, reference is made to old United States gold dollars.)

All gold produced, however, does not necessarily go into monetary stocks. Of the estimated 1930 production of 400 million dollars the Gold Delegation expected that only a little more than half would be available for monetary use. The demand from India was expected annually to require from 80 to 90 million, and industrial purposes were expected to use about 75 million dollars. In reality, instead of taking 450 million dollars during the past five years, India has exported to the West about 653 million, a net change in the estimates of over 1,100 million. The expectation of a net demand for industrial gold likewise proved misleading, for according to the Report of the Bank for International Settlements old gold surrendered by the public in 1933 and 1934 about equalled the industrial requirements. On the other hand, a new factor has appeared: hoarding on a considerable scale in England and on the Continent.

Thus, quite apart from new production, there can be said to exist three main gold reservoirs which may draw from or feed into world gold monetary stocks: (1) the Eastern gold hoards; (2) the Western gold hoards; (3) and the industrial

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or personal stocks of gold, jewelry, rings, etc. The Eastern gold hoard is made up primarily of the Indian hoard; the Chinese and Egyptian holdings have been relatively small. From 1890 to September 1931, when the pound sterling became no longer convertible into gold, India imported gold in all but three years, and during that period Indian net imports of gold were roughly 2,250 million dollars. Before net exports began in September 1931, the Indian hoard was thought to amount to about 3,300 million dollars; net exports to the West from September 1931 through January 1936 were about 653 million. The Chinese hoard is thought to have been about 240 million dollars, of which about 175 million has been shipped to the Occident. The Egyptian hoard of about 300 million dollars is believed to have remained unchanged. Thus, the Eastern hoards in the aggregate have yielded to the West over 800 million dollars in the past four years.

The Western hoard is a comparatively new phenomenon. Part of it is held by individuals in secret places or in public vaults, part is held as unrevealed reserves of central banks or exchange equalization funds. As of the end of 1934, the Bank for International Settlements estimated the value of Western hoards to be 7,000,000,000 Swiss francs, or $1,400,000,000. About half of this amount was estimated by the Bank to have been in London.

This figure would seem to be low, for the new imports of gold into London during the period September 1931 through March 1936 have been over 1,500 million dollars, whereas the reported gold holdings of the Bank of England have increased only 328 million. This would indicate the presence in London alone of the equivalent of $1,200,000,000. France is estimated to have in private hoards from 10 to 15 billion gold francs, or between 400 and 600 million dollars. Holland, Switzerland, Belgium and other European countries may together have a similar amount. The aggregate for Europe is thus possibly equal to 2,500 million dollars.

The industrial and old jewelry supplies need not be estimated. Suffice it to say that these supplies have filled the demand for new industrial gold and have probably provided part of the bars that make up hoards one step nearer monetary utilization.

In summary, the distant and supposedly unavailable Eastern hoards have sent West approximately 825 million dollars; industrial demand has been filled from industrial and second hand jewelry. The Gold Delegation expectation for the six years 1930–1935 was for a gold production of 2,410 million dollars, less exports and industrial use of 1,110 million, leaving net for monetary use of 1,300 million. Actually, production was 3,125 million dollars, plus imports of 800 million, making 3,929 million net, or three times what the Gold Delegation expected. Of this 3,900 million dollars about 2,362 million went into visible monetary reserves and 1,600 million into equalization funds, secret reserves or hoarding in the West, that is, where it might readily become part of the monetary stock.

The following table gives the published figures of visible monetary gold stocks in 1913 and from 1925 to 1935 (in millions of old gold dollars):[1]

[1] League of Nations: "Selected Documents on the Distribution of Gold," 1931, p. 66; "League of Nations Yearbook 1934–35," p. 240; *League of Nations Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*, October 1935, p. 457; *Federal Reserve Bulletin*.

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	Total monetary stocks	*Total reserves incl. Russia*	*Total reserves excl. Russia*	*Reserves of 50 countries*
1913	8,773	4,945	4,158	4,586
1925	10,232	9,157	9,063	8,974
1926	10,495	9,417	9,333	9,210
1927	10,610	9,487	9,390	9,568
1928	10,953	10,019	9,927	10,028
1929	11,210	10,405	10,258	10,306
1930	11,715	11,054	10,805	10,917
1931		11,391	11,130	11,291
1932		11,388	11,634	11,897
1933		12,028	11,612	11,951
1934		12,969	12,530	12,857
1935		12,997	12,501	13,272 (Dec.) 13,297 (March)

It would be folly, as precedents show, to attempt to define precise and inevitable consequences of this unusual abundance of gold. The consequences will depend upon human behavior, of which economic behavior is only one unpredictable aspect. If conclusions are drawn on the assumption of *ceteris paribus* — all other things remaining the same — they will probably be wrong, for all other things do not remain the same. The abundance of gold should tend, however, to make payment of international balances relatively easier, and should help in part to overcome the difficulty caused by tariffs, quotas and the settlement of balances with merchandise. There has been less heard of the pressure of Russian exports on the lumber, hide and wheat markets since the great increase in Russian gold production.

Eventually, this abundance of gold should operate toward raising the level of commodity prices. There is no direct proportional relationship between the amount of monetary gold and the level of commodity prices: a small disparity between the rate of growth of monetary gold stocks and that of general business cannot adequately explain sweeping changes in the price level. For decades there have been too many cushions between the monetary gold supply and the amount of money available for business use for any small disparity to produce a major dislocation. This is truer now than ever. None the less, substantial increases in gold production and monetary gold supply have been followed in the past by rising commodity prices, and they may well be expected to do so in the future.

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THE NEW FRENCH CHAMBER

By Edgar Packard Dean

THE election of April 26 and May 3, 1936, was France's depression election. Great Britain had a comparable election in 1931, the United States in 1932, Canada in 1935; and in each case the party in power was swept out of office. So it was in France. The chief victims were the Radical-Socialists; the victors were the Socialists and Communists.

		1928	*1932*	*1936*
RIGHT:	Conservatives	15	5	11
	Independent Republicans	—	28	—
	Republican Federation	131	76	88
	Popular Democrats	17	16	23
	Left Republicans	106	73	84
	Independent Radicals	55	68	31
LEFT:	Radical Socialists	123	159	116
	Dissident Socialists	48	37	37
	Socialists	101	130	146
	Dissident Communists	2	11	10
	Communists	14	12	72
	Legal Maximum	612	615	618
	RIGHT:	324 (53%)	266 (43%)	237 (38%)
	LEFT:	288 (47%)	349 (57%)	381 (62%)

Political Parties: The French people are divided into two great political camps: the Right and the Left. This is the fundamental fact underlying all French politics and it should never be lost sight of in the multiplicity of parties. The number of parties has been over-emphasized. True, there were in the last Chamber 17 different political groups; but many of these exist only on the parliamentary terrain and for tactical purposes. Two outstanding authorities on French politics, Charles Seignobos and Georges Lachapelle, list only 10 or 11 parties which have real roots throughout the country. The Ministry of the Interior uses a similar number in classifying electoral returns. These parties acquire meaning if one arranges them in a hierarchy extending from the monarchists on the extreme Right to the communists on the extreme Left.

On the extreme Right are the Conservatives, *i.e.*, monarchists. Next to them, proceeding from Right to Left, are two groups of what might be called dyed-in-the wool tories: the Independent Republicans and the Republican Federation. As parties they accept the Republic, although various members do not. Pierre Taittinger of the Republican Federation is not only the leader of the *Jeunesses Patriotes* but an outstanding Bonapartist and an advocate of some form of strong-man rule. The Popular Democrats are difficult to classify. They have two fundamental tenets which in the practice of French politics have always been contradictory: a strong defense of the Church and a fairly extreme social democracy. The deputies of this party vote quite conservatively. The two remaining parties of the Right are the Left Republicans of Pierre Etienne

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Flandin — André Tardieu once belonged to this group — and the Independent Radicals. The latter are former Radical-Socialists who have become mildly conservative. These two groups constitute what is known as the Right Center of the Chamber.

The most moderate group on the Left is the Radical-Socialist Party. This is the great party in the history of the Third Republic. It has included such men as Clemenceau and Poincaré (in their early days); its present outstanding members are Daladier, Herriot, Sarraut, and Caillaux. Further to the Left are the socialist parties: the orthodox Socialists, generally known as the S. F. I. O. (*Section française de l'internationale ouvrière*), and the various groups of Dissident Socialists. In the early twentieth century Jean Jaurès was the leader of the orthodox group; Léon Blum is its present leader. The Dissident Socialists are "dissident" because they have been willing to participate in bourgeois cabinets. Aristide Briand and Paul Painlevé were two of their great men; Paul Boncour is outstanding among contemporaries. On the extreme Left are the Communists, led by Marcel Cachin in the Senate and Maurice Thorez in the Chamber, and the small group of Dissident Communists.

Party Platforms: The Right in general controls the economic destinies of the Republic. It is the stronghold of Big Business and finance. In foreign policy the more conservative groups are strongly nationalist and pay only lip service to the League of Nations. Until the past year the Right was bitterly anti-German; but lately its hatred of communism has caused many of its members to direct their rage on Russia. The Left represents the small independent proprietor, Thomas Jefferson's "small man." It is opposed to economic bigness in all forms. It is anti-clerical, though not necessarily unreligious. Its foreign policy is one of international conciliation and defense of the League.

The electoral campaign of April 1936 was waged on these general issues, and on certain specific issues.

The parties of the Left combined to form the Popular Front. At first glance there seemed to be nothing new in such tactical procedure. It was merely another *Cartel des gauches* which the Radical-Socialists and Socialists have always formed for electoral purposes. But the Popular Front is something more. Unlike previous *Cartels* it includes not only the Radical-Socialists and Socialists but the Communists also. To be sure, it was formed to guarantee victory at the polls. But unlike the earlier *Cartels* it has a program of reform which its successful deputies are to enact when the Chamber reconvenes. The program of the Popular Front is as follows: politically, it is opposed to what it calls the fascist tendencies of the Right; it deprecates the existence of armed leagues such as the *Croix de Feu* and the *Jeunesses Patriotes*. Economically, it seeks to promote recovery by liberalizing the Bank of France and "breaking the power of the 200 families who control the economic life of the nation." Rather than curtailing production it will endeavor to stimulate it. All groups within the Popular Front declared themselves opposed to any devaluation of the franc. Internationally, it desires a strong League of Nations and has intimated that under it the Foreign Office will be more pro-British than it has been under Laval and Flandin.

Confronted with the unified force of the Left, the parties of the Right combined to form the Republican Front. But Right parties have rarely had the

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cohesion, the organization, the discipline which have characterized the Left. As a result, the *Front républicain* had by no means the strength of the *Front populaire*. Politically, it stood as the defender of democracy against the menace of a socialist-communist dictatorship. Economically, it defended the existing régime and contended that the Laval budget economies were restoring equilibrium. It criticized the economic program of the *Front populaire* as necessarily involving devaluation.

The Electoral System: Since 1928, French representation has been based on single member constituencies. Each department and the colonies are divided into a varying number of constituencies in proportion to the population. In the present election, continental France, including Corsica, had a total of 598 deputies, Algeria 10, and the remaining colonies 10. The right to vote belongs to all men over the age of 21 who can fulfill the basic requirements of nationality. Men doing their year of military service cannot vote. There is no female suffrage. In the election of 1936 there were some 12 million inscribed voters. More than 10 million, or about 84 percent of the population, appeared at the polls; in 1932 and 1928 the figure was 83 percent.

In going to the polls, the average Frenchman is confronted with a galaxy of candidates. This year André Tardieu refused to run for reëlection, contending that the actual powers of a deputy had become so distorted as to be meaningless. But few followed his example. There was an unprecedented total of 4,815 candidates for 618 electoral districts — an average of 8 candidates per constituency. In 1932 the total was 3,617 and in 1928 it was 3,735. The great number of candidates is due to two factors. There are about a dozen political parties in France and if each presents a candidate the total is bound to be large. Second, any Frenchman over 25 years of age and in full possession of his political rights can offer himself for election. He need not present a minimum number of signatures supporting his candidacy, nor need he deposit, as in Britain, a fee which is forfeited unless he obtains at least ⅛ of the votes actually polled.

Voting is held on two consecutive Sundays. During the postwar years it has become the practice of voters to mark the first ballot *for* the candidate they would ideally like to see in office. On the second ballot they vote *against* the candidate they do not wish elected. For a candidate to be elected on the first poll he must receive an absolute majority of the votes cast. On the second poll a plurality is sufficient. In the recent election, only 185 out of a total of 618 deputies, or 30 percent, were chosen on the first vote. In 1932, 42 percent and, in 1928, 31 percent were successful on the first ballot. But in 1914, when the régime of single member constituencies was last used, 58 percent of the deputies were elected on the first ballot.

The first vote has virtually become a primary and should be regarded as such. Thus the great number of candidates is a perfectly natural phenomenon. Even in the United States several candidates will compete for one office in the primaries. The results of the first vote, or primary, largely determine who will be a candidate on the second Sunday of voting. Many drop out voluntarily; in other cases all the parties of the Left will get together and agree to support that candidate of the Left, irrespective of nuance, who has polled the most votes on the first ballot. The Right in a less formal and effective way has adopted the same procedure. Thus in many constituencies in the 1936 election the number

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of candidates on the second ballot was two: the official representative of the *Front populaire* and representative of the *Front républicain*.

Since 1928 the French electoral machine has functioned increasingly as a two-party system. French politicians are extremely conscious of this trend, but thus far no French writer has commented on it. The galaxy of candidates on the first ballot has obscured the fact that on the second, and crucial ballot, the number of candidates is to all intents and purposes two. If in a given constituency the two leading candidates together receive at least 90 percent, and in many cases 95 and even 97 percent, of the votes cast, the contest may be defined as a two-cornered struggle. On this basis, an analysis of the 424 constituencies of continental France which voted this year on the second Sunday reveals that in 383, or 90 percent of the total, the contest was virtually between two and only two candidates. For the 1932 election this was so of 80 percent of the constituencies and in 1928 for 74 percent.

Results: The election of April 26–May 3, 1936, was a clear victory for the Left or *Front populaire*. It emerged with 381 seats as against 349 in 1932. Within the parties of the Left, the great victor was the Socialists. For the first time in the history of the Third Republic they constitute the largest single party (146 seats) in the Chamber of Deputies. The Radical-Socialists, with 116 seats, have lost their time-honored primacy. The moral victor was the Communist Party which increased its representation from 12 to 72. As for the Right, excluding the losses of the most moderate party, the Independent Radicals, it held its own. The new Chamber is essentially a Chamber of extremes. This is so because of the actual distribution of seats; and each of the two Center parties, already greatly weakened, will tend to gravitate towards its extreme.

The popular vote (based on first ballot) was given in *Le Temps* as follows:

		1932	*1936*
RIGHT:	Conservatives	82,859	46,540
	Independent Republicans	499,236	359,191
	Republican Federation	1,233,360	1,578,419
	Popular Democrats	309,336	373,493
	Left Republicans	1,299,936	1,004,182
	Independent Radicals	955,990	690,557
	Alsatian Autonomists	———	114,024
	Agrarians	———	156,891
LEFT:	Radical Socialists	1,836,991	1,401,974
	Dissident Socialists	518,176	587,777
	Socialists	1,964,384	1,887,209
	Dissident Communists	78,472	184,763
	Communists	796,630	1,453,923
		9,575,370	9,838,943
	RIGHT:	4,380,717 (46%)	4,323,297 (44%)
	LEFT:	5,194,653 (54%)	5,515,646 (56%)

Interpretation: The election of 1936 was above all a protest vote. In this respect it corresponds to the American election of 1932. France is no more bolshevist than the United States is permanently Democratic. If the French

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Socialists at last have their own cabinet under Léon Blum, they are far behind the British Socialists, who formed their first cabinet with Ramsay MacDonald in 1924. France is one of the few great nations which has passed through the depression without any major economic reforms. Impartial observers admit that the credit structure is unduly rigid and that the Bank of France could be changed to serve the economic needs of the country more adequately.

The gains of the Socialists and Communists, both as concerns seats and votes, are not so portentous as they appear. In the first place, the popular vote of the Communists in 1932 would, under a system of proportional representation, have given them 50 seats rather than the 12 they actually possessed. In 1936 they received a popular vote of 1.5 million as opposed to 0.8 million four years earlier; but in 1928 they amassed 1.1 million votes. All that has happened is that the Communists are now strong enough to elect their own deputies rather than giving their votes to a Radical-Socialist, who, in turn, had to take his stand in the Chamber with one eye to pleasing his Communist supporters. Second, both the Socialist and Communist Parties have in recent years become more national and more French. In the recent electoral campaign they called themselves the descendants of Voltaire rather than of Lenin. They perorated with the tricolor beside them, and the red flag often languished in the corner. The recent Franco-Russian pact of mutual assistance allowed them to appear, quite justifiably, as patriotic and truly French parties. France had acquired a new ally in Russia; even many members of the Right approved of it. The Socialists and Communists were no longer the apostles of some international economic régime: they were the friend of France's ally. For the first time in many years one could vote far to the Left and still be patriotic and respectable.

Last, if it is true that the Socialists and Communists have temporarily converted a large part of the country, it is also true that the country has converted the Socialists and Communists. In proportion as the latter have broadened their influence, so have they been influenced by the immediate needs of France. Drastic revolution has been placed in the background. Their present program of reform in many ways does not surpass the reforms actually instituted in Great Britain and the United States during the depression. France is the home of the small independent proprietor. This class constitutes the major portion of the French nation. It is anti-monopolistic and fiercely anti-Big Business. But it is just as strongly anti-collectivist.

The elections of 1924 and 1932 were victories for the Radical-Socialists. But the Radical-Socialist ministries formed by Edouard Herriot remained in office only with the concurrence of Léon Blum's Socialists. Today the rôles are reversed: it is M. Blum who courts M. Herriot. Although the Radical-Socialists suffered great losses at the polls, they are the pivotal group in the new Chamber. Their support is necessary if any Socialist government is to remain in power. Just how greatly a Socialist cabinet with Radical-Socialist support will differ from the former Radical-Socialist cabinets with Socialist support is something which will soon be determined.

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SOME RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By William L. Langer

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General: Political and Legal

THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. By FRANK M. HUGHES. New York: Appleton-Century, 1936, 659 p. $4.00.

An historical introduction.

DER NEUAUFBAU EUROPAS AUF GRUNDLAGE DER FRIEDLICHEN REVISION DER FRIEDENSVERTRÄGE. By G. LUKCÁS. Salzburg: Bergland, 1936, 108 p. M. 3.

A Hungarian statesman emphasizes that recognition of the demands of national pride and honor is a prerequisite for healthy international life.

LA SÉCURITÉ COLLECTIVE. Lwów: Institut de Droit Constitutionnel, 1935, 121 p. 6 Zloty.

A collection of memoranda by Polish authorities presented at the International Studies Conference in London in 1935.

PROBLEMS OF PEACE. Series X. Anarchy or World Order. New York: Oxford University Press, 1936, 272 p. $2.75.

The latest series of lectures at the Geneva Institute of International Relations.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE RULE OF LAW. By SIR ALFRED ZIMMERN. New York: Macmillan, 1936, 538 p. $4.00.

In these days when the so-called Old Diplomacy is celebrating resounding victories and funeral orations are being delivered over the League of Nations, this book, written by one of the most prominent advocates of the League, is particularly welcome. The subject treated is really broader than the title suggests. Sir Alfred gives an excellent brief review of the prewar system as well as of the organization and history of the League. He stresses the fact that in the postwar period the old and the new systems have existed side by side, leaving the problem of adjustment for the future.

AVORTEMENT DE LA SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS. By VICTOR MARGUERITTE. Paris: Flammarion, 1936, 288 p. Fr. 12.

A history of the League, including its recent debâcle, by a French pacifist.

THE CITIZEN FACES WAR. By ROBERT AND BARBARA DONINGTON. London: Gollancz, 1936, 286 p. 7/6.

A review of the experience of conscientious objectors during the war.

THE FAITH CALLED PACIFISM. By MAX PLOWMAN. Toronto: Dent, 1936, 126 p. $1.25.

An eloquent presentation of the pacifist viewpoint, putting the question on the basis of uncompromising individual responsibility.

FOOTSTEPS OF WARFARE. By R. L. WORRALL. London: Davies, 1936, 244 p. 7/6.

A purely materialistic, communist interpretation of the history of war and imperialism, competent so far as it goes.

DER ZWANG IM VÖLKERRECHT. By HANS WIDMER. Leipzig: Noske, 1936, 150 p. M. 5.10.

A German dissertation analyzing various aspects of the sanctions problem.

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SANZIONI. By L. Federici. Turin: Einaudi, 1935, 375 p. L. 40.
Another detailed treatment of the same question.

SANCTIONS BEGONE! By H. Rowan-Robinson. London: Clowes, 1936, 254 p. 7/6.
An exposition of the futility of sanctions and the need for reform of the League.

THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS. By Beni Prasad. New York: Oxford University Press, 1935, 301 p. $3.50.
An interesting text from the sociological standpoint, by an Indian professor.

WHY DEMOCRACY? By Jay W. Hudson. New York: Appleton-Century, 1936, 260 p. $2.00.
A general reconsideration of the basic concepts of democracy and of their validity in the modern world.

ANTI-SEMITISM YESTERDAY AND TOMORROW. By Rabbi Lee J. Levinger. New York: Macmillan, 1936, 334 p. $2.50.
A commendably well-balanced treatment of the whole subject. The author gives a good historical survey of the persecution of the Jews, to prepare the way for an excellent analysis of the various factors that enter into it. He takes due account of the economic, psychological and racial aspects, and generally approaches the question of anti-Semitism as one part of the larger problem of minorities.

ANTISEMITISM. By Hugo Valentin. London: Gollancz, 1936, 324 p. 10/6.
Another outstanding treatment, being the translation from the Swedish of a devastating critical analysis of the anti-Semitic argument.

DIE VORHERRSCHAFT DER WEISSEN RASSE. By Wahrhold Drascher. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1936, 420 p. M. 9.
A stimulating review of the motives of European world expansion. The writer sees the whole development as at bottom a conflict between the white race and inferior races, and discusses in detail the situation since the war.

RAUM OHNE VOLK. By H. Raab. Brno: Rohrer, 1935, 143 p. M. 3.50.
Covers somewhat the same ground as the preceding title, stressing the struggle of the yellow and black races for the possession of unoccupied areas of Manchuria, Mongolia, etc.

ALMANACH DE GOTHA. Gotha: Justus Perthes, 1936, 1431 p.
The most recent edition of a standard genealogical, diplomatic and statistical work.

General: Economic

THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY. By John Maynard Keynes. New York: Harcourt, 1936, 403 p. $2.00.
A leading economist carries on the theoretical work begun by his "Treatise on Money" five years ago.

DEPRESSION AND RECONSTRUCTION. By Eleanor L. Dulles. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1936, 352 p. $3.00.
A competent and well-written review of the background of the great depression, with consideration of the lessons to be derived from it.

THE FINAL CRISIS. By Allen Hutt. New York: International Publishers, 1936, 288 p. $2.50.
A rapid survey of the crises of the past century, designed to show that we are now on the eve of the millennial communist régime.

MODERN GOVERNMENT AS A BUSY BODY IN OTHER MEN'S MATTERS. By Sir Ernest J. P. Benn. New York: Appleton-Century, 1936, 245 p. $2.00.
A blast from a good old-fashioned liberal.

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PUISSANCE ET DECLIN DU CAPITALISME. By Jacques Saint-Germain. Paris: Oeuvres Françaises, 1936, Fr. 12.

A good review of the history of liberal capitalism in the past century and a half, ending on a note of doubt.

DISTRIBUTE OR DESTROY! By Brynjolf Bjørset. London: Nott, 1936, 196 p. 5/.

A fascinating analysis of the various proposals advanced for the equitable distribution of the world's plethora of goods.

DER STAND DES WELTLUFTVERKEHRS UND SEINE PROBLEME. By Jürgen Ulderup. Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt, 1935, 157 p.

A competent survey of the past and present problems of international aviation, with some reference to the industry's relationship to others.

THE FUTURE OF COLONIES. By Leonard Barnes. London: Hogarth, 1936, 38 p. 1/.

The position and grievances of the so-called dissatisfied powers, and the problem of national self-sufficiency.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN WORLD TRADE. By Isaac Lippincott. New York: Appleton-Century, 1936, 587 p. $4.00.

A general treatment.

LES PRIX AGRICOLES MONDIAUX ET LA CRISE. By Bertrand Nogaro. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1936, Fr. 20.

An economist reëxamines agricultural prices and concludes that their fall has been due chiefly to increased production and accumulation of stocks.

BRITISH BANKS AND THE LONDON MONEY MARKET. By R. J. Truptil. London: Cape, 1936, 352 p. 10/6.

Probably the best single book on the subject. The author, a French banker, studies in great detail the English organization and technique, and makes some interesting comparisons with French conditions.

ÖLPOLITIK DER GROSSMÄCHTE. By Fritz Fetzer. Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1935, 69 p. M. 1.80.

The author deals chiefly with countries like Japan which have no oil resources. The study is predominantly economic.

THE WORLD SUGAR PROBLEM, 1926–1935. By Viriato Gutierrez. London: Rodger, 1936, 187 p. 6/.

A Cuban grower reconsiders the attempts made to restrict production, stresses their failure, and advocates a return to the good old system of supply and demand.

STEEL—DICTATOR. By Harvey O'Connor. New York: Reynal, 1935, 390 p. $3.00.

An anti-capitalistic account of the development of the American steel industry.

International Relations of the United States

WITHOUT GREASE. By Frank R. Kent. New York: Morrow, 1936, 352 p. $2.50.

Articles by a well-known newspaper writer criticizing the New Deal.

LIBERALISM FIGHTS ON. By Ogden L. Mills. New York: Macmillan, 1936, 160 p. $1.50.

The present administration and its policies reviewed by an individualist of the old school, Secretary of the Treasury in the Hoover cabinet.

THE RAINBOW. By Donald R. Richberg. New York: Doubleday, 1936, 327 p. $2.50.

The N.R.A. as it appears to one of its chief creators.

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RULERS OF AMERICA. By Anna Rochester. New York: International Publishers, 1936, 367 p. $3.50.

American finance-capital studied from the Marxian standpoint.

WHERE LIFE IS BETTER. By James Rorty. New York: Reynal, 1936, 383 p. $3.00.

A distressing picture of all our weak spots, without any therapeutic suggestions.

THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN POLITICS. By Thomas V. Smith. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1936, 302 p. $2.50.

A competent reëxamination of the basic ideas and motives of foreign dictatorial régimes, followed by a demonstration of why they cannot serve us.

AMERICA CAME MY WAY. By Sir Anthony Jenkinson. London: Barker, 1936, 320 p. 10/6.

A disjointed, but friendly and often discerning analysis of the American scene.

IMPERIAL HEARST. By Ferdinand Lundberg. New York: Equinox, 1936, 406 p. $2.75.

An annihilating study of the newspaper magnate. It deserves wide attention.

WILLIAM RANDOLPH HEARST. By Mrs. Fremont Older. New York: Appleton-Century, 1936, 581 p. $4.00.

The "authorized" biography, uncritical, cloying.

BORAH OF IDAHO. By Claudius O. Johnson. New York: Longmans, 1936, 522 p. $3.50.

A good biographical study, of interest to all students of American foreign policy.

FRANK KNOX, AMERICAN. By Norman Beasley. New York: Doubleday, 1936, 184 p. $1.00.

Strive and Succeed; a campaign biography.

THIS MAN LANDON. By Frederick Palmer. New York: Dodd, 1936, 245 p. $1.50.

Another campaign biography.

MANIFEST DESTINY. By Albert K. Weinberg. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1935, 559 p. $4.50.

An historical study of the motives and forces behind American expansion.

PEACE OR WAR? By Merle E. Curti. New York: Norton, 1936, 374 p. $3.00.

Though there are many histories of the world's wars, little systematic study has been devoted to the history of efforts to secure and maintain peace. This book tells for the first time the full story of American peace movements; and it is to be hoped that we shall ultimately have similar surveys for other countries. The book is scholarly in the best sense of the word, but there is nothing forbidding about it. On the contrary, it reads like an impressive epic of idealistic effort which, even though it has borne no great fruit, is nevertheless part and parcel of the American ideology.

AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR PRACTICE. By Graham H. Stuart. New York: Appleton-Century, 1936, 571 p. $5.00.

Another important book, supplying for the first time a comprehensive account of the development and organization of our foreign service both at home and abroad.

ALIEN AMERICANS. By B. Schrieke. New York: Viking, 1936, 219 p. $2.50.

A study of the position and disabilities of the Japanese, Chinese, Mexicans and other alien elements in the United States, as seen in the larger framework of race relations.

NATIONAL ECONOMIC SECURITY. By Arthur B. Adams. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1936, 328 p. $2.50.

An able reconsideration of recent American development, of the depression, of the New Deal policies, and of the great unsolved issues which still confront us.

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THE ST. LAWRENCE DEEP WATERWAY. By C. P. Wright. Toronto: Macmillan, 1936, 450 p. $4.50.

Probably the best and most exhaustive treatment of a vexed problem, examined from the political, social and financial aspects.

The World War

BRITISH DOCUMENTS ON THE ORIGINS OF THE WAR, 1898–1914. Vol. X, part 1. Edited by G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley. London: H.M.S.O., 1936, 17/6.

This volume of the great British collection covers the history of the Near and Middle East from about 1910 to 1914. It is of great interest in connection with the Balkan Wars and the immediate background of the World War.

BEFORE THE WAR. By G. P. Gooch. New York: Longmans, 1936, 438 p. $4.00.

The first of two volumes in which a leading English historian reconsiders the policies of the Great Powers and their representatives between 1900 and 1914. The discussion here is of Lord Lansdowne, Delcassé, Bülow, Aehrenthal and Isvolsky. The author's mastery of the documentary material makes the book one of the most authoritative as it is one of the most readable accounts. Its only weakness is its restriction to official material, to the neglect of movements of opinion and economic forces.

THE EVE OF 1914. By Theodor Wolff. New York: Knopf, 1936, 655 p. $4.50.

Easily one of the most interesting as well as one of the most instructive books dealing with the prewar period. The author was for many years editor of the *Berliner Tageblatt*, and it is safe to say that few persons had a more intimate contact with men and events over so long a time. Herr Wolff is above all a cosmopolitan, a man of learning and taste. His volume is beautifully written, full of reflection, and must be given one of the first places in any library of modern memoirs.

VAN DE BOSNISCHE CRISIS TOT SERAJEWO. By R. Dufour. Utrecht: Keminck, 1935, 194 p.

A discriminating, scholarly study of the five years preceding the war.

VOZNIKNOVENIE MIROVOI VOINY. By Nikolai Poletika. Moscow: Socekgiz, 1935, 728 p.

An exhaustive study of the origins of the war.

DIE INTERNATIONALEN BEZIEHUNGEN IM ZEITALTER DES IMPERIALISMUS. Vol. VIII, part 1. Edited by O. Hoetzsch. Berlin: Hobbing, 1936, 426 p.

Another volume of the great Russian series of materials on Russian diplomacy during the war. This one covers the period from May 24 to August 4, 1915.

DER WELTKRIEG, 1914–1918. Volume X. Berlin: Mittler, 1936, 706 p. M. 30.50.

The latest volume of the German official history of the war, dealing with the year 1916 up to the retirement of Falkenhayn in August. In addition to the study of the Verdun, Somme, Russian and Italian campaigns, it contains important critical reflections on the strategy of the Germans under Falkenhayn.

THE AMERICAN ARMY IN FRANCE, 1917–1919. By Major-General James G. Harbord. Boston: Little, Brown, 1936, 650 p. $5.00.

One of the important general accounts of the American contribution in the great conflict. General Harbord distinguished himself especially by his organization of the service of supply, but his book is a full-length review of the achievement of the A.E.F.

LA GUERRA NELL' ARIA. By General F. Porro. Milan: Corbaccio, 1935, 451 p. L. 12.

One of the most detailed and competent histories of the war in the air from the Italian side. The author was one of the pioneers of the service and discusses the development of the industry as well as the actual fighting.

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LA GUERRE DE FORTERESSE. By J. Rebold. Paris: Payot, 1936, 272 p. Fr. 25.
A study of a neglected phase of warfare, by a former Swiss chief of fortifications.

FRENCH REPLIES TO HAIG. By Gerald French. London: Hutchinson, 1936, 266 p. 10/6.
A vehement reply by French's son, to remarks in the Haig biography.

VERDUN. By Wilhelm Ziegler. Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1936, 199 p. M. 4.80.
An exemplary study which brings together material in official histories and regimental studies and tries to explain the repeated failure of the Germans. The author participated in the campaign.

LUIGI CADORNA. By Varo Varanini. Turin: Paravia, 1935, 145 p. L. 9.50.
A good general sketch of the Italian commander-in-chief.

GORIZIA E LE BATTAGLIE DELL'AUTUMNO 1916. By Ambrogio Bollati. Milan: Corbaccio, 1935, 511 p.
A minute technical study of one of the most important Italian engagements.

GALLIPOLI. THE FADING VISION. By John North. London: Faber, 1936, 390 p. 15/.
Easily one of the best studies of the famous campaign. After several visits to Gallipoli and a careful study of all the sources, the author subjects the whole accepted story to critical review. The result is an interesting and highly instructive narrative.

WASSMUSS, "THE GERMAN LAWRENCE." By Christopher Sykes. London: Longmans, 1936, 294 p. 10/6.
The strange story of the German agents who were sent to Persia and Afghanistan to arouse those countries to war against England and Russia.

THE QUEEN OF SPIES: LOUISE DE BETTIGNIES. By Major Thomas Coulson. London: Constable, 1935, 385 p. 7/6.
A superior spy story, throwing light on the secret intelligence service.

Western Europe

MANUEL GÉOGRAPHIQUE DE POLITIQUE EUROPÉENNE. By Jacques Ancel. Paris: Delagrave, 1936, 472 p. Fr. 90.
The first volume of what promises to be a standard work.

FRA BREST-LITOWSK TIL RAPALLO. By H. Frisch. Copenhagen: Gad, 1935, Kr. 3.75.
The first volume of an elaborate general history of Europe from 1917 to 1922.

LA NOUVELLE EUROPE VIENT D'AVOIR 16 ANS. By Henry Laporte, Paris: Lanore, 1936, 230 p. Fr. 12.
A lively story of the situation in Germany, Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and the Balkans, as it has developed since 1919.

THE TUMULT AND THE SHOUTING. By George Slocombe. London: Heinemann, 1936, 437 p. 15/.
Interviews with Hitler, Gandhi, Austen Chamberlain, etc.

FACE OF REVOLUTION. By Michael John. New York: Macmillan, 1936, 333 p. $2.50.
A record of travel in various European countries, with emphasis on the revolutionary movements and revolutionary possibilities in England and the United States.

VÁLEČNÉ MOŽNOSTI VE STŘEDNI EVROPĚ A TAŽENÍ V HABEŠI. By Emanuel Moraveč. Prague: Svaz Národního Osvobozeni, 1936, 107 p. Kč. 7.50.
A discussion of the chances of war in Europe arising from the Ethiopian crisis.

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LES INTRIGUES REVISIONNISTES CONTRE LES TRAITÉS DE PAIX. By D. Tomitch. Paris: Bossuet, 1936, 224 p. Fr. 15.

A long-drawn indictment of the revisionist campaign since 1919.

THE ATTEMPTS TO FORM AN ANGLO-FRENCH ALLIANCE, 1919–1924. By J. Paul Selsam. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1936, 95 p. $1.00.

A neat and well-documented monograph which has a direct bearing on the history of American policy in 1919–1920 as well as on the evolution of the Locarno Pacts.

VERS LA GUERRE OU VERS LA PAIX? By Claude Bellanger. Paris: Fustier, 1936, Fr. 3.

Essentially an appeal to the youth of France and Germany to bury the hatchet and inaugurate a new era of friendship.

DEUTSCH-FRANZÖSISCHE MISSVERSTÄNDNISSE. By Walter Gruber. Leipzig: Bibliographisches Institut, 1936, 124 p. M. 1.

The author thinks the chief cause of friction between France and Germany is in differences of national character and in France's failure to appreciate the aims of Naziism.

DEUTSCH-BRITISCHE FRONT IN DER GESCHICHTE. By E. von Eisenhart and W. Beckmann. Berlin: Kyffhäuser, 1936, 122 p. M. 3.60.

A semi-popular review of Anglo-German relations, with a plea for a new entente.

LOCARNO. By F. S. Giovanucci. Rome: 1935, 448 p. L. 50.

A minute review of the origins and provisions of the Locarno Pacts.

LA FRANCE DE DEMAIN. By Jacques Bardoux. Paris: Sirey, 1936, 291 p. Fr. 20.

An important memorandum by a technical committee appointed to plan reform in French government.

LE SOUVERAIN CAPTIF. By André Tardieu. Paris: Flammarion, 1936, 282 p. Fr. 12.

The first of a projected series of five volumes entitled "La Révolution à refaire," in which the former Premier attacks the distortions of the French parliamentary system. This volume presents the indictment, vigorously and with many illustrations. Succeeding ones will doubtless explain precisely the reforms which M. Tardieu has in mind and outline a system which he considers might be adapted to the French spirit at the same time that it functions more efficiently and with greater impartiality. The book is attracting considerable attention in France.

VALEUR DE LA LIBERTÉ ET ADAPTATION DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE. By Joseph Barthélemy. Paris: Sirey, 1935, 260 p. Fr. 24.

A searching reconsideration of the entire democratic system in France, by an outstanding writer on constitutional matters.

LA FRANCE À LA RECHERCHE D'UN MYSTIQUE. By A. de Wissant. Paris: Delmas, 1936, Fr. 8.

Revealing interviews with de la Rocque, Flandin, the Comte de Paris, etc.

MISSION OU DÉMISSIQN DE LA FRANCE. Paris: Fustier, 1936, Fr. 3.

An unvarnished reply to Hitler's proposals for a new European system.

LE PROBLÈME DE L'ÉQUILIBRE BUDGÉTAIRE EN FRANCE DEPUIS LA GUERRE. By Jean Dufour. Paris: Librairie Technique, 1936, 237 p. Fr. 25.

A scholarly study of the evolution of French financial policy since the war, by an author who regards devaluation as inevitable.

DON QUIJOTE NA ROXCESTÍ. By G. Winter. Prague: Sfinx Bohumil Janda, 1935, 316 p. Kč. 45.

A vivid psychological and sociological study of the Spanish situation, by a Czech journalist.

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LA POLITICA RELIGIOSA DE LA REPÚBLICA. By Alvaro de Albornoz. Madrid: Gagues, 1935, 245 p. Pes. 5.

A timely analysis of one of the urgent problems of the new Spain.

LA PESETA ET L'ÉCONOMIE ESPAGNOLE DEPUIS 1928. By Pierre Lefaucheux. Paris: Librairie Technique, 1936, 212 p. Fr. 30.

A systematic study of recent Spanish finance.

UNDER THE AXE OF FASCISM. By Gaetano Salvemini. New York: Viking, 1936, 402 p. $3.00.

Since 1934 countless books and articles have hailed the new corporative state in Italy. Professor Salvemini, whose scholarly competence no one will question, here subjects the whole organization and its operation to a ruthlessly realistic analysis. His conclusions, based almost exclusively upon official fascist material, are little short of startling. A decided fall in real wages, much unemployment, a lowered standard of living — these are set down as some of the achievements of the present régime. The corporate state appears as a huge mystification, designed to camouflage the failure of the dictatorship.

FASCIST ITALY. By Herbert Vivian. London: Melrose, 1936, 288 p. 16/.

A sympathetic and not too profound descriptive survey.

ENTER MUSSOLINI. By Emilio Lussu. London: Methuen, 1936, 251 p. 7/6.

A brilliant and devastating account of the rise of Fascism.

ITALIANI NEL MONDO. By P. Parini. Milan: Mondadori, 1935, 185 p. L. 6.

An enthusiastic confession of faith in the new Italy and its place in the world.

IL CAPO DEL GOVERNO NELLO STATO FASCISTA. By V. Corsini. Bologna: Zanichelli, 1935, 322 p. L. 12.

A technical analysis of the position and powers of the dictator.

SETTE ANNI DI POLITICA AERONAUTICA. By Italo Balbo. Milan: Mondadori, 1936, 260 p. L. 12.

The famous Italian airman reviews the progress of the past years.

LAND RECLAMATION IN ITALY. By Cesare Longobardi. London: King, 1936, 255 p. 12/6.

An illustrated exposition of the fascist land and agricultural policy.

PAPSTGESCHICHTE DER NEUESTEN ZEIT. By J. Schmidlin. Munich: Kösel und Pustet, 1935, 350 p. M. 13.50.

The third and concluding volume, covering the pontificates of Pius X and Benedict XV, of what is probably the best general history of the Papacy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

FRANTIŠEK JOSEF I. By Bedřich Hlaváč. Prague: Borový, 1935, 715 p. Kč. 125.

An admirable detailed study of the history of the Hapsburg Monarchy from 1848 to 1916, with many documents and photographs.

KAISER, POLITIKER UND MENSCHEN. By Franz Brandl. Leipzig: Günther, 1936, 446 p. M. 7.50.

The reminiscences of a Vienna police chief.

OESTERREICH, 1918–1934. By Leopold Kunschak. Vienna: Typographische Anstalt, 1935, 221 p. Sch. 3.60.

The postwar history of Austria as seen by the veteran leader of the Christian Workers' Movement. A valuable addition to the literature on the liberal side.

DER AUTORITÄRE STAAT. By Erich Voegelin. Vienna: Springer, 1936, 289 p. M. 13.80.

A study of the constitutional development of Austria since 1848, with emphasis on the authoritarian phase since 1933.

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DIE "VERFASSUNG 1934" DES BUNDESSTAATES OESTERREICH. By G. Froehlich. Brno: Rohrer, 1936, 291 p. M. 8.50.

A decidedly critical analysis of the present Austrian régime.

HITLER: A BIOGRAPHY. By Konrad Heiden. New York: Knopf, 1936, 415 p. $3.00.

The author is already well-known for his excellent "History of National Socialism." As Munich correspondent of the *Frankfurter Zeitung* for many years he had unusual opportunities to observe the growth of the Nazi movement and to study Hitler's tactics. The present volume is one of the most instructive biographies of the Führer that has yet been written, not only because of the wealth of the factual material presented, but also because of the author's philosophic grasp.

HITLER. By Louis Bertrand. Paris: Fayard, 1936, 128 p. Fr. 3.50.

A brilliant French interpretation.

DER RHEIN IM DEUTSCHEN SCHICKSAL. By Kurt von Raumer. Berlin: Stilke, 1936, 109 p.

Timely essays on the Rhine question by a recognized authority.

THE YELLOW SPOT. London: Gollancz, 1936, 287 p. 5/.

A detailed, documented account of the persecution of the Jews in Germany, constituting a terrible indictment of the government policy.

THE REFUGEES FROM GERMANY, 1933–1935. By Norman Bentwich. London: Allen and Unwin, 1936, 228 p. 6/.

The author reviews the many aspects of the problem as they have emerged in the past three years and shows the urgent need of some coördinated effort at relief.

THE BROWN NETWORK. THE ACTIVITIES OF THE NAZIS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES. New York: Knight, 1936, 300 p. $3.00.

A companion volume to "The Brown Book of the Hitler Terror" of a few years ago — an exposé of the widespread organization of the Nazi directorate.

FÜR DEN REICHSGEDANKEN. By Martin Spahn. Berlin: Dümmler, 1936, 464 p. M. 8.60.

A collection of essays of the years 1915–1934 by a well-known German thinker, regarded by some as an intellectual forerunner of the Nazi movement.

KOLONIALPOLITISCHES QUELLENHEFT. By Ernst G. Jacob. Bamberg: Buehner, 1935, 198 p.

Documents on the German colonial question since the war.

VON VERSAILLES ZUR WEHRFREIHEIT. By Michael Freund. Essen: Essener Verlags-Anstalt, 1936, 180 p. M. 4.

Documents on the German struggle for military equality 1934–1935.

ÉGLISE ET ÉTAT EN ALLEMAGNE DE WEIMAR AUX PREMIÈRES ANNÉES DU IIIe REICH. By Henri Cazelles. Paris: Rousseau, 1936, 282 p. Fr. 30.

A competent survey of the religious question in Germany since the war.

GOVERNMENT IN THE THIRD REICH. By Fritz M. Marx. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1936, 169 p. $1.50.

Probably the best short analysis of the present governmental system in Germany, written by a former German civil servant.

L'ÉVOLUTION DU POUVOIR EXÉCUTIF EN ALLEMAGNE. By William Gueydon de Roussel. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1935, Fr. 30.

A study showing how the separation of powers gradually disappeared.

WAHL UND VOLKSABSTIMMUNG IM FÜHRERSTAAT. By Gustav Uhde. Würzburg: Trilstsch, 1936, 62 p. M. 2.75.

A dissertation of interest to those who fail to understand Nazi election results.

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DIE NÜRNBERGER GESETZE. By B. Lösener and F. A. Knost. Berlin: Vahlen, 1936, 107 p. M. 2.50.

The text of the famous laws of citizenship, with the necessary elucidations.

GERMAN AGRICULTURAL POLICY, 1918–1934. By John B. Holt. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1936, 240 p. $2.50.

An examination of one of the crucial problems of postwar Germany.

THE DRAMA OF UPPER SILESIA. By William J. Rose. Brattleboro: Day Press, 1935, 349 p. $3.50.

An excellent study of the problem since the war.

Eastern Europe

WHO'S WHO IN CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPE 1933–1934. Edited by Stephen Taylor. Zürich: Central European Times, 1935, 1164 p. Sw. Fr. 60.

A useful new compendium, containing about 10,000 biographical sketches of prominent persons in Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Danzig, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Jugoslavia, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Poland, Rumania, Switzerland and Turkey. A feature is a geographical index.

HANDBOOK OF CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPE 1935. Edited by Stephen Taylor. Zürich: Central European Times, 1935, 992 p., 2 maps. Sw. Fr. 5.50.

This handy reference work covers the same countries as the last item and gives succinct geographical, economic, political and social information about each.

LA POLOGNE D'AUJOURD'HUI. By Vaclav Fiala. Paris: Hartmann, 1936, 280 p. Fr. 15.

One of the best recent surveys, discussing in some detail the party system and domestic set-up, as well as the chief issues of foreign policy.

POLAND AND HER ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. By Roman Gorecki. London: Allen and Unwin, 1935, 119 p. 3/6.

A concise review of the resources of Poland and of its economic development since the war, by a prominent banker, now a cabinet minister.

DIE POLNISCHE SEEHANDELSPOLITIK. By Jutta Rudershausen. Berlin: Ost-Europa Verlag, 1936, 83 p. M. 4.50.

A monograph which contains among other things a good discussion of the Danzig-Gdynia problem.

LA TERRITOIRE DE MEMEL ET LA POLITIQUE EUROPÉENNE. By Jean Meuvret. Paris: Hartmann, 1936, 90 p. Fr. 5.

An impartial analysis of the evolution of the Memel problem since the war. The first of the publications of the Centre d'Études de Politique Étrangère.

DIE ENTWICKLUNG DES LETTLÄNDISCHEN STAATSGEDANKEN BIS 1918. By Helene Dopkewitsch. Berlin: Engelmann, 1936, 125 p. M. 6.

A collection of forbidden literature and propaganda from 1900 to 1918.

DREADED HOUR. By George A. Hill. Toronto: McClelland, 1936, 280 p. $2.75.

The adventures of an Allied agent during the Russian civil war, with interesting sidelights on Allied and White policies.

SMELL OF SMOKE. By Ben Magnus. London: Duckworth, 1936, 314 p. 8/6.

A vivid picture of the counter-revolution in South Russia, by a partisan of the Whites.

SOVIET UNION 1935. New York: International Publishers, 1936, 452 p. $1.25.

Speeches and statements by high Russian officials, on many current problems.

THIS SOVIET WORLD. By Anna Louise Strong. New York: Holt, 1936, 312 p. $2.00.

A well-known sympathizer's interpretation of Soviet policies.

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LENIN. By William C. White. New York: Random House, 1936, 172 p. $1.50.
The first of what is intended to be a series of popular sketches of the leaders of the Bolshevik Revolution.

STATUT INTERNATIONAL DE L' U.R.S.S. By A. Stoupnitzky. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1936, 486 p. Fr. 50.
A documented study of Russia's international position and foreign trade.

LA TERRE SOVIÉTIQUE. By Jean Renaud. Paris: 1936, 160 p. Fr. 5.
The Soviet agricultural policy and the emergence of the new *moujik*.

I WAS A SOVIET WORKER. By Andrew and Maria Smith. New York: Dutton, 1936, 298 p. $3.00.
Two communists return disillusioned after three years in the workers' paradise.

LE PEUPLE AU POUVOIR. By André Ribard. Paris: E.S.I., 1936, Fr. 12.
The organization of "democracy" in the Soviet Union.

ARBEITSVERFASSUNG UND ERTRAGSVERTEILUNG IN DER RUSSISCHEN KOLLEKTIVWIRTSCHAFT. By Horst E. Mentzel. Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt, 1935, 116 p. M. 4.50.
An account of the collective farm system, by a German agricultural expert.

T. G. MASARYK. By Ivan Herben and Josef Mach. Prague: Orbis, 1935, 100 p. Kč. 15.50.
The German translation of one of the best brief biographies of the former president.

VAVŘÍN SPRAVEDLIVÉMU SVĚT O T. G. MASARYKOVI. Edited by Josef Fischer. Prague: Orbis, 1936, 333 p. Kč. 38.
Essays and articles on Masaryk published throughout the world in 1935.

MOJE AMERIKA. By Tomáš Čapek. Prague: Borový, 1935, 272 p. Kč. 48.
Memoirs of a well-known Czech-American historian who worked actively for the Czech cause during the war.

PODKARPATSKÁ RUS A ČESKOSLOVENSKO. By Kamil Krofta. Prague: Svaz Národního Osvobození, 1936, 62 p. Kč. 4.
A sketch of Ruthenian history, by a Czechoslovak historian, now foreign minister.

DIE TESCHENER FRAGE. By K. Witt. Berlin: Volk und Reich, 1935, 291 p. M. 4.
An historical analysis of a problem of Czech-Polish relations in the years 1918–1920.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

ENGLAND, 1870–1914. By R. C. K. Ensor. New York: Oxford University Press, 1936, 634 p. $6.00.
One of the volumes in the "Oxford History of England" and probably the best treatment of the period now available. The author does not restrict himself to the political scene, but considers economic and social matters and intellectual and artistic currents. The book is distinguished by breadth of view and detachment.

DIE WELTMACHT GROSSBRITANNIEN. By Nikolai Golowin. Berlin: Siegesmund, 1936, 151 p. M. 6.
A very competent reconsideration, by a Russian general, of the basic problems of British foreign policy and imperial defense.

LES NATIONS ANGLO-SAXONS ET LA PAIX. By Charles D. Hérisson. Paris: Sirey, 1936, 204 p. Fr. 20.
The volume tries to analyze English and American pacifism and ideology in foreign relations, especially touching France.

PROBLÈMES BRITANNIQUES. Paris: Alcan, 1936, 240 p. Fr. 12.
Lectures by various outstanding writers, delivered at the École des Sciences Politiques.

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SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN BRITAIN. By H. M. Lee and E. Archbold. London: Social Democratic Federation, 1936, 7/6.

A history of the socialist movement in the last fifty years.

WAR FINANCE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES. By F. Fairer Smith. London: Faber, 1936, 320 p. 12/6.

A critical, though not particularly novel examination of the taxing and borrowing problems, the gold standard, etc.

RUFUS ISAACS, FIRST MARQUESS OF READING. By Stanley Jackson. London: Cassell, 1936, 312 p. 12/6.

An excellent biography of the jurist and statesman.

GENERAL SMUTS. By Sarah G. Millin. Boston: Little, Brown, 1936, 366 p. $3.50.

This first volume of the authorized biography of General Smuts covers the period to 1917. It is well written, if not always balanced, and gives a vivid picture of the famous soldier's career in the Boer War and in Africa during the World War.

MODERN IRELAND. By Cicely Hamilton. Toronto: Dent, 1936, 239 p. $2.50.

A sketch of Ireland, quite up to the standard of the travel books written by the same author about many other European countries.

IRELAND. By J. Chartres Molony. London: Arrowsmith, 1936, 223 p. 5/.

A fine, impartial review of Irish history in the period since 1900.

ROGER CASEMENT. By Geoffrey Parmiter. London: Barker, 1936, 392 p. 15/.

A straightforward, impartial biography of a tragic figure.

PRESS, POLITICS AND PEOPLE. By A. H. U. Colquhoun. Toronto: Macmillan, 1936, 306 p. $5.00.

The Life and Letters of Sir John Willison, a well-known Canadian editor and for many years Canadian correspondent of the London *Times*. An invaluable picture of Canadian politics and affairs in the last generation.

CANADIAN-AMERICAN INDUSTRY. By Herbert Marshall, Frank Southard, and Kenneth Taylor. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1936, 361 p. $3.00.

This is the first of a series of studies in Canadian-American relations. It constitutes a pioneer attempt to chart the course of migration of capital between the two countries.

THE COLONIZATION OF WESTERN CANADA. By Robert England. London: King, 1936, 341 p. 15/.

Another interesting volume, on the history of the northwestern frontier since about 1896 and analyzing the foreign colonies that have played so large a rôle there.

GROUP SETTLEMENT. ETHNIC COMMUNITIES IN WESTERN CANADA. By C. A. Dawson. Toronto: Macmillan, 1936, 395 p. $4.50.

A volume in the important series "Canadian Frontiers of Settlement." It deals scientifically and in detail with the colonies of Doukhobors, Mennonites, Mormons, German Catholics and French Canadians.

TRENDS IN AUSTRALIAN POLITICS. By W. G. K. Duncan. London: Australian Book Company, 1935, 263 p. 5/.

Papers by various authorities, read before the Australian Institute of Political Science.

A FOREIGNER LOOKS AT AUSTRALIA. By Paul Staal. London: Cape, 1936, 237 p. 7/6.

An historical account of Australia's development and present problems, by a Dutch consular officer who has already written an admirable study of modern India.

A HISTORY OF INDIA FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE PRESENT DAY. By Sir George Dunbar. London: Nicholson, 1936, 653 p. 12/6.

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A beautifully illustrated history of the Indian people, useful as an introduction, but adding little to previous accounts.

A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF INDIA, 1600-1935. By Sir Arthur Berriedale Keith. London: Methuen, 1936, 536 p. 15/.

The work of an outstanding authority, with a critical discussion of postwar reforms.

THE MAKING OF FEDERAL INDIA. By N. Gangulee. London: Nisbet, 1936, 367 p. 12/6.

Another good book on the same subject, by a moderate nationalist not uncritical of the Indian viewpoint, who examines in some detail the period from 1911 to 1935.

The Near East

UMBRUCH IM MORGENLAND. By G. Stratil-Sauer. Leipzig: Lindner, 1935, 128 p. M. 2.60.

The author deals chiefly with the revolution in communications in the Near East during the past decade.

REVOLUTIONARY TURKEY. By H. M. Evrenol. London: Luzac, 1936, 146 p. 5/6.

A general survey of postwar developments.

LA TURQUIE D'ATATÜRK. By Marguerite Bourgoin. Paris: Rey, 1936, Fr. 12.

Another general sketch.

GOVERNING PALESTINE. By J. M. Machover. London: King, 1936, 297 p. 10/.

A thorough presentation of the Jewish case against the establishment of a Legislative Council, in which the Jews would obviously be outvoted by the Arabs.

PALESTINE ÉCONOMIQUE, 1936. Paris: Cahiers Juifs, 1936, Fr. 25.

A complete survey of the resources and economic problems of Palestine.

PALESTINAS AUSSENHANDEL IN GRAPHISCHER DARSTELLUNG. By S. Zuckermann. Berlin: Zuckermanns Graphischer Wirtschaftsdienst, 1935, 30 p. M. 10.

A graphic presentation of Palestinian trade and industry since 1923.

A PALADIN OF ARABIA. By N. N. E. Bray. London: Unicorn Press, 1936, 445 p. 12/6.

An admirable biographical account of the English officer-explorer, Colonel Leachman, who played a large rôle during the war in Mesopotamia and Arabia.

REZA SHAH. By Essad Bey. Vienna: Passer, 1936, 250 p. M. 5.

A rather over-dramatized biography of the Persian reform ruler.

Africa

THE RAPE OF AFRICA. By Lamar Middleton. New York: Random House, 1936, 331 p. $3.00.

A timely book narrating the unedifying course of imperialism in Africa since the middle of the last century and pointing out some of the disastrous consequences of European rule and exploitation.

THE SEETHING AFRICAN POT. By Daniel Thwaite. London: Constable, 1936, 256 p. 7/6.

A pioneer effort to plot the course of the movement of negro nationalism in Africa and America since about 1882 — a movement of which doubtless more is to be heard.

CONSIDER AFRICA. By Basil J. Mathews. New York: Friendship Press, 1936, 187 p. 60¢.

A missionary survey.

LA QUESTION ALGÉRIENNE. By N. d'Orient and M. Loew. Paris: Bureau d'Éditions, 1936, 248 p. Fr. 10.

A general historical and analytical survey of French rule during the past century.

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LA FIN DES FRANÇAIS EN AFRIQUE NOIRE. By Jean Paillard. Paris: Oeuvres Françaises, 1936, Fr. 10.

Primarily a sensational account of the Levantine invasion of the French domain.

THE LEAGUE AND ABYSSINIA. By Leonard Woolf. London: Hogarth, 1936, 35 p. 1/.

Just a pamphlet, but an able radical presentation of the importance of the League in the crisis.

ETHIOPIAN REALITIES. By Major Polson Newman. London: Allen and Unwin, 1936, 134 p. 3/6.

The situation as seen by a very pro-Italian writer after a visit in October 1935.

JOHN HOY OF ETHIOPIA. By Robinson MacLean. New York: Farrar, 1936, 279 p. $2.50.

The Emperor and the country seen by a Canadian journalist covering the war.

FIASCO IN ETHIOPIA. By Wynant Hubbard. New York: Harper, 1936, 391 p. $2.75.

The experiences of a correspondent, having little to do with the operations in the field but much with life in Addis Ababa.

LAKE TANA AND THE BLUE NILE. By R. E. Cheesman. London: Macmillan, 1936, 400 p. 18/.

One of the most valuable of recent books on Ethiopia. The author, formerly British consul in western Ethiopia, discusses that whole area and its people and supplies the most authentic data available on the Tana region and the canyon of the Blue Nile.

L'ITALIA E L'ETIOPIA DA ASSAB A UALUAL. By L. Traversi. Bologna: Cappelli, 1935, 243 p. L. 12.

One of the best historical accounts of Italian policy in Ethiopia.

PAROLE AI COLONIALI. By Maurizio Rava. Milan: Mondadori, 1935, 396 p. L. 12.

A high Italian colonial official discusses the Ethiopian situation.

L'OPINION BRITANNIQUE, LA SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS ET LA GUERRE ITALO-ÉTHIOPIENNE. By Paul Vaucher and Paul-Henri Siriex. Paris: Hartmann, 1936, 98 p. Fr. 5.

Written by two Frenchmen educated in England, this is a most illuminating study of the movement of English opinion since 1934, with reference particularly to the curious revolution that made England the leader of the League.

LA FIN D'UNE FÉODALITÉ. By Henry de Monfreid. Paris: Grasset, 1936, 232 p. Fr. 15.

The author of several books on Ethiopia here reveals the "dessous" of the present crisis.

BLACK AND WHITE IN EAST AFRICA. By Richard C. Thurnwald. London: Routledge, 1935, 424 p. 21/.

A rather ponderous but nevertheless valuable study of the impact of western influences on the life of the Tanganyika natives.

UGANDA. By H. B. Thomas and R. Scott. New York: Oxford University Press, 1935, 559 p. $5.00.

An excellent semi-official handbook, beautifully illustrated.

KENYA, CONTRASTS AND PROBLEMS. By L. S. B. Leakey. London: Methuen, 1936, 205 p. 7/6.

The author, an anthropologist who has spent much of his life in Kenya, discusses current native problems, the administrative system, the agrarian situation, etc.

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NIGERIA. By W. R. Crocker. London: Allen and Unwin, 1936, 277 p. 10/6.

A severe criticism of British officialdom, which, according to the writer, is so bound up with red tape that it fails to react to urgent racial and other problems.

THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA. By M. H. de Kock. London: King, 1936, 143 p. 7/6.

A brief historical outline.

THE STORY OF RHODESIA. By T. G. Standing. London: Longmans, 1936, 2 v. 3/ each.

A popular account of the opening up of the country.

The Far East

JAPAN'S FOREIGN RELATIONS. By Roy Hidemichi Akagi. New York: G. E. Stechert Press, 1936, 560 p. $4.00.

A brief treatment of the period after 1542, followed by a much more detailed survey of Japanese policy since the opening of the country. The book is intended as a general text and has neither documentation nor bibliography. Within its limitations, however, it seems to be a competent account.

THE BASIS OF JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY. By Albert E. Hindmarsh. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936, 264 p. $2.50.

A thought-provoking study. The author begins with the thesis that Japan's recent foreign policy is at least in large part the reflection of a special domestic situation and that consequently the militarist influence is relatively unimportant. He therefore analyzes the crucial problem of population pressure and the possible remedies, after which he proceeds to an examination of industrialization and trade expansion and their repercussions. There is an extended bibliography and much statistical material.

DIPLOMATIC COMMENTARIES. By Viscount Kikujiro Ishii. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1936, 375 p. $3.25.

These memoirs and reflections of an eminent Japanese diplomat appeared some years ago. Their translation into English is decidedly welcome.

JAPAN'S PLACE IN THE MODERN WORLD. By Ernest H. Pickering. London: Harrap, 1936, 326 p. 10/6.

A sympathetic picture, by a man who taught school for years in Japan.

WHEN JAPAN GOES TO WAR. By O. Tanin and E. Yohan. New York: Vanguard, 1936, 271 p. $3.00.

The authors of "Militarism and Fascism in Japan" investigate Japan's capacity for war. The militarists want it; but the writers conclude that Japan is not yet ready for extended operations against a major Power and that a conflict might well result in the collapse of the social and economic structure.

JAPAN MUST FIGHT BRITAIN. By Tota Ishimaru. New York: Telegraph Press, 1936, 329 p. $3.00.

The author is a Japanese naval officer writing for his own people. As he sees it, the British drafted the Japanese to fight Russia and manœuvred the French and Russians into war with Germany in order to get rid of a dangerous rival. The Anglo-German situation before the Great War is now repeated in the Anglo-Japanese situation. Unless England is willing to give up her position in the Pacific, Japan will simply have to fight her. But the struggle will be as much a diplomatic as a military one, and it behooves the Japanese to leave their foreign office a fairly free hand to deal with the situation, and to avoid interference by the military. The author concludes that when war comes the Japanese will be victorious, for England is too deeply involved in other parts of the world to be able to mobilize her power effectively.

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TOGO AND THE RISE OF JAPANESE SEA POWER. By Edwin A. Falk. New York: Longmans, 1936, 508 p. $4.00.

A study of the career of the great Japanese naval hero, and at the same time an important contribution to the history of Japanese sea power.

CHINAS GEIST UND KRAFT. By P. F. Tao. Breslau: Priebatsch, 1935, 250 p. M. 5.

A nationalist interpretation of Chinese history and culture, designed as a corrective to current ideas of her weakness.

FACING LABOUR ISSUES IN CHINA. By Chuan-Hua Lowe. London: Allen and Unwin, 1935, 211 p. 7/6.

A discussion of a basic problem, by one thoroughly conversant with it.

THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE PHILIPPINES. By George A. Malcolm. New York: Appleton-Century, 1936, 511 p. $5.00.

A comprehensive survey of the new Commonwealth, by the former chief justice of the Philippine Supreme Court. The book is especially valuable for the treatment of the new constitutional system, but it covers also most other phases of Philippine life.

Latin America

HISTOIRE DE L'AMÉRIQUE ESPAGNOLE. By Hugo D. Barbagelata. Paris: Colin, 1936, 323 p. Fr. 28.

An attractive all-round history, published under the direction of the Institut des Études Américaines.

LA POLITICA DEMOGRAFICA DE MEXICO. By Gilberto Loyo. Mexico City: Secretaria de Prensa, 1935, 485 p.

A scientific study, packed with valuable information.

THE CARIBBEAN SINCE 1900. By Chester L. Jones. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1936, 522 p. $5.00.

An excellent general treatment of the history and problems of the islands and Central America. The book is lavishly documented and contains an extended bibliography. As a digest of the best modern knowledge it should be of interest to all students of American foreign affairs.

WARNING FROM THE WEST INDIES. By W. M. Macmillan. London: Faber, 1936, 213 p. 8/6.

A careful, critical account of problems and policies, by a distinguished writer on African affairs who is concerned largely with the status of the black population.

FROM A COLONIAL GOVERNOR'S NOTE-BOOK. By Sir Reginald St. Johnston. London: Hutchinson, 1936, 288 p. 12/6.

Comments based on a long official experience in Britain's West Indian possessions.

HIS MAJESTY THE PRESIDENT OF BRAZIL. By Ernest Hambloch. New York: Dutton, 1936, 261 p. $3.00.

A study of the presidential régime, particularly in Brazil, with special reference to social and economic problems.

DIE POLITIK BRASILIENS WÄHREND DES WELTKRIEGES. By Georg Königk. Hamburg: Christians, 1935, 66 p. M. 2.10.

A doctoral dissertation, based primarily on Brazilian documents.

DER GRAN CHACO UND SEINE RANDGEBIETE. By H. Kanter. Berlin: De Gruyter, 1936, 376 p. M. 18.

A beautifully illustrated record of travel in the region in the years 1930–1931.

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By Denys P. Myers

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Documents may be procured from the following: *United States:* Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D. C. *Great Britain:* British Library of Information, 270 Madison Ave., New York. *France:* Gerda M. Anderson, 12 Ave. Ernest Reyer, Paris XIVe. *League of Nations, Int. Labor Office, Perm. Court of Int. Justice* and *Int. Institute of Agriculture:* World Peace Foundation, 40 Mt. Vernon St., Boston. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office and London imprints are His Majesty's Stationery Office, unless otherwise noted. Since 1928 a list of Government documents has been printed in the *Monthly List of Books Catalogued in the Library of the League of Nations.*

ADULT EDUCATION

RECREATION and Education. Reports presented to the International Conference on Workers' Spare Time, Brussels, 15–17, June 1935. Geneva, 1936. viii, 151 p. 24 cm. (International Labor Office, Studies and Reports, Series G, No. 4.) $1.00.

CHINA

CO-OPERATION between the Organisation for Communications and Transit of the League of Nations and the National Government of China. Report by the Committee of Experts on Hydraulic and Road Questions in China. Geneva, 1936. 213 p. 27 cm. (League of Nations, C.91.M. 34.1936.VIII.4.)

ANNEXES to the Report to the Council of the League of Nations of its Technical Delegate on His Mission in China from Date of Appointment until April 1, 1934. Shanghai, North China Daily News & Herald, Ltd., 1934. 294 p. incl. tables. 26 cm.

THE CHINA FOUNDATION for the Promotion of Education and Culture. Tenth Report. Peiping [Printed by the San Yu Press] 1935. 68 p., tables. 22½ cm.

COMMERCIAL CONFERENCE, PAN AMERICAN

REPORT of the Delegates of the United States of America to the Pan American Commercial Conference Held at Buenos Aires, Argentina, May 26–June 19, 1935. Washington, 1936. v, 164 p. 23 cm. (Department of State, Conference Series No. 22.) 15 cents.

COURT OF ARBITRATION, PERMANENT

RAPPORT du Conseil administratif de la Cour Permanente d'Arbitrage sur les travaux de la Cour, sur le fonctionnement des services administratifs et sur les dépenses pendant l'exercice 1935. Trente-cinquième Année. La Haye, Bureau International de la Cour Permanente d'Arbitrage, 1936. 39 p. 33½ cm.

COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, PERMANENT

ACTS relating to the Constitution of the Permanent Court of International Justice. [Geneva, 1936] 42 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C.80.M.28.1936.V.1.)

Contains Statute in revised form as it entered into force February 1, 1936.

CONSISTENCY of Certain Danzig Legislative Decrees with the Constitution of the Free City. Permanent Court of International Justice XXXVth Session. Advisory Opinion of December 4, 1935. Leyden, 1936. 303 p. 24½ cm. (Series C, No. 77.)

ETHIOPIAN-ITALIAN WAR

Conciliation

REPORT to the Council by the Committee of Thirteen. Geneva 1936. (C.176.M.112.1936.VII. Dated April 18, 1936.)

This report deals with the efforts to establish negotiations and the very numerous allegations of the commission of atrocities made by the parties.

The situation created by the Italian military occupation of Addis Ababa was considered by the Council at its session beginning May 11.

National Publications

DISPUTE between Ethiopia and Italy. Documents and Proceedings of the League of Nations, October 7, 1935, to January 22, 1936. London, 1936. 67 p. 24½ cm. (Ethiopia No. 1 (1936) Cmd. 5071.) 1s. 0d.

——— CORRESPONDENCE in connexion with the application of Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, January 1936. 11 p. 24½ cm. (Ethiopia No. 2 (1936) Cmd. 5072.) 2d.

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DOCUMENTS Relating to the Italo-Ethiopian Conflict. Published by authority of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Canada. Ottawa, J. O. Patenaude, 1936. 182 p. 24½ cm. 50 cents.

Oil Traffic

DISPUTE between Ethiopia and Italy. Co-ordination of Measures under Article 16 of the Covenant. Co-ordination Committee. Report of the Committee of Experts for the Technical Examination of the Conditions governing the Trade in and Transport of Petroleum and its Derivatives, By-Products and Residues. Geneva, 1936. 24 p. 33 cm. (Co-ordination Committee 113. 1936. Gen. 1.) Reprinted as:

DISPUTE between Ethiopia and Italy. Co-ordination of Measures under Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Report of the Committee of Experts regarding Petroleum and its Derivatives, By-products and Residues. Geneva, February 12, 1936. London, 1936. 38 p. 24½ cm. (Ethiopia No. 3 (1936) Cmd. 5094.) 9d.

Sanctions

DISPUTE between Ethiopia and Italy. Co-ordination of Measures under Article 16 of the Covenant. Co-ordination Committee. Committee of Eighteen and Sub-Committees. Minutes of the Second Session, October 31–November 6, 1935. Geneva, 1936. 83 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, Official Journal Special Supplement No. 146.)

——— I. COMMITTEE of Eighteen. Minutes of the Third Session, December 12 to 19, 1935. II. Committee of Experts (appointed under the Terms of the Resolution adopted by the Committee of Eighteen on November 6, 1935). Minutes of the First Session, November 27 to December 12, 1935. Geneva, 1936. 62 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, Official Journal Special Supplement No. 147.)

——— CO-ORDINATION Committee. Statistics of the Trade with Italy and the Italian Colonies for the period November 1935–January 1936 and the Corresponding Period of the Preceding Year. Geneva, 1936. 33 cm. (League of Nations, Co-ordination Committee 116.)

INDIGENT FOREIGNERS

COMMITTEE of Experts on Assistance to Indigent Foreigners and the Execution of Maintenance Obligations Abroad. Report to the Council on the Work of the Second Session, from January 27 to February 1, 1936. Geneva, 1936. 7 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C.94.M.37.1936. IV.2.)

INTELLECTUAL COÖPERATION

LA FORMATION de l'Homme Moderne. J. Destrée, K. Čapek [et al.] Paris [1936] 227 p. 22 cm. (Entretiens.)

HOLIDAY Courses in Europe 1936. Paris, 1936. iv, 68, v–viii p. 24 cm.

HANDBOOK of National Centres of Educational Information. Supplement. Paris, 1935. 31, 31 p. 21½ cm. (In French and English.)

MUSÉOGRAPHIE. Architecture et Aménagement des Musées d'Art. Conférence Internationale d'Études Madrid 1934. [Paris, 1935] 2 vols. diagrs. photos. 28 cm.

INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION

INTERNATIONAL Labour Conference. Nineteenth Session, Geneva, 1935. Record of Proceedings. Geneva, 1935. xxxv, 1015 p. 31½ cm.

INTERNATIONAL Labour Conference, Twentieth Session to be held in June 1936. Replies of H. M. Government to the Questionnaires on the Subject of the Reduction of Hours of Work in Certain Industries. London, 1936. 17 p. 24½ cm. (Cmd. 5113.) 3d.

MINUTES of the Seventieth Session of the Governing Body, Geneva, April 11–13, 1935. Geneva [1935] 106 p. 31½ cm.

MINUTES of the Seventy-First and Seventy-Second Sessions of the Governing Body, Geneva, May 31–June 1, 1935, and June 21, 1935. Geneva [1935] 45 p. 31½ cm.

PREPARATORY Maritime Meeting. Geneva, November–December 1935. Report and Record of the Meeting. Geneva, 1936. ix, 274 p. 23½ cm.

MANCHUKUO

GENERAL SURVEY of Conditions in Manchoukuo. With Special Emphasis on Economic Developments. Revised Edition. Hsinking, Department of Foreign Affairs, Manchoukuo Government, 1935. 57 p. incl. tables. 22 cm.

MANCHOUKUO *Illustrated.* [Hsinking, Bureau of Information and Publicity, Department of Foreign Affairs, 1935] 25½ cm.

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MANDATORY REPORTS

ANNUAL REPORT to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of the South Sea Islands under Japanese Mandate for the year 1934. [Hibiya, Tokyo, The Herald Press] Japanese Government. v, 100 p. maps, tables. 26 cm.

LAWS AND REGULATIONS. The South Sea Islands Under Japanese Mandate. [Hibiya, Tokyo, The Herald Press] Japanese Government. iv, 260 p. 26½ cm. (Annex to the Annual Report for the Year 1934.)

RAPPORT Annuel adressé par le Gouvernement Français au Conseil de la Société des Nations, conformément à l'article 22 du Pacte sur l'Administration sous mandat du territoire du CAMEROUN pour l'année 1934. Paris, Imprimerie Générale Lahure, 1935. 240 p. 31½ cm.

RAPPORT Annuel adressé par le Gouvernement Français au Conseil de la Société des Nations, conformément à l'article 22 du Pacte sur l'Administration sous mandat du territoire du TOGO pour l'année 1934. Paris, Imprimerie Générale Lahure, 1935. 175 p. 31½ cm.

RAPPORT présenté par le Gouvernement Belge au Conseil de la Société des Nations au sujet de l'Administration du RUANDA-URUNDI pendant l'année 1934. Bruxelles, Établissements Généraux d'Imprimerie, 1935. 283 p. map. 31½ cm.

MARITIME TONNAGE MEASUREMENT

ORGANISATION for Communications and Transit. Maritime Tonnage Measurement. Report to the Advisory and Technical Committee for Communications and Transit by the Chairman and the Rapporteur of the Technical Committee for Maritime Tonnage Measurement on the Replies received from the Governments to the Circular Letter forwarding the Results of the Technical Committee's Work. Geneva, 1934. 22, 6, 23 p. incl. tables, diagr. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C. 4. M. 4. 1936. VIII. 1.)

——— Annex I. Geneva, 1934. 29 p. incl. diagrs. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C. 4. M. 4. 1936. VIII. Annex 1. 1936. VIII. 2.)

The rules of 1934 are regarded as agreed standards to which governments are gradually making their national practices conform to the extent possible.

MIGRATION

The MIGRATION of Workers, Recruitment, Placing and Conditions of Labour. Geneva, 1936. iv, 205 p. 24 cm. (International Labor Office, Studies and Reports, Series O, No. 5.)

The RURAL EXODUS in Czechoslovakia. Results of Investigations made by Dr. H. Böker and F. W. von Bülow. Geneva, 1935. iv, 170 p. 24 cm. (International Labor Office, Studies and Reports, Series K, No. 13.) $1.25.

NAVAL ARMAMENT

TREATY between His Majesty in respect of the United Kingdom, Canada, Commonwealth of Australia, New Zealand and India, the President of the United States of America and the President of the French Republic for the Limitation of Naval Armament, London, March 25, 1936. London, 1936. 43 p. 24½ cm. (Miscellaneous No. 1 (1936) Cmd. 5136.) 9d.

Cabled text in Department of State, Press Releases, XIV, 264.

MEMORANDUM on the London Naval Conference, December 9, 1935, to March 25, 1936. London, 1936. 8 p. 24½ cm. (Miscellaneous No. 2 (1936) Cmd. 5137.) 2d.

NAVY ESTIMATES 1936. Presented by Command of His Majesty. Ordered by The House of Commons to be Printed February 19, 1936. London, 1936. 471 p. 24½ cm. (Sessional Papers 46.) 7s.

STATEMENT of the First Lord of the Admiralty Explanatory of the Navy Estimates 1936. London, 1936. 19 p. 24½ cm. (Cmd. 5105.) 4d.

NEUTRALITY

NEUTRALITY. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate Seventy-Fourth Congress, Second Session on S.3474 . . . January 10 to February 5, 1936. Washington, 1936. iii, 302 p. 23 cm.

POLICY of the United States Toward Maritime Commerce in War. Prepared by Carlton Savage, Division of Research and Publication. Volume II, 1914–1918, With Documents. Washington, 1936. xxii, 896 p. 23½ cm. (The Department of State, Publication No. 835.) $1.75.

PALESTINE

PROPOSED New Constitution for Palestine. London, 1936. 8 p. 24½ cm. (Cmd. 5119.) 2d.

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

COMPILATION of Documents Relating to the Inauguration of the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Communication from the President of the United States transmit-

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ting a compilation of documents relating to the inauguration of the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Washington, 1936. vii, 76 p. 23 cm. (H. Doc. No. 400, 74th Cong., 2d Sess.)

RHINELAND GUARANTY

MEMORANDUM by the German Government respecting the Franco-Soviet Treaty, the Treaty of Locarno and the Demilitarised Zone in the Rhineland. Communicated to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs by the German Ambassador on March 7, 1936. London, 1936. 6 p. 24½ cm. (Germany No. 1 (1936) Cmd. 5118.) 1d.

TEXT OF PROPOSALS drawn up by the Representatives of Belgium, France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Italy, London, March 19, 1936. London, 1936. 7 p. 24½ cm. (Germany No. 2 (1936) Cmd. 5134.) 2d.

CORRESPONDENCE with the Belgian and French Ambassadors relating to "Text of Proposals . . . London, March 19, 1936. Cmd. 5134" London, April 1, 1936. London, 1936. 6 p. 24½ cm. (Miscellaneous No. 4 (1936). Cmd. 5149.) 1d.

CORRESPONDENCE showing the Course of Certain Diplomatic Discussions directed towards securing an European Settlement, June 1934 to March 1936. London, 1936. 88 p. 24½ cm. (Miscellaneous No. 3 (1936). Cmd. 5143.) 1s. 6d.

MINUTES of the Ninety-First (Extraordinary) Session of the Council, Held at London from Monday, March 16, to Tuesday, March 24, 1926. (League of Nations, Official Journal, 1936.)

ROAD TRAFFIC

ADVISORY and Technical Committee for Communications and Transit. Permanent Committee on Road Traffic. REPORT on the Tenth Session of the Committee held at Geneva from November 1 to 5, 1935. Geneva, 1935. 73 p. 30 cm. (League of Nations, C. 468. M. 246. 1935. VIII. 1936. VIII. 3.)

ORGANISATION for Communications and Transit. SIGNALS at Level Crossings. Report of the Special Committee. Adopted by the Advisory and Technical Committee for Communications and Transit (Nineteenth Session, November 1935). Geneva, 1935. 4 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C. L. 46. 1936. VIII. Annex. 1936. VIII. 5.)

SOCIAL SERVICE

INTERNATIONAL Survey of Social Services 1933. Volume I. Geneva, 1936. xv, 710 p. 24 cm. (International Labor Office, Studies and Reports, Series M, No. 13.) $4.00.

PROBLEMS of Vocational Guidance. Geneva, 1935. iv, 183 p. 24 cm. (International Labor Office, Studies and Reports, Series J, No. 4.) $1.25.

STRAITS COMMISSION

RAPPORT de la Commission des Détroits à la Société des Nations année 1935. Istanbul, Imprimerie Française L. Mourkidès, 1936. 122 [2] p. incl. maps, tables. 24 cm.

The Turkish Government on April 10, 1936, proposed negotiations for modification of the régime of the Straits, League of Nations, C. 154. M. 92. 1936. VII.

TERRORISM

COMMITTEE for the International Repression of Terrorism. Report to the Council adopted by the Committee on January 15, 1936. Report adopted by the Council on January 23, 1936. Geneva, 1936. 16 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, A. 7. 1936. V. 2.)

Contains draft conventions on the repression of terrorism and on an international criminal tribunal.

TOURIST TRAFFIC

ECONOMIC Committee. Survey of Tourist Traffic considered as an International Economic Factor. Geneva, 1936. 47 p. incl. graphs. 27 cm. (League of Nations, C. 3. M. 3. 1936. II. B. 1.)

UNITED STATES — FOREIGN RELATIONS

PAPERS Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1920 (In Three Volumes). Washington, 1935–36. 23½ cm. (The Department of State, Publication Nos. 809, 814, 816.) $1.75 each (cloth).

As full a publication of the year's papers as the courtesies due to other governments permitted.

AMERICAN Delegations to International Conferences, Congresses and Expositions and American Representation on International Institutions and Commissions, with relevant data. Fiscal year ended June 30, 1935. Compiled in the Division of Protocol and Conferences. Washington, 1936. 133 p. 23 cm. (Department of State, Conference Series No. 23.) 15 cents.

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